In the first three sections of this paper, the author examines the ambiguous usage of legal and moral terminology in the field of neurosciences. The fourth section is devoted to the analysis of the natural law tradition: obviously in this context naturalistic tendencies have been opposed and isolated by the forbiddance derived from the naturalistic fallacy argument. The question is whether neurosciences can attribute a new (by any chance different and debatable) role to the “nature” in law and morals.
Viola, F. (2014). Neuroscienze e diritto naturale. RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO, 3(numero speciale 2014), 131-144 [10.4477/78478].
Neuroscienze e diritto naturale
VIOLA, Francesco
2014-01-01
Abstract
In the first three sections of this paper, the author examines the ambiguous usage of legal and moral terminology in the field of neurosciences. The fourth section is devoted to the analysis of the natural law tradition: obviously in this context naturalistic tendencies have been opposed and isolated by the forbiddance derived from the naturalistic fallacy argument. The question is whether neurosciences can attribute a new (by any chance different and debatable) role to the “nature” in law and morals.File in questo prodotto:
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