La forza della volontà. Sul rapporto tra volontà e ragione in Leibniz

The concept of reason plays a fundamental role in Leibniz’s philosophy overall, as well as in his conception of the will. In the Discourse on Metaphysics, he asserts that each volition always derives from a certain reason. In this paper, I explore the relationship between reason and will in Leibniz’s philosophy and show how the former supports the realization of the latter. First, I discuss the notion of will in general, understanding it as a grade of appetition. Then, I distinguish between "volonté antécédente" and "volonté conséquente" and, based on this theory, I discuss freedom and slavery in spirits. Finally, I identify and distinguish two meanings of "reason" (principle and faculty) and argue that the will is animated by reason as a principle and supported by reason as a faculty (intellect) – indeed, will and intellect are both expressions of reason as a principle. Therefore, the intellect represents not the will's greatest adversary, but its most valuable ally.