

Organizing for What: Job Rotation as an Organizational Development Strategy or as an Organizational anti-Corruption Tool?

Raimondo Ingrassia*

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to understand if Job Rotation (JR)/Organizational Development (OD)-oriented strategies are compatible with JR strategies to curb Organizational Corruption (OC), as these strategies seem to indicate an apparent contradiction. To this end, the paper is structured as follows. Firstly, the main points of JR-Theory in organizational studies are displayed. Subsequently, JR-Theory in organizational anti-corruption is more deeply explored. At the end of the review, the research question is proposed in the methodological section. The two sections after that are devoted to answering this question. The first of which examines the laws and documents of the *National Anti-Corruption Agency (ANAC)* on JR-based anti-corruption policies in Italian public administrations. In the second section, some cases reported in the ANAC documents are analyzed. The results seem to suggest we can positively answer the research question, even if further research is needed. The theoretical contributions, managerial implications, limitations and future research are highlighted in the last section.

Keywords: Job Rotation; Organizational Development Strategy; Organizational anti-Corruption Tool.

* **Raimondo Ingrassia**, Full Professor in Organization Theory and Human Resource Management at Department of Economics, Business and Statistics at University of Palermo (Italy); email: raimondo.ingrassia@unipa.it.

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1. Introduction

Job rotation (JR) pursues the same objectives as organizational development (OD) by promoting the well-being of people, the professional growth of employees and the strengthening of organizational skills. Alongside **physiological goals**, aimed at making the organization more productive and engaging, there are also **defensive ones** which tend to use JR as a tool to combat a pathological phenomenon of organizational life, that of corruption. The purpose of this article is to understand if JR/OD-oriented strategies are compatible with JR strategies to curb organizational corruption (OC). To this end, the paper is structured as follows. Firstly, the main points of JR theory in organizational studies are displayed. Subsequently, JR theory in organizational anti-corruption is more deeply explored. At the end of the review, the research question is proposed in the methodological section. The two sections after that are devoted to answering this question. The first of which examines the laws and documents of the *National Anti-Corruption Agency (ANAC)* on JR based anti-corruption policies in Italian public administrations. In the second section, some cases reported in the ANAC documents are analyzed. The results are discussed in the following section. To conclude, the theoretical and managerial implications, limitations and future research of this study are highlighted.

2. Job Rotation Theory

JR consists in assigning new tasks to employees as part of their work. The rotation can involve a vertical or horizontal displacement of the employee. Vertically, tasks are assigned at a higher level of complexity and responsibility than the position previously held. In a horizontal sense, rotation requires the employee to perform tasks at a level of complexity and responsibility similar to the previous one (Cosgel and Miceli, 1998; Noe et al. 2010; Casad, 2012). The studies on JR analyzed in this paper have shown how movements of this type can be conceived both for OD purposes and for purposes of protection and defense from organizational corruption. The content of these studies will be examined in the two sub-sections that follow.

2.1 Job Rotation as an Organizational Development Strategy

OD is a set of strategies for change, aimed at improving the organizational effectiveness, productivity and well-being of employees (Cheraskin and Champion, 1996; Worren et al. 1999; Oparanma and Nwaeke, 2015). JR is one of the tools for achieving OD goals (Forti and Varchetta, 1996). Several of these issues have been taken into consideration from this perspective by the research. One of the first issues dealt with the relationship between JR and **individual capacities and well-being** (Noe et al., 1988). A series of studies show that JR tends to generate positive effects on people's abilities and well-being (Huang, 1999; Johnson and Nissi, 2018). In fact, JR: (a) allows the creation of new life experiences, enriches the wealth of knowledge of individuals;

(b) introduces variety and change, reduces the monotony of tasks, work disaffection and the dangers of alienation from the work environment; (c) improves the psychological well-being of the person by determining a positive impact on individual productivity. However, not all people react the same to JR. Several studies have found evidence that JR negatively impacts people. These studies show that the instability generated by change may not lead to a person-job fit, and instead, cause role stress, resistance to change, a sense of ineffectiveness and loss of self-control, demoralization and loss of motivation (Brett et al., 1992; Ortega, 2001; Eriksson and Ortega, 2006; Van De Voorde et al., 2012; Nafei, 2014; Mlekus and Maier, 2021).

A second issue focused on the relationships between JR and the **development of the worker's professional skills** (Woodall and Winstanley, 1998; Dessler, 2015; Santos et al. 2016). Carrying out new tasks allows people to deal with different customers, problems, goals and working times. This makes it possible to face working life from new perspectives that stimulate people's latent abilities and the development of new skills. These new professional experiences of the worker improve their ability to solve the technical and organizational issues of their work with skill and competence (Akbari and Maniei, 2017). Research has shown that employees who rotate the most are also those who are most likely to advance their careers and benefit from pay progressions (Campion et al. 1994; Zin, 2015).

A third issue dealt with the relationship between JR and **the capacity of the organization** (Feldman, 1988; Cosgel and Miceli, 1998; Ericksson and Ortega, 2006; Casad, 2012; Gabrielli and Profili, 2016, p. 218). Organizations that implement JR plans have a greater number of people with a broader knowledge of the various departments of the organization (Huang, 1999). This allows career paths to be better supported, succession plans and staff replacement actions which grant the organization the right people at the right time in key positions (May, 1997). The joint result of JR plans and career management also increases the ability to respond to the problems of internal integration and external adaptation of the organization, thanks to the possibility of training technically trained personnel with greater knowledge of the organizational context (London, 1985; Campion et al, 1994). However, the impact on the organization does not stop there. Campion et al. (1994) report in their study the advantages of JR as seen by managers. Responses include empathy, mental adaptability and the flexibility of people, greater leadership and interpersonal relationship skills, employee exposure to different management styles and the development of formal and informal networks. Other studies have shown instead how JR policies can cause slowdowns in the flow of activities and high training costs (Campion and McClelland, 1993).

To summarize, JR generates many benefits for the organization and its members, but also some risks (Campion and McClelland, 1993; Campion et al, 1994; Kaymaz, 2010). JR leads to greater individual well-being and better trained employees. They are able to work better and handle higher workloads. Rotated personnel need less explicit communication due to a better understanding of work issues and a broader view of the organizational context. Risks include: a potential demoralizing and destabilizing impact on people, wasted time and productivity, errors in carrying out new tasks, increases in workloads, slowdowns in work processes (Santos et al., 2016).

2.2 Job Rotation as an Organizational anti-Corruption Tool

A fourth issue which emerged from the studies on JR concerns the use of internal mobility as a key tool for defending oneself from organizational corruption (Jellal, 2012). These studies start from the assumption that organizational design can help prevent opportunities for deviant behavior in the workplace (Luo, 2005; Walcher et al. 2013). They tend to show strong cause and effect relationships between organizational policies and anti-corruption actions: organizational structures and processes, if well designed, have the ability to minimize the phenomenon of corruption (Becker and Stigler, 1974/a; Klitgaard, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Azfar et al., 2001; Rose-Ackerman and Truex, 2012; Ingrassia, 2018 and 2020).

Two influential works frame JR in the context of policies to combat organization-driven corruption. Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Lambsdorff (2009) classify anti-corruption strategies according to two dimensions: top-down/bottom-up and internal/external. Top-down strategies come from the formal institutions of society such as government agencies, corporations or the legislative bodies of the state. They are implemented through the channels of organizational control and have the purpose of preventing, deterring and sanctioning deviant behaviors. A bottom-up strategy, on the other hand, is a «more grassroots-type of phenomenon», as it starts from the base of society (individual initiatives, actions by interest groups, protests by social groups). Internal and external anti-corruption strategies indicate the extent to which they are undertaken on the initiative of actors internal or external to the organization. According to this scheme, **JR is an internal top-down strategy** as it is implemented on the initiatives of the company's top management (Jancsics, 2019 and 2020).

Clarke (2005) also frames JR as part of a vertical supervisory control strategy of the organization. The study by Tanley et al. (2018), however, reports uncertainties in the managerial policies to combat corruption. Managers, for example, give little consideration to work performance reorganization strategies regarding anti-corruption once people enter the company. This could happen because managers are often reluctant to use this tool for fear of undermining the trust and harmony of organizational groups and compromising the wealth of professional knowledge accumulated during the stay of people in their units. A conservative attitude which regards JR as more of a threat than an opportunity.

Other research has moved in the same direction as Tanley's et al. work. Sectoral studies on police forces argue that the nature of the tasks of those who work in these sectors lead them to come into contact with social deviance and with large and small economic interests in an institutional context which gives them great monopoly power and wide discretion (Klitgaard, 1988; Punch, 2000; Williams, 2002; Masiloane, 2007; Cook, 2013).

A shrewd JR can prevent these contacts from turning into symbiotic relationships and complicity with deviant purposes. Perry's (2001) study examines the relationship between long-term police officers and deviant behavior. The suggested solution is that of frequent changes of assignments both in the performance of services and in the assignment of geographical areas of competence. The goal is to reduce group cohesion for criminal purposes by introducing people unrelated to the history of the

group and who for this reason could be seen as not trustworthy enough to be involved in illegal activities (Janis, 1983; Wagner et al. 2017).

Osrecki's study (2015) warns against the fact that measures to combat corruption produce latent effects such as to discourage not only dysfunctional discretionary behaviors for the organization but also discretionary behaviors functional to its interests. While it is true that a JR program can be implemented to destabilize criminal schemes, disrupt corrupt actions and interrupt the collusive relationships that occur between the corrupted and the corruptors, it is also true that measures of this type can discourage honest and competent managers from implementing JR programs that could harm the smooth running of the organization. Executives might ask themselves, for example, why move a person who has done well in a certain sector just because a JR plan requires it, which arranges, in a rigid and indiscriminate way, the alternation of personnel after a certain number of years.

JR has also been examined from an *Information Theory* and *Agency Perspective* (Becker and Stigler, 1974/b; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Ryvkin and Serra, 2010). When the social distance between the corrupted and the corruptor is relatively large, thanks to the alternation of officials in various positions, the parties to the relationship are less likely to have direct or indirect information on each other's corruptive potential (Tanzi, 1995). JR in public offices helps to fuel this information asymmetry. It can, therefore, serve to break the web of corruption between these two parties in a context of large and petty corruption, preventing the formation of symbiotic relationships due to the stability of relationships and the development of relationships of mutual trust. This does not always generate positive organizational effects. We know that being close to the customer, thanks to a prolonged stay of the employee in a certain position, determines positive effects on the quality of the public service offered to the citizen (Buonocore and Ingrassia, 2020).

Jacobs (2002) argues that anti-corruption policies should be posed more in terms of comparing the costs and benefits pertaining to corruption rather than in terms of ethical principles. The ratio between the resources spent and the benefits obtained from the fight against corruption is probably higher than in other types of crime. This is due to the difficulties not so much in measuring the costs of law enforcement, which in many cases are patently evident due to internal dysfunction and the lower quality of services to the citizen, but rather for the difficulties in quantifying the real benefits of the action in terms of downsizing the phenomenon. In fact, it is known that the measurement of a shrouded and collusive act such as corruption tends to have poor public visibility and to emerge rarely. This basic ambiguity often prevents us from having precise tools to evaluate the efficiency of anti-corruption policies (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Coviello and Gagliarducci, 2010).

Søreide (2002) supports this same relativist position, examining the critical area of public procurement. The political scientist argues that in high-corruption countries the benefits of reducing corruption opportunities through JR may be greater than those that would be gained by keeping officials in their respective areas of responsibility for a long time. But she also warns that frequent rotation can lead to increased corruption when officials decide to take advantage of short-term opportunities by stealing more in the shortest time possible. In addition, the scholar notes that in highly

corrupt bureaucracies, superiors can use their power to choose and reassign officials as they please with the view of perpetuating the corrupt organization (UNDP, 1997).

3. Method

What emerges from the framework of the studies carried out so far is an intrinsic ambivalence of JR policies both in terms of anti-corruption and in terms of OD. An ambivalence that is accentuated when OD policies are pursued jointly with anti-corruption policies. What impact do JR initiatives have on individuals and group cohesion? Do the decision-makers have the moral integrity and managerial skills to undertake correct JR policies? Are the economic and organizational costs and benefits of JR balanced? Can combating deviant behavior in the organization damage the intentions of deviant behavior in favor of the organization?

Therefore, the research question we ask ourselves is:
*Organizing for what? Are JR OD-oriented strategies compatible
with JR-based strategies to curb organizational corruption?*

To answer this question, we analyzed documents and the rules of law of the National Anti-Corruption Agency (ANAC) concerning JR-based anti-corruption policies in Italian public administrations. ANAC is the authority in charge in Italy regarding the regulation and control of anti-corruption policies. In particular, we made use of a series of documents containing directives, recommendations, interpretations of the law, analysis of jurisdictions, acts and reports of ANAC (FAQ, replies to reports) concerning the use of JR related to anti-corruption. The search for documents in the ANAC database by typing the keyword «Rotation» produced 57 results by 04.19.2021, of which 27 of actual interest for this study and 8 referred in the bibliography.

4. Job Rotation as an Organizational anti-Corruption Tool: Italian Regulation

The Italian public administration has also recently included JR in the framework of anti-corruption policies, providing indications on how to implement it and verifying its practical achievements in the national administrative system. JR was officially considered a standard instrument to combat corruption in the public sector in 2012 with the so-called *Monti Reform* which provided for «the rotation of assignments in the offices responsible for carrying out activities where the risk of committing corruption offenses is higher» (ANAC/Annex 2). JR must be implemented as part of a multiannual programming of human resources aimed at allowing its effective implementation within the broader framework of multiannual anti-corruption planning.

The guiding principles that emerge from analyzing the regulation can be summarized as follows (ANAC/Annex 2). **Priority.** The sectors and organizational units that

must be considered as a priority for rotation must be those with a higher corruption risk and subsequently those with a lower risk probability. **Gradualness.** Rotation should minimize slowdown and the possible malfunction of ordinary activities, avoiding untimely and inconsistent rotation in terms of the quantity and quality of the personnel employed. **Implementation Criteria.** Rotation must take into account the length of service of the personnel in the unit, any legal or contractual duration envisaged for certain positions, the periodicity scheduled by anti-corruption plans and the type of rotation. **Training.** Rotation plans must provide for targeted preventive training to prevent mobility from damaging the operation of the offices. The training tools for this purpose are: the development of skills suitable for filling new job positions and the support of a colleague who could replace them over time. **Contingencies.** Rotation must be carried out in relation to the organizational characteristics of each structure (size of services and the catchment area, overall staff, workloads, quality of personnel, complexity of administrative processes). **Subjective constraints.** Rotation must be carried out in compliance with any limitations provided for by law such as trade unions and social rights protected in the workplace (union positions, family assistance for the disabled, parental leave). **Objective constraints.** The rotation must ensure the smooth running of the organization, the continuity of administrative action and the quality of professional skills. The reference in this last case is to activities with a high technical content such as those, for example, which require special qualifications, registration in professional registers, specific certifications. **Alternative measures.** Rotation is not always a realistic measure in the context in which it is to be implemented. Consider, for example, the administrations of small Italian municipalities: about 43% of them have an average of 6.7 staff in service (IFEL Foundation, 2015). In such contexts, it is very likely that a single employee will end up having sole control of administrative processes. Alternative measures in these cases proposed by ANAC are: *knowledge* and *transparency management* which involves the disclosure of documents and the internal sharing of administrative information and, where possible, the separation of functions which implies that different phases of an administrative process are assigned to different subjects (instruction, assessment, decision, implementation, follow-up).

We have seen that among the implementation criteria of a JR program there is the type of rotation to choose. ANAC documents provide for various types of rotation (ANAC/Annex 2). **Rotation within the same office.** This is the so-called functional rotation, i.e. an organizational intervention that involves the assignment of different tasks and responsibilities within an organizational unit. The rotation may concern: participation in internal commissions, the transition from front-office to back-office positions (and vice versa), responsibility for an entire procedure or for some of its phases. **Rotation within different offices.** This is a functional rotation like the previous one but carried out within offices belonging to different sectors of the same administration. This rotation must be established on the basis of criteria defined by anti-corruption plans in compliance with the existing laws on corporate mobility. **Rotation within different administrations.** The general rules on public employment in Italy provide that administrations can fill vacant positions in the workforce through the direct transfer of employees (Article 30, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Legislative Decree

165/2001). The so-called *Madia Reform* allows employees to be transferred from one administration to another, by agreement between the administrations concerned, into offices located in the territory of the same municipality or at a distance of no more than fifty kilometers from the place of origin. It is a form of mobility designed to compensate for staff imbalances between administrations which can help the implementation of JR programs in terms of OD. At present it seems that there are no legal conditions to implement JR using this standard. The ANAC hopes for legislative changes that can allow for rotation between administrations, giving high value to partnership to be implemented through agreements between neighboring and homogeneous territorial bodies (municipalities, health organizations, social areas, unions of municipalities) (ANAC/Annex 2). **Territorial rotation.** It is a form of rotation accessory to the previous three. The rotation can take place by changing the areas of territorial competence of the employee within the office. It is a fairly incisive form of rotation in anti-corruption, widely practiced, for example, by law enforcement agencies all over the world, which responds to both OD and corruption prevention needs (Onder, 2015). **Rotation of managers.** In certain areas at risk of corruption, rotation of managers should be a virtuous and physiological practice and not punitive or sanctioning. In doing so, organizational development and anti-corruption policies would be more synergistic rather than incompatible. JR should also involve those managers who do not operate in the high risk areas in order to avoid the same people always being rotated in the same areas. According to the ANAC, in the offices with the highest risk of corruption it would be preferable that the duration of the assignment was limited to the minimum legal duration. Upon expiry, the assignment should be entrusted to another manager, regardless of the outcome of the assessment reported by the outgoing manager. We see in this rigidity a contradiction between JR OD-oriented policies, which would require confirmation in case of positive evaluations (and removal in case of negative evaluations) and anti-corruption-oriented JR policies. A contradiction that only a clear order of priority, given a certain context, can resolve. **Employee rotation.** The general principle established by Italian law declares that all employees are potentially subject to anti-corruption rotation, without exception. JR can be both functional and territorial depending on the organizational contingencies that the administration must face. **Special rotation.** It is a mandatory form of rotation that is implemented when criminal proceedings are initiated against a civil servant for «crimes against the public administration», «mafia crimes» and, in general, for all crimes indicating corrupt conduct.

5. Job Rotation as an Organizational anti-Corruption Tool: Italian Cases Analysis

Eight years after the enactment of the first legislation and five years after the ANAC first started its regulatory and monitoring behavior, a review of JR practices with the aim of combating corruption in Italian public administrations can be made. We have analyzed in this regard a series of cases reported in the ANAC documents in the three-

year period 2015-2017 as a result of its frequent supervisory activities (ANAC, 2017, pp. 90-91).

Case 1. The Rome Police Force. An interesting case for the topic of this study is that of the Corpo di Polizia di Roma Capitale. The ANAC (2015) conducted a hearing with the Force Commander in January 2015. The subject of the hearing was the evaluation of JR anti-corruption initiatives undertaken by the capital. In its verification activity, the ANAC ascertained a series of facts and circumstances which are summarized below. (a) JR potentially involved 6,000 employees, of which 2,500 were low to mid managers (contractual level D) and 3,500 officers (contractual level C), distributed across central traffic police, administrative, construction, social and environmental departments and 19 territorial groups. (b) Rotation only concerned *street level officials* and excluded those who held back-office positions. (c) The implementation criteria adopted to carry out the rotation were the following: (c/1) *seniority*, those who had occupied a certain position for more than 5 years (back-office officials) and for more than 7 years (street level officials); (c/2) *territory*, rotation took place only at the level of territorial groups, not central departments; (c/3) the *gradualness* of rotation over time (to be carried out within 22 months); (c/4) *compliance with subjective constraints* provided for by law (for example: the right to assistance for disabled parents). (d) The trade unions complained about the lack of information on the reorganization and the fact that rotation involved many union leaders in a disproportionate way (17% of the workforce!). On the basis of these facts and circumstances, the ANAC expressed its opinion, establishing that: (a) JR, which has always been envisaged as a measure to enrich the professional background of employees and the effectiveness of the organization of the offices, must now be considered an integral part of anti-corruption legislation in Italy; (b) JR as an anti-corruption tool encounters objective limits, such as the need to ensure proper internal functioning, continuity of administrative action and the quality of professional skills necessary for carrying out activities with a high technical content; therefore, the ANAC observes, rotation initiatives should not be carried out when it involves the reduction of specialized professional skills from offices entrusted with activities with a high technical content or which could damage the smooth functioning of processes; (c) JR encounters subjective limits with particular regard to individual and trade union rights; it follows that rotation measures must be able to balance the needs of objective protection of the administration (prestige, impartiality, functionality) with respect for these rights; (d) the high number of employees in the Rome Police Force suggests that there are no objective limits for JR, also taking into account that the activities carried out do not constitute in general, except for specific activities of individual offices, as functions with a high technical content; (e) information must be given to the Unions on the general criteria of JR; this obligation would allow them to submit their own comments and proposals, but would not imply any negotiation or veto power; However, the ANAC hopes that, based on the current regulatory framework in Italy, the rule-makers will provide clear rules that prevent the paralyzing power of the Unions and at the same time enable them to evaluate individual reorganization initiatives.

Case 2. Job Rotation in the Italian National Health Service. The ANAC's 2016 National Anti-Corruption Plan dedicates an ample part to the issues of staff rotation

in the health sector (ANAC, 2016, pp. 99-101). Starting from the premise that JR should be considered «primarily as a regular instrument of organization and optimal use of human resources not to be used in an emergency or with punitive value», the ANAC notes some specific critical issues in the health sector. The clinical area is substantially constrained by its need for specialist qualifications and skills and consolidated expertise which cause it to be considered as an area in which JR is difficult to apply. That said, levels of organizational discretion can be found. The ANAC points out that medical personnel are all framed in the managerial role and therefore potentially fungible within the medical category and that the positions of greatest interest for the purposes of JR could be those of management in the *Unità Operative Complesse* (UOCs) of the department. While the UOCs carry out mainly clinical-care tasks, other departmental units carry out mainly managerial functions. Given the current selection system based on the principle of open competition which allows any medical officer of a department to compete for the direction of departmental offices, it would be possible in theory to envisage a wider rotation system. For UOCs with robust management, such as, for example, those of a hospital unit or health district, the design of an adequate and timely system of selection and professional development could create the conditions to expand the base of human resources to be used in case of JR. For the area of the other clinical and health professions most exposed to corruption risks (pharmacists and nurses), JR would allow them to comply to obligations of a correct anti-corruption policy and also to help the professional development of these particular figures. As for the clinical area, a gradual system of developing skills consistent with the levels of responsibility attributed to them should be designed. Even in the technical area (clinical engineering, health physics, computer science, etc.) the ANAC detects critical issues. The professions in this area require specific technical skills and the people able to carry out these tasks are very limited in number in Italian healthcare organizations. The case of administrative roles is different, such as those of Chief of Staff, Purchasing Department or Administrative Director, for which JR is viable, thanks to the broader cultural and professional base of the subjects able to fill those roles. Ultimately, the ANAC observes, healthcare companies now have a whole series of organizational levers aimed at implementing JR policies that are compatible with both OD objectives and objectives to combat organizational corruption. This can be achieved by acting on human resources and the organizational structure. For human resources, long-term planning that aims to encourage the expansion of the professional base capable of occupying the required positions. For this purpose, tools such as incisive training, potential analysis, performance management can be used. As regards the organizational structure, with the development of organizational models that enhance interdepartmental coordination, which seize the opportunities offered by the integration policies between the hospital network and the network of local services (Ministerial Decree 70/2015) or which increase the mobility of personnel between healthcare companies within the territorial healthcare area.

Case 3. Special Job Rotation. In this case, the ANAC notes some critical issues. Special JR has been little implemented since it was introduced in 2016; corporate anti-corruption plans do not provide for anything in this regard; the administrations, once they have received news of a crime, do not proceed to activate it but rather await the

conclusion of the criminal trial or the intervention of ANAC before doing so; employees do not communicate that they are subjected to criminal proceedings as they should do (ANAC, 2019 / a; ANAC, 2019 / b, pp. 74-75; ANAC / c, 2019, p. 41). A significant case is that of a local authority in which an employee was accused of crimes of «fraudulent misrepresentation», «embezzlement», «bid rigging», «fraud in public supplies», «issuing of false invoices» in the context of a public procurement procedure. The local authority, the ANAC observes, did not make any assessment of the crime allegations nor has it carried out any employee rotation, as it should have done, arguing the need to ensure the proper functioning of the administration. A case in which the administration (in good faith or in bad) opposes plausible organizational motives in the presence of an unequivocal rule of law (ANAC, 2019 / b, pp. 74-75).

Case 4. Smaller Administrations. The ANAC's monitoring also focused on some smaller Italian municipalities. A municipality in Campania of 7.000 inhabitants with reduced staff raised the problem of being unable to implement a JR program due to a lack of staff. The commander of the municipal police was in fact shared with another municipality and middle management performed technical and accounting functions that were not easy to replace. In this case, the ANAC suggested alternative measures to rotation that included teamwork, job sharing, separation between phases of administrative processes, fragmentation of responsibilities. To a municipal administration that had professionals for urban planning and public works (engineers and architects), the ANAC pointed out that with a precise and timely JR policy it could rotate these professionals between the various positions, while respecting the principles of competence, gradualness and training seen previously (ANAC, 2018, pp. 73-79).

Case 5. Larger Administrations. In the case of larger administrations with numerous and extensive territorial divisions, the ANAC finds a general tendency to approve regulations or guidelines aimed at governing JR. This obviously can be explained in terms of greater qualitative and quantitative availability of human resources which allows these administrations to implement effective JR policies. The ANAC, however, verified a case of central administration at the provincial and regional level that had established a strict JR regime that imposed mandatory rotation and a maximum length of stay in positions. This policy of JR was contested within the administration because, it was said, it precluded the «possibility of continuing to make use of valid professionals who had successfully exercised the management functions of the offices entrusted to them» (ANAC, 2018, pp. 73-79; ANAC, 2019/b, pp. 78-83; ANAC, 2019/c, pp. 74-76).

6. Results

JR pursues OD goals by promoting the well-being of people, the professional growth of employees and the strengthening of organizational skills. Alongside physiological purposes aimed at making the organization more productive and engaging, there are also purely defensive purposes that tend to use JR as a tool to combat a potentially destructive phenomenon for the organization such as corruption. The result that emerges from the analyzed sources suggests that we can positively answer the

research question. JR/OD-oriented strategies do not seem necessarily incompatible with JR strategies for combating organizational corruption. The margins for organizational discretion to obtain positive effects from the joint actions of both policies are there. JR/OD-oriented policies can very well avoid the worsening of symbiotic relationships between the corrupted and corruptors who can damage the organization and society. In addition, policies of programmed staff rotation in anti-corruption can have the secondary and unexpected effect of stimulating the professional and human growth of people and the development of the organization's operational capabilities. JR guiding principles from an anti-corruption point of view seem useful and reasonable also from a development perspective. The range of the types of JR identified by the ANAC is very wide and comprehensive and not very different from the measures that could be taken into consideration as part of standard OD strategies. The analysis of the cases examined highlighted areas for action, circumstances, opportunities, common constraints both to the policies to combat organizational corruption and to the policies for growth and strengthening of organizational capacities.

JR is an organizational measure to combat corruption covered by the best legislation in the world and is used by all organizations to combat abuse and misconduct of all kinds. JR is an organizational measure with multiple effects and only a contingent assessment of the priorities that characterize an organization in a certain place and at a specific moment can establish which objectives it should mainly respond to. A competent and far-sighted policy of JR would help the organization not only to improve its performance, the well-being and skills of the individuals who are part of it, but also to counteract the abuses and misconduct that can undermine its survival. "Organizing for what" is therefore not an unsolvable organizational dilemma but rather an organizational policy question that those who manage organizations have a duty to ask themselves.

7. Theoretical contributions, managerial implications, limits and future research

The results of this study **help integrate the theory of organization**. The possible synergies between JR OD-oriented strategies and JR anti-corruption-oriented strategies should lead scholars to consider *Theory of Organization* not only as a *mean* to finding adequate solutions to a given set of problems, but also as an *end*, aimed at making judgments of desirability on a future state of the world (Simon, 1947). JR allows multiple goals to be achieved, individual well-being and organizational effectiveness, protection and defense of the organization from the destructive effects of corruption. The methods of implementation for JR may be conditioned by the aims and priorities that are intended to be pursued, given a certain context, at a given moment in the life of the organization.

The findings of this study have some **practical implications for management**. First implication. The ratio between costs and benefits of JR interventions may seem high in the short term but experiences in this field tell us that the long-term benefits

may exceed the most skeptical expectations, this is because JR is an intervention capable of breaking the spiral of corruption and instead help grow the organization (Philp, 2009). Second implication. Rotation should be seen both as a standard tool for organizing and managing human resources and as an organizational control tool not to be used on a residual basis for emergency or punitive purposes.

This study does have some **limitations**. Regarding the literature, it is possible that the analysis neglected some contributions, given the quantity and pluralism of the studies which deal with the issues of JR and organizational corruption. As for the empirical analysis, it was limited to a documentary analysis of facts, collected and described by a secondary source of information, albeit an authoritative and competent one such as the ANAC.

Future research. Qualitative approaches to research in the field (for example: specific anti-corruption plans and reports analysis; JR analysis through reports and interviews with their staff and administrators in commissioned local authorities, etc.) and quantitative research tools based on the collection and processing of data (for example: through sample statistical analysis) can integrate the results achieved by this study which, however, has the merit of having dealt with a scarcely addressed or explored topic in organizational research. In order to verify the validity of these first results, future research should not only seek confirmation that specific JR strategies jointly cause both organizational development and corruption reduction, but also verify the possibility that there are alternative hypotheses, namely, that JR strategies can generate conflict between organizational development and anti-corruption policies. Future research should gather evidence that a rotation program can strengthen organizational development on the one hand but on the other weaken or leave unchanged the anti-corruption system capacities or satisfy needs to fight corruption at the expense of development. These checks presuppose a rigorous definition of the organizational development and anti-corruption constructs in order to create the basis for rigorously measuring and evaluating their reciprocal relationships and how they vary over time.

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