This paper aims to show that the emergency measures adopted by the Hungarian Government in response to COVID-19 are in conflict with fundamental aspects of the rule of law, under the European Convention on Human Rights. Firstly, these measures are discriminatory under Article 1 of the Convention, as they are designed to protect the life and health of Hungarian citizens only. Furthermore, they are not “necessary” within the meaning of Article 15, since they extend to “legal security and the stability of the national economy.” Thirdly, the measures at stake are not “proportionate”, under Article 15, as they: a) are not time-limited; b) grant the Government the power to extend them indefinitely; and c) do not provide for online sessions of Parliament (unlike the Constitutional Court), in a broader context where Parliament can revoke these powers only by a two-thirds majority. Finally, some reflections are submitted concerning the weak responses from EU institutions and the member states of the Council of Europe.
De Sena, P. (2021). COVID-19, Stato di diritto e Convenzione europea dei diritti umani: il caso ungherese. QUADERNI DI SIDIBLOG, 7/2020, 191-201.
COVID-19, Stato di diritto e Convenzione europea dei diritti umani: il caso ungherese
De Sena, Pasquale
2021-01-01
Abstract
This paper aims to show that the emergency measures adopted by the Hungarian Government in response to COVID-19 are in conflict with fundamental aspects of the rule of law, under the European Convention on Human Rights. Firstly, these measures are discriminatory under Article 1 of the Convention, as they are designed to protect the life and health of Hungarian citizens only. Furthermore, they are not “necessary” within the meaning of Article 15, since they extend to “legal security and the stability of the national economy.” Thirdly, the measures at stake are not “proportionate”, under Article 15, as they: a) are not time-limited; b) grant the Government the power to extend them indefinitely; and c) do not provide for online sessions of Parliament (unlike the Constitutional Court), in a broader context where Parliament can revoke these powers only by a two-thirds majority. Finally, some reflections are submitted concerning the weak responses from EU institutions and the member states of the Council of Europe.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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