We consider repeated coalitional TU games characterized by unknown but bounded and time-varying coalitions' values. We build upon the assumption that the Game Designer uses a vague measure of the extra reward that each coalition has received up to the current time to learn on how to re-adjust the allocations among the players. As main result, we present an allocation rule based on the extra reward variable that converges with probability one to the core of the long-run average game. Analogies with stochastic stability theory are put in evidence.
Bauso, D., Reddy, P.V. (2011). Learning for allocations in the long-run average core of dynamical cooperative TU games. In Proc. of the 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2010 [10.1109/ALLERTON.2010.5707043].
Learning for allocations in the long-run average core of dynamical cooperative TU games
BAUSO, Dario;
2011-01-01
Abstract
We consider repeated coalitional TU games characterized by unknown but bounded and time-varying coalitions' values. We build upon the assumption that the Game Designer uses a vague measure of the extra reward that each coalition has received up to the current time to learn on how to re-adjust the allocations among the players. As main result, we present an allocation rule based on the extra reward variable that converges with probability one to the core of the long-run average game. Analogies with stochastic stability theory are put in evidence.
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