Corruption is “the abuse of public office for personal gain” (World Bank, 1997: 8). Although this definition captures a broad notion of corrupt behaviour, many forms of corruption actually occur in small municipalities each reflecting context-specific features and dynamics. Their impacts are rather evident, but their cause-effects relationships are not always clear, so that tangled issues may ineluctably arise without an apparent explanation. As such, a systemic focus is needed in order to gain an insightful understanding of particular configurations of malfeasance at local level in the attempt to hinder them in the future. The aim of this research project is to explore the dynamic relationships of patronage, and other similar practices in small municipalities, with the public workforce’s stock and composition, by designing a dynamic performance management (DPM) system (Bianchi, 2016) able to support decision and policy-makers in setting effective strategies to curb the associated negative implications over time.
Salvatore Gnoffo; Angelo Guerrera (19-24 luglio 2020).Political Patronage in a Small Italian Local Government: An Outcome-Based DPM Approach on Fiduciary Practices.
|Titolo:||Political Patronage in a Small Italian Local Government: An Outcome-Based DPM Approach on Fiduciary Practices|
GNOFFO, Salvatore [Writing – Original Draft Preparation] (Corresponding)
|Citazione:||Salvatore Gnoffo; Angelo Guerrera (19-24 luglio 2020).Political Patronage in a Small Italian Local Government: An Outcome-Based DPM Approach on Fiduciary Practices.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||6.1 Paper non pubblicato|
File in questo prodotto:
|Gnoffo_S. and Guerrera_A. - Political Patronage in a Small Italian Local Government.pdf||Long abstract||Pre-print||Administrator Richiedi una copia|