Libertà e necessità nell'inizio della "Scienza della Logica". Un confronto tra la prima e la seconda edizione

The beginning of Logic has a close relationship with the outcome of the Phenomenology, which Hegel summed up in a few lines in the chapter on the beginning of science: the ultimate foundation of phenomenological course is the free alienation of absolute knowledge, which makes itself something other while remaining in unity with itself. The paper shows the relation between the free self- alienation and the task of a “logical”, “immanent” beginning of the philosophy, and the relation binding logical necessity and freedom. The differences between the first and the second edition of the Hegelian work are used to show how the growth of attention paid to the free decision of the beginning, which is recorded in the transition from the first to the second edition, is not to be seen as intensification of subjective arbitrariness, but as freedom of the subject to “sacrifice” itself, i.e. to make itself a moment of the objective truth.