The spending autonomy of the Regions between the State and the European Union from l. cost. 3/2001 to the European conditionalities on Recovery and Resilience plan The Next generation EU is also a test on the relations between the State and the Italian Regions. This is a huge amount of resources that will also have to be spent locally. The trend towards centralization of governance on the State level already emerges from the tenor of art. 1 d.l. 77/2021, paragraph 3 of which qualifies the provisions contained therein as "directly implementing the obligations assumed in execution of Regulation (EU) 2021/241" and "adopted in the exercise of exclusive legislative competence regarding the relations of the State with the European Union". Add to this the reference to a specific national interest. The essay questions the constitutionality and EU compatibility of these rules that affect the state-regional relations by compressing the powers of the latter. The rules seem to conflict not only with internal constitutional principles but also with the protection of territoriality guaranteed in the community according to the principle of subsidiarity One way to raise the issue could be the judgment of equalization of the financial statement of the regions by the Regional Court of Auditors. In conclusion, the principle of imputability in the discipline relating to the allocation of responsibility for nonfulfillment of EU obligations, together with the constitutional principle of proportion between functions and resources, in a context in which the principle of indifference is no longer so solid, would impose on the legislator a discipline of the “descending phase” of expenditure, in the implementation of the European NGU be as consistent as possible with the constitutional principles on regional financial autonomy and with the principle of loyal collaboration
L'articolo ricostruisce la tendenza all’accentramento nel governo delle finanze pubbliche e l’eccessiva distanza fra testo costituzionale e diritto costituzionale vivente per analizzare l'attuazione del Recovery Plan (PNRR) rilevando un ulteriore tendenza all’accentramento del governo della spesa. Si indagano dunque le ragioni della compressione dell’autonomia finanziaria di spesa per effetto del principio di indifferenza e del “doppio intreccio federale”. Si mira a inquadrare il tema alla luce della leale collaborazione e dellala resilienza istituzionale per accorciare la “distanza” fra testo costituzionale ed attuazione costituzionale in tema di autonomia di spesa delle Regioni. Si prospetta come i Trattati UE superino il principio di indifferenza e possa essere aperta una via "europea" alla garanzia dell’autonomia regionale. Si conclude soffermandosi sulla necessaria integrazione fra la giurisprudenza sul bilancio come bene pubblico e “la lex fiscalis” eurocostituzionale: autonomia e responsabilità; efficienza allocativa delle risorse e test di “ragionevolezza. 4.3. Le “nuove” condizionalità di bilancio europee e gli spazi per l’autonomia finanziaria regionale
Cavasino Elisa (2021). L’autonomia di spesa delle Regioni fra Stato ed Unione europea dalla l. cost. 3/2001 alle condizionalità europee sulla ripresa e la resilienza. BILANCIO COMUNITÀ PERSONA(2/2021), 31-49.
L’autonomia di spesa delle Regioni fra Stato ed Unione europea dalla l. cost. 3/2001 alle condizionalità europee sulla ripresa e la resilienza
Cavasino Elisa
2021-01-01
Abstract
The spending autonomy of the Regions between the State and the European Union from l. cost. 3/2001 to the European conditionalities on Recovery and Resilience plan The Next generation EU is also a test on the relations between the State and the Italian Regions. This is a huge amount of resources that will also have to be spent locally. The trend towards centralization of governance on the State level already emerges from the tenor of art. 1 d.l. 77/2021, paragraph 3 of which qualifies the provisions contained therein as "directly implementing the obligations assumed in execution of Regulation (EU) 2021/241" and "adopted in the exercise of exclusive legislative competence regarding the relations of the State with the European Union". Add to this the reference to a specific national interest. The essay questions the constitutionality and EU compatibility of these rules that affect the state-regional relations by compressing the powers of the latter. The rules seem to conflict not only with internal constitutional principles but also with the protection of territoriality guaranteed in the community according to the principle of subsidiarity One way to raise the issue could be the judgment of equalization of the financial statement of the regions by the Regional Court of Auditors. In conclusion, the principle of imputability in the discipline relating to the allocation of responsibility for nonfulfillment of EU obligations, together with the constitutional principle of proportion between functions and resources, in a context in which the principle of indifference is no longer so solid, would impose on the legislator a discipline of the “descending phase” of expenditure, in the implementation of the European NGU be as consistent as possible with the constitutional principles on regional financial autonomy and with the principle of loyal collaborationFile | Dimensione | Formato | |
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