Beyond the post-war Schumpeterian consensus: Governance, legitimacy and post-democracy

Two distinct visions of democratic politics, both of which are in sharp contrast to Schumpeter's competitive leadership model, are to be found at the heart of governance theory. The first advocates anti-democratic solutions, aiming to depoliticize public policy, while the second supports ultra-democratic reforms promoting the involvement of citizens in policy-making. The article pursues three main aims. First, it proposes a reading of the weaknesses attributed to Schumpeter's competitive leadership model. Second, it clarifies the nature of the innovations advocated by the anti-democratic camp in its attempt to build a regulatory state, and by the ultra-democratic camp in its struggle to engender a networked polity. Lastly, a critical evaluation of these solutions and their democratic visions is carried out. I argue that while anti-democratic solutions rest ultimately on disputed notions of social efficiency and contradictory appeals to pluralism, ultra-democratic solutions are either likely to undermine political equality, or incapable of supporting the claims associated with the ideal of a networked polity. © 2010 Institute of Local Government Studies.