Elezione diretta del Presidente del Consiglio e sistema parlamentare

The author reads the direct election of the Prime Minister as a systemic change that goes beyond the mere “rationalization” of parliamentarism and also affects the form of the State. The core is the popular investiture held concurrently with the election of the Houses, but democratic effectiveness hinges on the future electoral law (threshold, majority bonus, possible runoff, single vs. split ballot). Such simultaneity may restrict voters’ choice if implemented through a single ballot without split-ticket voting; a nationwide bonus raises issues of representativeness. The anti–ribaltone clause is judged weak: it allows replacements and does not rule out majority shifts during the legislature. Hence the need for counterweights: strengthen Parliament’s role and guarantees (limit decree-laws, confidence votes, maxi-amendments; adopt an opposition statute). The President of the Republic remains a guarantor: a moderator when governments are stable and a facilitator in times of crisis. Looking ahead, the already “premier-centric” set-up by practice should be written into clear rules to avoid personalistic drifts. The essay concludes that constitutional reform alone is not enough; system-wide reforms (parliamentary rules, parties, electoral law) are needed to reconcile stability and representation.