This note considers the paper of Poyago Theotoky (1999) on stretegic R&D with endogenous spillovers. It proves through an example that, under R&D collusion, optimality sometimes requires either minimal or asymmetric spillovers. It also provides a simple sufficient condition for optimal spillovers between colluding firms to involve maximal spillovers.
Tesoriere, A. (2008). A further note on endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly. REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 33, 177-184 [10.1007/s11151-008-9184-x].
A further note on endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly
TESORIERE, Antonio
2008-01-01
Abstract
This note considers the paper of Poyago Theotoky (1999) on stretegic R&D with endogenous spillovers. It proves through an example that, under R&D collusion, optimality sometimes requires either minimal or asymmetric spillovers. It also provides a simple sufficient condition for optimal spillovers between colluding firms to involve maximal spillovers.
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