In recent times, "luck egalitarianism" - the claim that neutralizing the effects of brute luck is the main aim of egalitarian justice - has been the object of serious criticism, both on normative and on metaphysical grounds. Objections of the first kind do indeed prove well-grounded. Luck egalitarianism misleadingly focuses on the distribution of resources; egalitarianism, though, should be understood as primarily concerned with social and political standing. It can be shown, however, that the core of luck egalitarian views - the argument from the "natural lottery" - can be dissociated from the project of a fully-fledged conception of equality; and that it does indeed provide a powerful, indispensable insight supporting egalitarianism. The argument from the natural lottery looks, however, vulnerable to serious metaphysical difficulties. Specifically, who is the Self to whom properties are attributed through the (metaphorical) natural lottery? Devising a suitable conception of the Self, capable of supporting the "natural lottery" insight, while in itself plausible, is no easy task.
CELANO B (2005). Luck egalitarianism, responsabilità e identità personale. TEORIA POLITICA, 21, 19-36.
Luck egalitarianism, responsabilità e identità personale
CELANO, Bruno
2005-01-01
Abstract
In recent times, "luck egalitarianism" - the claim that neutralizing the effects of brute luck is the main aim of egalitarian justice - has been the object of serious criticism, both on normative and on metaphysical grounds. Objections of the first kind do indeed prove well-grounded. Luck egalitarianism misleadingly focuses on the distribution of resources; egalitarianism, though, should be understood as primarily concerned with social and political standing. It can be shown, however, that the core of luck egalitarian views - the argument from the "natural lottery" - can be dissociated from the project of a fully-fledged conception of equality; and that it does indeed provide a powerful, indispensable insight supporting egalitarianism. The argument from the natural lottery looks, however, vulnerable to serious metaphysical difficulties. Specifically, who is the Self to whom properties are attributed through the (metaphorical) natural lottery? Devising a suitable conception of the Self, capable of supporting the "natural lottery" insight, while in itself plausible, is no easy task.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.