Soggettività, identità, metafisica. Da Cartesio a Wittgenstein

In recent articles I analysed the relationship between the proposals for a criti- que or “reformation” of metaphysics formulated according to the analytical and the continental points of view, underlining how in the former case there was an interest not so much in definitively dismissing metaphysics as in purifying it from obscure notions. In particular, I focussed on the way in which the notions of “totality” and “absolute” have been thoroughly reconsidered within a metaphysics that has been oriented towards a plane of scientific consistency. This essay aims to verify whether the notion of subjectivity could be considered another of the “great renunciations” on which many scholars of contemporary metaphysics seem to agree, or if it is rather one of those notions that can be maintained after they have been reformulated.