Social expectations and norm nudging in anti-coordination problems: An El Farol Bar Game experiment

Norm nudging interventions seek to influence behavior by shaping what individuals expect others to do (empirical expectations) or regard as appropriate (normative expectations). We study how such interventions operate in an anonymous anti-coordination problem, using an online El Farol Bar Game experiment composed of two studies. Study 1 elicits social expectations (empirical and normative) and personal normative beliefs before subjects make their decision in the El Farol Bar Game. Study 2 implements norm nudges by providing participants with pre-decision messages based on the social expectations elicited in Study 1. Results show that subjects conform not only to their empirical expectations, but also to their personal normative beliefs. Normative expectations exert weaker and less consistent effects. Moreover, norm nudging interventions primarily induce prudence by reducing behavior that jeopardizes social welfare.