Our aim is to provide an account of constitutive rules in terms of (1) the acceptance of regulative norms, and (2) a cognitive process we call “symbolization” (in an altogether different sense from what J. R. Searle means by this word). We claim, first, that institutional facts à la Searle boil down to facts concerning the collective acceptance of regulative norms in a given community. This, however, does not exhaust what institutional facts are. There is a residue, symbolization. Symbolization, as we understand it, involves a transfer of cognitive models from one domain to another. We introduce this notion by exploring different sorts of games, taking our cue from games of pretend play. In the context of this exploration, we introduce the idea of the significance—a matter of degree—of symbolization for a given institutional concept. In particular, we claim, symbolization may play, vis-à-vis a given institutional concept, a properly constitutive or a merely auxiliary role. We further argue that, in most legal concepts as conceived in our legal culture, symbolization plays a merely auxiliary role. A possible exception is the concept of political representation, at least on some understandings of it.

Brigaglia Marco, Celano Bruno (2021). Constitutive Rules: The Symbolization Account. RATIO JURIS, 34(2), 1-19 [10.1111/raju.12327].

Constitutive Rules: The Symbolization Account

Brigaglia Marco;Celano Bruno
2021-09-25

Abstract

Our aim is to provide an account of constitutive rules in terms of (1) the acceptance of regulative norms, and (2) a cognitive process we call “symbolization” (in an altogether different sense from what J. R. Searle means by this word). We claim, first, that institutional facts à la Searle boil down to facts concerning the collective acceptance of regulative norms in a given community. This, however, does not exhaust what institutional facts are. There is a residue, symbolization. Symbolization, as we understand it, involves a transfer of cognitive models from one domain to another. We introduce this notion by exploring different sorts of games, taking our cue from games of pretend play. In the context of this exploration, we introduce the idea of the significance—a matter of degree—of symbolization for a given institutional concept. In particular, we claim, symbolization may play, vis-à-vis a given institutional concept, a properly constitutive or a merely auxiliary role. We further argue that, in most legal concepts as conceived in our legal culture, symbolization plays a merely auxiliary role. A possible exception is the concept of political representation, at least on some understandings of it.
Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia Del Diritto
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/raju.12327
Brigaglia Marco, Celano Bruno (2021). Constitutive Rules: The Symbolization Account. RATIO JURIS, 34(2), 1-19 [10.1111/raju.12327].
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Brigaglia&Celano 2021. Constitutive Rules. The Symbolization Account.pdf

Solo gestori archvio

Descrizione: testo dell'articolo pubblicato
Tipologia: Versione Editoriale
Dimensione 119.29 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
119.29 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10447/521515
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact