‘True’ and ‘False’ are defined through a linguistic rule requiring the negation operator. This is the elaboration of an idea proffered for the first time by the Stoics on the basis of some remarks by Aristotle and then in modern times by Frege and Wittgenstein. Another thesis of this essay is the following: the true/false rule is a sort of Ur-Regel underlying all linguistic practices (including prayers and commands) and all human cultures. Reinterpreting the notion of Spielraum put forward by Wittgenstein in 4.463 of the Tractatus, I will present an implicational pragmatic theory of a true proposition. Wit and reductio ad absurdum are explained as examples of Spielraum.
Lo Piparo, F. (2013). Truth, Negation and Meaning. In F.L.P. A. Capone (a cura di), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy (pp. 593-608). Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London : Springer [DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3].
Truth, Negation and Meaning
LO PIPARO, Francesco
2013-01-01
Abstract
‘True’ and ‘False’ are defined through a linguistic rule requiring the negation operator. This is the elaboration of an idea proffered for the first time by the Stoics on the basis of some remarks by Aristotle and then in modern times by Frege and Wittgenstein. Another thesis of this essay is the following: the true/false rule is a sort of Ur-Regel underlying all linguistic practices (including prayers and commands) and all human cultures. Reinterpreting the notion of Spielraum put forward by Wittgenstein in 4.463 of the Tractatus, I will present an implicational pragmatic theory of a true proposition. Wit and reductio ad absurdum are explained as examples of Spielraum.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
