Social Ontology, Collective Intentionality, and Mindreading

Standard 
accounts 
of 
social 
reality 
take
collective
 intentionality 
as 
the starting 
point
 of
 the
 creation
 and
 maintenance
 of
 social
 facts.
 But 
collective intentionality 
is 
enabled, 
as
Searle
 suggests,
by
 a 
more 
basic
 capacity 
to 
understand 
another 
person
 as 
an 
agent
like 
oneself
 and
 as 
ready 
to 
engage 
in 
cooperative 
activities.
 We 
can 
coordinate 
our 
collective 
actions
 only
 insofar
 we
 are
 able
 to
 explain
 and
 predict
 the
 behavior
 of
 other
 persons,
 we
 can
 understand 
behavior 
only 
insofar
 we 
can
mindread
 them,
and 
we 
can 
mindread 
them
only
 if
 we
 assume
 the
 constitutive
 role
 of
 rationality
 in
 action.
 Therefore
 collective
 intentionality
 requires
 mindreading,
 and
 mindreading
 requires
 that
 we
 assume
 the
 rationality
 of 
the 
agent.

 Contemporary
 debate
 on
 mindreading, however,
 excludes
 rationality
 as
 a
 viable
 option
 to 
account
 for mindreading.
 Does
 this
 point 
undermine 
our 
account 
of collective
 intentionality?
 We
 argue
 that,
 mostly 
when 
we 
fail 
in
mindreading 
tasks,
we
 make
 a 
rational
effort
 of
 adjusting
 our misinterpretation.
 This
 entails
 balancing
 two
 factors:
 a)
 general
 theoretical
 information
 about
 the
 target
 and
 simulative
 strategies;
 b)
 normative
 considerations.
 Therefore
 we
 propose
 that
 rationality
 theory
 and
 hybrid
 theory
 of
 mindreading
 are
 not
 incompatible
 but
 should
 fruitfully
 interact.
 Moreover,
 the
 rational
 effort 
should 
also 
entail 
an 
attitude 
to
 individualize 
our 
prediction/explanation
by 
means
 of
 more 
and 
accurate
 information
 about 
the
 specific
 target 
we 
are 
mindreading. 
This 
kind
 of
 information
 is
 not
 only
 theoretical,
 representational
 and
 propositional
 but
 also
 practical,
 based
 on 
our 
local
 (cultural) 
and
 deep
 (biological)
Background 
knowledge
 that
 we
 have 
as 
embodied,
 embedded 
agents.