In this paper study the effect of simmetry on workers' aggregate output and inequality. In particular, we adopt a version with heterogeneous jobs of the model by Calvò-Armengol and Jackson (2007), in which exogenous social networks facilitate the transmission of information on job vacancies among workers. We find that: a) symmetric networks produce higher output and lower inequality than asymmetric networks and, b) the introduction of social links, having the function of ``structural holes'' (see Burt, 1992), has a larger positive effect on output and inequality if they are associated with symmetric networks.
LAVEZZI, A.M., MECCHERI, N. (2007). A Note on Simmetry in Job Contact Networks. In Artificial Markets Modeling (pp. 157-169). Springer.
A Note on Simmetry in Job Contact Networks
-
2007-01-01
Abstract
In this paper study the effect of simmetry on workers' aggregate output and inequality. In particular, we adopt a version with heterogeneous jobs of the model by Calvò-Armengol and Jackson (2007), in which exogenous social networks facilitate the transmission of information on job vacancies among workers. We find that: a) symmetric networks produce higher output and lower inequality than asymmetric networks and, b) the introduction of social links, having the function of ``structural holes'' (see Burt, 1992), has a larger positive effect on output and inequality if they are associated with symmetric networks.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Lavezzi A note.pdf
Solo gestori archvio
Dimensione
832.59 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
832.59 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.