This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.

Bauso, D., Basar, T. (2016). Strategic Thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CONTROL [10.1016/j.ejcon.2016.04.006].

Strategic Thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations

D. Bauso;
2016-01-01

Abstract

This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.
Settore MAT/09 - Ricerca Operativa
Bauso, D., Basar, T. (2016). Strategic Thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CONTROL [10.1016/j.ejcon.2016.04.006].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10447/253213
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