The complementarity between the virtue of law (the rule of law) and the legal virtues

Following the thesis according to which virtues are rooted in social practices, it is possible to develop an account of legal virtues starting from the distinctive character of the legal practice, rather than from a general account of human capacities to apply in the legal field as well as in many other different contexts. In this article, I connect the institutional and procedural dimension of law with the abilities and virtues of those involved in its practice through the notion of the rule of law, famously indicated as the virtue of law, in the light of the complementarity between the rule of law and the legal virtues. But to do that, the rule of law must be understood as a social ordering and not as a list of requirements. From this perspective, the virtues needed to uphold the rule of law are some specific abilities and attitudes of all those taking part in the practice, not only legal practitioners, but also parties and citizens. Reflexivity, fidelity to law, and teamworking are three examples of legal virtues so conceived.