The competitive landscape where pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies operate has changed radically due to a scientific/technological progress that has revolutionised the process by which drugs are developed. In fact, pharmaceutical industry more and more relies on advances in biochemistry and molecular biology. As a consequence, the number of partnerships between pharmaceutical and biotech firms has grown significantly. Research contributions addressing the biopharmaceutical alliances design have also focused on the optimal timing to sign a partnership. In this paper, we introduce and analyse the effect of competition in biotechnology industry by modelling the decisions of whether and when ally with a pharmaceutical company through a real options game. We find that the timing decisions depend on the level of the competition, synergies obtained through the alliance and contract terms offered by the pharmaceutical company as well. Also, we show that the first mover might not always pre-empt the follower in partnering with the pharmaceutical company
Lo Nigro, G., Morreale, A., Robba, S., Roma, P. (2013). BIOPHARMACEUTICAL ALLIANCES AND COMPETITION: A REAL OPTIONS GAMES APPROACH. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT, 17(6) [10.1142/S1363919613400239].
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL ALLIANCES AND COMPETITION: A REAL OPTIONS GAMES APPROACH
LO NIGRO, Giovanna;MORREALE, Azzurra;ROBBA, Serena;ROMA, Paolo
2013-01-01
Abstract
The competitive landscape where pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies operate has changed radically due to a scientific/technological progress that has revolutionised the process by which drugs are developed. In fact, pharmaceutical industry more and more relies on advances in biochemistry and molecular biology. As a consequence, the number of partnerships between pharmaceutical and biotech firms has grown significantly. Research contributions addressing the biopharmaceutical alliances design have also focused on the optimal timing to sign a partnership. In this paper, we introduce and analyse the effect of competition in biotechnology industry by modelling the decisions of whether and when ally with a pharmaceutical company through a real options game. We find that the timing decisions depend on the level of the competition, synergies obtained through the alliance and contract terms offered by the pharmaceutical company as well. Also, we show that the first mover might not always pre-empt the follower in partnering with the pharmaceutical companyFile | Dimensione | Formato | |
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