La sentenza della Grande Camera della Corte europea dei diritti umani nel caso S.A.S. c. Francia: una 'sentenza-monito', ma di che tipo?

L'articolo commenta la sentenza S.A.S. c. Francia in cui la Corte EDU ha stabilito che la legge francese 2010-1192, che proibisce la coperura del viso in tutti i luoghi pubblici, non viola il diritto delle donne di religione musulmana di indossare il burqa e il Niqab. Il commento si concentra in particolare sulla questione del valore giuridico che può essere atttribuito ad alcuni "moniti" che la Corte indirizza alla Francia in questa sentenza, i quali sembrano difficilmente collocabili nel solco della precedente giurisprudenza della Corte.

In the judgment S.A.S. versus France the ECtHR held that the French law «prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in public spaces» does not violate the right of Muslim women to wear the burqa and niqab according to their faith. This position of the Court has rightly been criticized. However, the significance of this judgment does not only lie in the declaration of non-violation of the Convention, but also in some statements raising the standards of protection of the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs by wearing Islamic veils. First, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that wearing a full- face veil is not a ‘manifestation’ or a ‘practice’ within the meaning of Article 9, paragraph 1. Sec- ond, the Court held that wearing full-face veils does not necessarily infringe the principles of gender equality and human dignity. The article argues that the Court can rely on these findings as ‘general principles’ concerning Article 9 in future cases. Finally, while recognizing to France a margin of appreciation in deciding to protect the conditions of ‘living together’, the Court warned the government against the ‘Islamophobic’ risks of its policy. This is not the first judgement in which the Court expressed warnings to Respondent States. However, the value of the Courts comments in the present case seems to be purely political. The paper argues that the Court is not competent to express them.