We study an n-player averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in two distinct application domains: i) coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) and ii) opinion propagation. We study conditions under which the average allocations achieve robust consensus to some predened target set.
Bauso, D., Cannon, M., Fleming. J (2014). Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games. In Proceedings of IFAC World Congress.
Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games
BAUSO, Dario
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2014-01-01
Abstract
We study an n-player averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in two distinct application domains: i) coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) and ii) opinion propagation. We study conditions under which the average allocations achieve robust consensus to some predened target set.
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