Virtuous Constructions in Legal Reasoning

Following the Aristotelian constructivism proposed by Mark LeBar, the paper outlines a possible metaethical framework of values, necessary elements within legal reasoning. This framework proposes a consideration of values that need to be virtuously constructed, namely through the virtue of phronesis. In this way, legal reasoning can take into account more elements concerning the specific legal case, not only legal provisions, but also abstract objects, such as pain. The central feature of phronesis will lead to support a virtue-ethical approach to law. More specifically, the paper will be structured as follows. The first section will introduce the topic and the structure of the paper. The second section will analyze Vittorio Villa’s post-positivist costructivism, which makes it possible to understand the role of value judgments in legal reasoning. The third section will therefore examine Mark LeBar’s metaethical constructivism, investigating, in particular, two different elements: experience (paragraph 3.1) and phronesis (paragraph 3.2). In the fourth section, considering what has emerged from the research, the conclusion will highlight a possible connection between this metaethical framework and a virtue-ethical approach to law.