Blockchain in the Agri-Food Supply Chain: A Game-Theoretical Approach for a Strategic Solution to Information Asymmetry

The increasing complexity of global agri‑food supply chains has exacerbated the issue of information asym metry, undermining trust among stakeholders and compromising transparency in production processes. In such a fragmented and opaque ecosystem, the ability to access reliable, veri iable information becomes not just a compet itive advantage but a necessity for the sustainability, accountability, and resilience of the entire agri‑food supply chain. This study explores the potential of blockchain technology as a strategic tool to mitigate such asymmetries by developing a formal model grounded in evolutionary game theory. The model simulates the strategic interac tions between supply chain actors, speci ically, the choice to cooperate by sharing truthful information or to defect by concealing or falsifying it, within a blockchain‑enabled environment. By employing a two‑strategy replicator dynamic, theresearchidenti ies the conditions under whichcooperationbecomesanevolutionarilystable strategy. The indings suggest that the introduction of blockchain, combined with targeted incentives and credible penal ties, signi icantly increases the likelihood of cooperative behavior. Simulations reveal that the implementation of blockchain, when combined with appropriate incentive and penalty mechanisms, signi icantly reduces tendencies towarddataconcealmentorfalsi ication. The indingsalsohighlightthepivotalroleofblockchaininfosteringinter organizational trust, enhancing traceability, and promoting sustainable practices throughout the value chain. The paperconcludeswithpractical implicationsand policyrecommendationsaimed atsupportingthe digital transition and strengthening the resilience of the agri‑food sector.