This paper investigates the relations between the concepts of moral harm and moral responsibility, arguing for a circularity between the two. On this basis the conceptual soundness of descriptivism, on which consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments are often grounded, is questioned. In the last section a certain version of ascriptivism is defended: the circularity is relevant in order to understand how a restricted version of ascriptivism may in fact be well founded.
|Data di pubblicazione:||2012|
|Titolo:||Moral Harm and Moral Responsibility: A Defence of Ascriptivism|
|Citazione:||Denaro, P. (2012). Moral Harm and Moral Responsibility: A Defence of Ascriptivism. RATIO JURIS, 25(25), 149-179.|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2012.00508.x|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia Del Diritto|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.01 Articolo in rivista|