The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. A. Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or it is a concept with limited explanatory potential - in either case, at best a concept whose scope is much narrower, in contemporary legal systems, than the one envisaged by Hart. It will also be argued that the rule of recognition, if subject to a possible (and plausible) reformulation, can nevertheless play a significant, non-redundant role. This, however, will require to assign the rule of recognition a rather different job than the one proposed by Hart, as well as by most post-Hartian positivist literature, namely it will require to locate the rule of recognition not in the theory of the legal system, but in the theory of legal reasoning.
Pino, G. (2015). La norma di riconoscimento come ideologia delle fonti. ANALISI E DIRITTO(2015), 183-201.
La norma di riconoscimento come ideologia delle fonti
PINO, Giorgio
2015-01-01
Abstract
The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. A. Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or it is a concept with limited explanatory potential - in either case, at best a concept whose scope is much narrower, in contemporary legal systems, than the one envisaged by Hart. It will also be argued that the rule of recognition, if subject to a possible (and plausible) reformulation, can nevertheless play a significant, non-redundant role. This, however, will require to assign the rule of recognition a rather different job than the one proposed by Hart, as well as by most post-Hartian positivist literature, namely it will require to locate the rule of recognition not in the theory of the legal system, but in the theory of legal reasoning.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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