L’ESPERIENZA DEL PRESIDENZIALISMO IN ZAMBIA: TRA ACCENTRAMENTO DEL POTERE E CORRETTIVI COSTITUZIONALI

The constitutional system of Zambia represents a peculiar example of adaptation of the presidential model in the post-colonial African context. Since independence in 1964, the country has alternated phases of strong concentration of executive power with periods of democratic openness. The current Constitution, most recently amended in 2016 under President Edgar Lungu, establishes a presidential system in which the President combines the functions of Head of State and Head of Government, exercising a crucial role in the national political direction. However, the Zambian institutional structure cannot be reduced to pure hyper-presidentialism: along- side the centralization of presidential power, the Constitution provides democratic correctives and constitutional limits aimed at balancing the strength of the executive. The Zambian experience demonstrates how a presidential system can combine elements of strong political leadership with instruments of institutional checks and balances. This paper examines the essential characteristics of Zambian presidentialism, highlighting the tension between the centralization of presidential power and the presence of democratic correctives, in order to assess its nature and relevance in the contemporary political framework.