This paper provides a comparative analysis of foreign-investment screening powers in Italy and France. It traces Italy’s transition from the golden share to the golden power, and France’s development from noyaux durs and the action spécifique to the IEF regime (Investissements Étrangers en France), highlighting the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in subjecting both systems to necessity, proportionality and transparency requirements. The study also addresses the European framework established by Regulation (EU) 2019/452, the 2024–2025 reform proposal, and Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. Although both systems seek to protect national security and strategic assets, they follow different institutional designs: Italy relies on a unified, formalized and procedural framework coordinated by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; France combines preventive screening led by the Ministry of Economy with permanent corporate-governance safeguards. The comparison reveals different balances between openness to foreign investment, economic sovereignty and integration within the internal market.
Messina, G. (2026). GOLDEN POWER E ACTION SPÉCIFIQUE: LA DISCIPLINA DEI POTERI SPECIALI A CONFRONTO. RIVISTA DI DIRITTO DELL'ECONOMIA, DEI TRASPORTI E DELL'AMBIENTE, 815-860.
GOLDEN POWER E ACTION SPÉCIFIQUE: LA DISCIPLINA DEI POTERI SPECIALI A CONFRONTO
G. Messina
Primo
2026-08-01
Abstract
This paper provides a comparative analysis of foreign-investment screening powers in Italy and France. It traces Italy’s transition from the golden share to the golden power, and France’s development from noyaux durs and the action spécifique to the IEF regime (Investissements Étrangers en France), highlighting the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in subjecting both systems to necessity, proportionality and transparency requirements. The study also addresses the European framework established by Regulation (EU) 2019/452, the 2024–2025 reform proposal, and Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. Although both systems seek to protect national security and strategic assets, they follow different institutional designs: Italy relies on a unified, formalized and procedural framework coordinated by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; France combines preventive screening led by the Ministry of Economy with permanent corporate-governance safeguards. The comparison reveals different balances between openness to foreign investment, economic sovereignty and integration within the internal market.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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