L’interpretazione del trust e l’obbligo di interpretazione conforme («Reading down»)

The recent decision in Goodrich v AB highlights a number of problems which this essay centres upon in an eort to outline a more modern and CEDU oriented version of the law of trust. In particular, the focus will be on the applicable criteria in this branch of the law to the interpretation of settlements aimed at conferring benets on one or more persons, to be identied through a correct analysis of their objective, legal status in relation to the settlor's intention. It will also be devoted to the determination of whether or not duties of disclosure of relevant documents relating to his/her activity may be said to be incumbent, and in the event to what extent, on the trustee. All these issues have been accurately and extensively taken into account in its decision by the Chancery Division of the High Court and have been given a satisfactory answer. In particular, the interpretative methods to be applied to trust cannot but be the same as in contracts and wills according to the Supreme Court precedents. As to the denition of the beneciaries of the trust in question, the Court has shown to adhere to an evolutive interpretation derived from the direct application in the domestic law, via the Human Rights Act 1998, of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, with the ultimate result of the broadening of the categories of those who can benet from the trust, such as civil partners and married couples of the same sex. Finally, a clear tendency to stress the very existence of a duty to frankly and openly disclose relevant information on the part of the trustee is emphasized with an eye to the protection of beneciaries. The non-performance of such a duty may give rise to a judicial intervention in the light of the Public Trust v Cooper decision.