Constructing a Regional Order Through Security: Strategies and Failures of US Policy Towards the Sahara-Sahel Region

Considering the Sahara-Sahel as an unstable periphery of the international system, since the end of the Cold War the United States has tried to export liberal order in the region. Sharing the burden with its European allies, during the 1990s, the US focused its action on spreading democracy, spreading market economy and containing violent crises. After 9/11, and as a consequence of the “ungoverned space” framework, United States strongly increased its engagement in the Sahara-Sahel, pursuing an integrated approach to counterterrorism and de-radicalization. American initiatives promoted a securitization of the region, while also contributing to redefine regional borders and local dynamics. The civil war in Mali and the temporary collapse of the Malian state called into question the American approach in the region, considering that the Sahara-Sahel has probably never been as dis-ordered and “ungoverned” as it is today. On the one hand, cognitive and normative problems determined the failure of the US strategy in the region. On the other hand, recent events and the international reaction to the Malian crisis show, that the United States is still a necessary actor to bring order and stability to the Sahara-Sahel.