By asking the reason for the existence of something rather than nothing, the question of ground implies another question, which asks what is meant by existence. Depending on the criterion of existence and, hence, on the following ontological commitment, the question of ground can assume different ontological weights and may even appear senseless. Further, the question of sufficient reason refers to the causal power of the form, which marks the original questioning of metaphysics.

Lupo, R.M. (2021). Realtà e fondamento. Su un certo modo dell’esistenza. GIORNALE DI METAFISICA(1), 94-108.

Realtà e fondamento. Su un certo modo dell’esistenza

Lupo, R. M.
2021-01-01

Abstract

By asking the reason for the existence of something rather than nothing, the question of ground implies another question, which asks what is meant by existence. Depending on the criterion of existence and, hence, on the following ontological commitment, the question of ground can assume different ontological weights and may even appear senseless. Further, the question of sufficient reason refers to the causal power of the form, which marks the original questioning of metaphysics.
2021
Settore M-FIL/01 - Filosofia Teoretica
Lupo, R.M. (2021). Realtà e fondamento. Su un certo modo dell’esistenza. GIORNALE DI METAFISICA(1), 94-108.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10447/527264
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