Blockchain in the Agri-Food Supply Chain: A Game-Theoretical Approach for a Strategic Solution to Information Asymmetry

The increasing complexity of global agri‑food supply chains has exacerbated the issue of information asymmetry, undermining trust among stakeholders and compromising transparency in production processes. In such a fragmented and opaque ecosystem, the ability to access reliable, veri􀏐iable information becomes not just a competitive advantage but a necessity for the sustainability, accountability, and resilience of the entire agri‑food supply chain. This study explores the potential of blockchain technology as a strategic tool to mitigate such asymmetries by developing a formal model grounded in evolutionary game theory. The model simulates the strategic interactions between supply chain actors, speci􀏐ically, the choice to cooperate by sharing truthful information or to defect by concealing or falsifying it, within a blockchain‑enabled environment. By employing a two‑strategy replicator dynamic, the research identi􀏐ies the conditions under which cooperation becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy. The 􀏐indings suggest that the introduction of blockchain, combined with targeted incentives and credible penalties, signi􀏐icantly increases the likelihood of cooperative behavior. Simulations reveal that the implementation of blockchain, when combined with appropriate incentive and penalty mechanisms, signi􀏐icantly reduces tendencies toward data concealment or falsi􀏐ication. The 􀏐indings also highlight the pivotal role of blockchain in fostering interorganizational trust, enhancing traceability, and promoting sustainable practices throughout the value chain. The paper concludes with practical implications and policy recommendations aimed at supporting the digital transition and strengthening the resilience of the agri‑food sector.