La selezione dei giudici della Corte di giustizia. Poteri e limiti del comitato ex. art. 255 TFUE

Abstract The appointment of judges to supranational and international courts has long been an unstudied area of sovereign activity. However, the growing role and significance of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), by now one of the most significant players within the European political and constitutional space, demands reforms which also affect its architecture. The creation of the advisory panel under article 255 TFUE, is a way to improve judicial independence and proficiency but also a mean to achieve an adequate level of judicial accountability. Indeed, the existing national nomination processes, missing both transparency and public involvement, risk to shape courts which are far away to reach an adequate degree of legitimacy, especially in a supranational order. In this paper, we are going to put together all the stages that have led to the ECJ judicial selection reforms, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Then, we are going to analyse the composition and the functioning of the new panel under article 255, especially pointing out its limits and strength. In conclusion, together with a far-seeing consideration of all future perspectives, the paper will focus on an interesting comparative datum: judicial appointment panels are not a peculiarity of the ECJ but a “trend” which characterizes several judicial selection reforms both for national and supranational courts.