

Papers on Ancient Greek Linguistics

Proceedings of the Ninth International Colloquium on
Ancient Greek Linguistics
(ICAGL 9)

30 August – 1 September 2018, Helsinki

Societas Scientiarum Fennica

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Edited by
MARTTI LEIWO, MARJA VIERROS & SONJA DAHLGREN

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Modality and Injunctive in Homeric Greek: The role of epistemic particles and adverbs in counterfactual constructions

ANNAMARIA BARTOLOTTA & DANIEL KÖLLIGAN

Structurally, unaugmented aorists and imperfects belong to the oldest layer of verbal forms attested in Greek, which continue the so-called Indo-European ‘injunctive’. The latter was inflectionally underspecified as regards verbal categories such as tense or mood (Hoffmann 1967; Kiparsky 1968). Thus, the question arises as to how the attitude of the speaker toward the content of his utterance was expressed. The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of epistemic particles and adverbs co-occurring with injunctives in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, focusing in particular on past counterfactual constructions. Crosslinguistic studies have shown that such modal constructions reflect the universal semantic distinction between *realis* and *irrealis* (Wierzbicka 1997: 38). In Greek, on the one hand, the main clause or apodosis was always lexically marked by the *irrealis* particle $\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$, expressing a potential event in the past, which in fact never happened (see Hettrich 1998). On the other hand, the *if*-clause or protasis referred to an actual event in the past for which the outcome is already known (*realis*). The data show how particles and adverbs occurring in the protasis assumed an epistemic value, expressing the speaker’s commitment to the truth-value or factual status of his proposition. The analysis of all the occurrences of such complex constructions shows a non-random distribution of those epistemic particles and adverbs, whose frequency significantly decreases when the verb of the protasis is an indicative rather than an injunctive. Thus, it might be argued that they played an important role in expressing epistemic modality before the emerging indicative mood rendered them less functional at a later stage. Another piece of evidence in favour of this hypothesis comes from the epistemic verb $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$, that develops into a periphrastic marker for future tense, especially as a future in the past (cf. Allan 2017). The Homeric poems show most instances of the unaugmented 3SG occurring with an epistemic particle, while there is variation with the augmented form.

1 Introduction¹

The literature on epistemic modality has mostly focused on grammatical expressions, such as affixes, clitics, and auxiliaries, although all languages have lexical epistemic modal expressions at their disposal (Boye 2016: 122), such as verbs, adverbs, adjectives, but also particles. In addition, epistemic modality can be conveyed through mood selection (Podlesskaya 2001: 1005; Ruiz Yamuza 2014: 456; Hoff 2019). The indicative mood implies a high confidence in or certainty about the proposition asserted (Boye 2016: 126 and references therein; Silk 2018: 160; cf. Bybee et al. 1994: 226, 321; De Haan 2006: 33). As Fillmore (1990: 142) puts it, the indicative expresses “the positive epistemic stance of the speaker” (see also Willmott 2007: 39). If one takes a diachronic perspective, it is worth investigating how the attitude of the speaker toward the content of his/her utterance was originally expressed with relation to the earlier Greek inflectional verb system. As is well-known, Homeric augmentless aorists and imperfects were residual forms that continued PIE injunctives. These were inflectionally underspecified as regards verbal categories such as tense, mood or modality (Hoffmann 1967; Kiparsky 1968), and consequently one might suppose that the speaker’s commitment to the truth of his proposition could be expressed by lexical means. Specifically, one might expect that modal epistemic particles and adverbs were more frequent with injunctives than indicatives, as the latter were already inflected according to the mood expressing assertion, which in turn involves epistemic modality (Bybee 1985: 16). Let us consider the following formulaic passages taken from the *Iliad* forming a ‘minimal pair’:

(1) ἐνθά **κέ** τοι Μενέλαε **φάνη** βιότοιο τελευτή (*Il.* 7.104).
 ‘then, Menelaus, the end of life would have appeared to you’

(2) ἐνθ’ **ἄρα** τοι Πάτροκλε **φάνη** βιότοιο τελευτή (*Il.* 16.787).
 ‘then, Patroclus, the end of life appeared to you’.

Both (1) and (2) show exactly the same constituents, including the same injunctive φάνη from φαίνω ‘to appear’, but what makes the difference is the

¹ This paper is the result of the collaboration of the two authors. For academic purposes, Annamaria Bartolotta is responsible for writing Sections 1, 2, and 3, while Daniel Kölligan for writing Sections 4 and 5. We would like to thank the audience at the Helsinki International Conference on Greek Linguistics and the members of the international research group GAG (Group Aspect en Grec) for their useful comments on an earlier version of this study.

modal particle. In (1) the conditional (*irrealis*) particle *κέ* marks the apodosis of a past counterfactual construction: the analysis of the discourse context shows indeed that Menelaus does not die (3).

(3) ἔνθά **κέ** τοι Μενέλαε **φάνη** βιότοιο τελευτή
 Ἕκτορος ἐν παλάμῃσιν, ἐπεὶ πολὺν φέρτερος ἦεν,
 εἰ μὴ ἀναΐζαντες ἔλον βασιλῆες Ἀχαιῶν (*Il.* 7.104–106).
 ‘Then, Menelaus, the end of life would have appeared to you
 at the hands of Hector, as he was mightier far,
 if the kings of the Achaeans had not sprung up and grasped you.’

Instead, in (2) the epistemic particle *ἄρα* marks an assertion expressing an objective fact that really happened (*realis*), and that the speaker considers as established, given, and uncontroversial: Patroclus died during the battle (4).

(4) ἔνθ' **ἄρα** τοι Πάτροκλε **φάνη** βιότοιο τελευτή [...]
 Ἕκτωρ Πριαμίδης σχεδὸν ἔγχεϊ θυμὸν ἀπήυρα (*Il.* 16.787; 828)
 ‘Then, Patroclus, the end of life appeared to you [...]
 Hector, Priam’s son, took his life away, smiting him from close with his spear’

This minimal pair allows us to observe the important role of modal particles co-occurring with injunctives, as they seem to be the only means that specify the modal value of the sentence. In (4) the indicative *ἀπήυρα* describes a real, factual event, i.e. Hector killed Patroclus, conveying *per se* the speaker’s commitment to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition (cf. De Haan 2006: 33), whereas it seems that the ‘neutral’ injunctive *φάνη* in the preceding verse prefers a lexical strategy, here the particle *ἄρα*, to mark such factuality.²

The aim of this paper is to investigate the path of development that has characterized the expression of epistemic modality in the passage from the zero-mood stage of the injunctive (cf. Duhoux 2000: 92) to the inflectional-mood stage of the indicative, which has been defined as an ‘epistemic mood’ (Bybee 1985: 16; 1994: 321).³ In particular, Homeric Greek shows a non-random distribution

² This does not mean that injunctives without epistemic particles may not describe factual events, as e.g. in *Il.* 11.734 ἀλλά σφι προπάρσιθε φάνη μέγα ἔργον Ἄρης ‘but before that a mighty deed of war appeared to them’. The following discussion will show, however, that there is a preference for unaugmented forms as opposed to past indicatives to co-occur with epistemic particles.

³ For a different opinion on this definition, see Boye (2012: 34).

of epistemic particles and adverbs co-occurring with injunctives and indicatives in past counterfactual constructions. In what follows the role of such epistemic particles in the *Iliad*, *Odyssey* and the *Homeric Hymns* will be investigated based on the textual analysis of discourse contexts and with reference to the theoretical framework of Functional Discourse Grammar (cf. Allan 2017b; Hengeveld 2004). The major corpus resources used in this study include the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG 2000) as digital corpus of Homeric Greek texts.⁴ The paper is organized as follows. After introducing the role of epistemic modality in past counterfactuals from a typological perspective, Section 2 describes the structure of Homeric past counterfactuals, dwelling upon the distinction between the so-called *if*-clause or protasis and *then*-clause or apodosis. The latter is the main clause, lexically marked by the *irrealis* particle $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ followed by an injunctive or a past indicative, whereas the protasis is usually introduced by $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ $\mu\grave{\eta}$ followed by an injunctive or a past indicative. Section 3 focuses on the protasis and, specifically, on how the speaker expresses his attitude toward the truth of the proposition. The analysis of all the epistemic particles and adverbs occurring in the protasis will show that their frequency significantly decreases when the verb is an indicative rather than an injunctive. Thus, it might be argued that particles and adverbs played an important role in expressing epistemic modality before the emerging indicative mood rendered them less functional or more redundant at a later stage. The particles found in the protasis of past counterfactuals are $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ (3.1), $\delta\acute{\eta}$ (3.2), $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ (3.3), $\gamma\epsilon$ (3.4), $\tau\omicron\iota$ (3.5), and the epistemic adverb $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha$ (3.6). In Section 4 this hypothesis is supported by the analysis of a specific case-study of the verb $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$ whose epistemic meaning ('be likely') is restricted to unaugmented forms, while in the past indicatives it describes an event as predestined, intended by the subject or as about to happen soon after the reference time. The concluding Section 5 provides some final remarks and gives directions for further research.

2 The dual meaning of counterfactuals

According to Chung and Timberlake (1985: 242) and Elliott (2000: 71), counterfactuals belong to the domain of possibility, and therefore they should be analyzed within the framework of epistemic modality (see Hengeveld 2004:

⁴ Reference works for Homeric Greek include Schwyzer (1959), Chantraine (2013; 2015), and LSJ (1996). Critical editions of the Homeric poems used are Mazon (1957–1961), Monro-Allen (1978), van Thiel (1991; 1996), West (1998; 2000; 2017). The reference translation is Murray-Wyatt (1999a; 1999b).

1195), which characterizes the event with respect to the actual world and its possible alternatives. As Traugott et al. put it (1986: 3), “conditional (*if-then*) constructions directly reflect the characteristically human ability to reason about alternative situations, [...] to imagine possible correlations between situations, and to understand how the world would change if certain correlations were different”. Counterfactual constructions are indeed considered as a semantic primitive reflecting the universal distinction between *realis* and *irrealis*, as there is no language that does not have some lexical or grammatical means for marking counterfactuals (Wierzbicka 1997: 38). Interestingly enough, cognitive theories of counterfactual language processing assume that counterfactuals convey a dual meaning, i.e. they express a supposition while implying the factual state of affairs (Kulakova and Nieuwland 2016: 49). In a typological perspective, although it is the apodosis that typically attracts *irrealis* marking, in the ‘imaginative conditionals’ “there can be a combination of *irrealis* marking and *realis* marking, conditioned by the perceived status of the event reported in each separate clause” (Elliott 2000: 72–73) that is part of the whole construction. Focusing on Homeric Greek, it is worth observing that the inverted and typologically unexpected order of apodosis (modal particle $\kappa\epsilon$ + preterite) and protasis (subordinating conjunction $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ + negation $\mu\acute{\eta}$ + preterite) that characterizes the structure of past counterfactuals has been explained as a reflex of an older paratactic structure (Hettrich 1998; Haiman 1983 for a typological perspective). More specifically, the conditional main clause expressed a potential event (*irrealis*), but was followed by a coordinated main clause to exclude the realization of the potential event and report what really happened (*realis*). The latter clause was initially introduced by the adversative, non-subordinating conjunction $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$, as shown in (5):

(5) οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ κεν αὐτὸς ὑπέκφυγε κῆρα μέλαιναν,
 ἄλλ’ Ἥφαιστος ἔρυτο, σάωσε δὲ νυκτὶ καλύψας (Il. 5.22–23).
 ‘Nay, nor would he himself (Idaeus) have escaped black fate,
 but Hephaestus guarded him, saved him, enfolding him in darkness.’

Although (5) does not show the canonical *if-then* structure, in which the protasis precedes the apodosis, it nonetheless represents a past counterfactual construction (= Idaeus would not have escaped his fate, if Hephaestus had not guarded him). Only at a later stage was the adversative conjunction $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$, which in our corpus is found 22 times, replaced by the subordinating conjunction $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ (63×), usually followed by the negation $\mu\acute{\eta}$ (Hettrich 1998: 267). In this study we have analyzed all the past counterfactuals in the Homeric poems (and hymns), paying particular

attention to the epistemic or attitudinal particles and adverbs co-occurring within the protasis, which represents the *realis* part of the construction (De Haan 2012: 124). These particles/adverbs can express different degrees of the speaker's commitment to the truth or factual status of the proposition. The corpus consists of 116 past counterfactuals, whose protases show the following verb distribution (table 1).

Table 1. The distribution of aorist/imperfect injunctives and indicatives in the protasis.

	aorist	imperfect	total
injunctive	51	9	60
indicative	46	10	56

It is worth noting that while the absence of the augment in all the instances of injunctive in our corpus is metrically secure, the augment of the indicative forms is not always guaranteed, i.e. some indicatives could actually be interpreted as injunctives (Krisch 1986: 26). Overall, table 1 shows a quite balanced distribution of injunctives and indicatives, with a strong predominance of aorists over imperfects.⁵ The aorist/imperfect distinction is aspectual rather than temporal (Horrocks 1996, Gerö 2001, see Basset 2004) and turns out not to be relevant for the purpose of this analysis. The sample also includes those forms of the verb ὀφείλω (13×) that are not simple desideratives, but part of a counterfactual construction, such as in (6).

- (6) [...] ὡς ὄφελεν θανέειν ἐν χερσὶν ἐμῆσι·
 τό κε κορεσσάμεθα κλαίοντέ τε μυρομένω τε
 μήτηρ θ', ἣ μιν ἔτικτε δυσάμμορος, ἠδ' ἐγὼ αὐτός (Il. 22.426–428).
 '[...] I wish he had died in my arms;
 we would have satiated ourselves crying and shedding tears
 both mother, who miserable begot him, and myself.'

⁵ There are only two optatives in the protases of the whole corpus, and they will not be considered in our analysis. Since the injunctive will be replaced by the indicative, optatives are indeed not representative in order to evaluate the role of epistemic particles in the injunctive/indicative opposition. More details on the role of the optative in Homeric counterfactuals and within the Greek verbal system can be found in Hettrich (1998), Horrocks (1996), and Rix (1986).

The impersonal form ὄφελεν in (6) used by Priam, the king of Troy, refers to a counterfactual wish referring to the past,⁶ which would have had a consequence that in fact did not take place, as the preceding verses let us know (Achilles has just killed Priam's son Hector outside the walls of Troy). It thus functions as a protasis, which is followed by the apodosis in a counterfactual construction (= if Hector had died at home in his parents' arms - but both Priam and the Trojans know that he did not -, Priam and his wife Hecuba would have satiated themselves with tears).

As regards the distribution of counterfactuals between narrative and speech, the indicative turns out to be more frequent in the speech dialogues compared to the injunctive, as shown in table 2.

Table 2. The distribution of narrative/speech injunctives and indicatives in the protasis.

	narrative	speech
injunctive	38	22
indicative	26	30

This is not surprising, since the augmented forms of the indicative tend to replace the unaugmented forms in the history of Greek, and this replacement is observable more clearly in the actual language used in dialogues (cf. Lazzeroni 2017 and references therein). As is predicted in a typological perspective (Elliott 2000), our sample shows that the main clause is always marked by the modal *irrealis* particle κε(v). This is followed by a preterite injunctive or indicative and refers to a potential event in the past that never happened. On the other hand, the subordinate clause turns out to be lexically marked by an epistemic particle or adverb, though not systematically. In fact, the *realis* tends to be cross-linguistically unmarked (Elliott 2000: 57; Palmer 2001 [1986]: 7; Hengeveld 2004: 1196). In a Functional Discourse Grammar perspective, we will see how these co-occurring particles can take their scope at both representational (semantic) and interpersonal (pragmatic) levels. Different levels of epistemic modality may indeed co-exist in the same utterance (cf. Ramat & Ricca 1998: 267).

⁶ On the progressive grammaticalization of ὄφείλω in ancient Greek see Allan (1993).

3 Epistemic particles and adverbs in the protasis of Homeric past counterfactuals

In this section the role of epistemic particles and adverbs co-occurring with injunctives *vs* indicatives is investigated by means of textual analysis of discourse contexts, within the framework of Functional Discourse Grammar. The particles and adverbs found in our sample are ἄρα (14×), γε (8×), δὴ (4×), πού (1×), τοι (1×), and μάλα (2×). We will analyse a set of examples chosen for each particle and adverb modifying the protasis of past counterfactuals.

3.1 The particle ἄρα

The modal or attitudinal particle ἄρα is the most frequently attested in the corpus (14×), which also includes six formulae, thus proving that this construction pertains to the earliest stage of the language (Krisch 1986: 28; Edwards 1997: 267 and references therein). It is widely held that ἄρα specifies the attitude of the speaker with regard to the proposition he puts forward for consideration (Wakker 1994: 350), also expressing a lively feeling of interest (Denniston 1954: 33). It thus takes scope over the proposition at the so-called representational level (subjective epistemic modality). However, it also indicates shared knowledge of facts that are already known (Grimm 1962: 9) and is used by the speaker to draw attention (cf. LSJ *s.v.* ἄρα), thus reinforcing the assertive force of the speech act. In other words, its scope ranges from the representational (propositional) to the interpersonal (pragmatic) level, and specifically to the layer of illocution, which is related to the conversational use of the sentence (Hengeveld 2004: 1192).⁷ It might be said that already in Homer this particle shows the tendency of semantic–functional scope increase that has been ascribed to ancient Greek particles within the framework of Functional Discourse Grammar (Allan 2017: 103). Consider, for instance, the following examples (7)–(9).

⁷ According to Bakker (1993; 1997) ἄρα would be an evidential particle, marking the interpretation of visual evidence related to a previous experience in the past that is re-experienced in the here and now of the speaker. In this way, ἄρα would mark the participatory involvement of the speaker/poet and of the audience. However, both the existence of the category of evidentiality in Homeric Greek and the boundary between evidentiality and epistemicity are debated topics, which will not be pursued in this paper. For further details see Joseph (2003a; 2003b) and Van Rooy (2016) on Attic Greek.

(7) καί κεν πάλαι ἐνθάδ' Ὀδυσσεὺς
 ἦην· ἀλλ' ἄρα οἱ τό γε κέρδιον εἶσατο θυμῷ,
 χρήματ' ἀγυρτάζειν πολλὴν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἰόντι (*Od.* 19.282–284).
 'And Odysseus would have been here for a long time;
 but certainly it seemed to his mind more profitable
 to collect goods while going over the wide earth.'

The passage in (7) is taken from the story that Odysseus tells Penelope about his adventures after the war of Troy, without revealing his own identity. Disguised as an old beggar, he tells Penelope why Odysseus has not returned yet. The use of ἄρα in this narration shows Odysseus' high confidence in the truth of his assertion, since of course only he knows his own mind. He tries to convince Penelope that Odysseus is late for a noble cause, i.e. gathering wealth for his family. In this sense, the epistemic particle is meant to reinforce the assertion in order to persuade Penelope of his loyalty, functioning at both semantic and pragmatic levels. The interaction with the addressee is also evident in (8).

(8) τῷ κέν τοι τύμβον μὲν ἐποίησαν Παναχαιοί,
 ἠδέ κε καὶ σῶ παιδί μέγα κλέος ἦρα' ὀπίσσω·
 νῦν δ' ἄρα σ' οἰκτίστῳ θανάτῳ εἴμαρτο ἀλῶναι (*Od.* 24.32–34).
 'All the Achaeans would have made you a tomb,
 and also you would have raised great glory for your son afterwards;
 but now it was decreed that you were seized by the most pitiable death.'

Example (8) is taken from the dialogue between Achilles and Agamemnon as ghosts in the realm of the dead. Achilles thought that Agamemnon was dearer to Zeus than all other heroes (v. 25). However, everyone on earth can see now that he died a miserable death at the hands of Aegisthus and his wife Clytemnestra. If he had died during the battle of Troy, all the Achaeans would instead have honored him and his son. The epistemic particle ἄρα in this dialogue refers to a factual event that is well-known to both speaker (Achilles) and addressee (Agamemnon). In this sense, ἄρα expresses not only the speaker's high commitment to the truth of his proposition at the representational level, but also a high involvement of the addressee at the interpersonal or pragmatic level.

Example (9) contains the formula that typically appears in the protasis of Homeric past counterfactuals:

- (9) καί νύ κεν εἴρυσσέν τε καὶ ἄσπετον ἦρατο κῦδος,
 εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη (*Il.* 3.373–374).
 'And now he (Menelaus) would have dragged (Alexander) away and taken
 unspeakable glory, if Aphrodite daughter of Zeus had not quickly noticed him.'

Here the poet explains how Alexander escaped death at the hands of Menelaus thanks to the goddess Aphrodite, who broke the thongs with which Menelaus was dragging the Trojan hero (v. 375). The epistemic particle ἄρα indicates the total commitment by the poet to the truth of the proposition, which describes a factual event that really happened. At the same time, it refers to the common ground shared by the poet and his audience: they both know that the goddess protected the Trojan hero.

3.2 *The particle δῆ*

The modal or attitudinal particle δῆ 'certainly, surely' (LSJ), which is found four times in our corpus, expresses subjective epistemic modality denoting "that a thing really and truly is so" (Denniston 1954: 202).⁸ Additionally, it can be used to emphasize or reinforce the force of the speech act (illocutionary modification), drawing special attention to the proposition presented (Wakker 1994: 351). In the perspective of Functional Discourse Grammar it can thus function at both representational and interpersonal levels. As seen for ἄρα, δῆ takes its scope over the whole proposition (Denniston 1954: 204),⁹ as illustrated in the following examples (10)–(11).

- (10) οὐ γάρ κέν με τάχ' ἄλλος ἀνὴρ παρέπεισεν Ἀχαιῶν.
 ἀλλὰ σὺ γὰρ δῆ πολλά πάθεις καὶ πολλά μόγησας (*Il.* 23.606–607).
 'In fact another man of the Achaeans would have not soon persuaded me.
 But you certainly have suffered greatly and toiled greatly [...for my sake].'

Here Menelaus is addressing Antilochus, who has always shown great loyalty toward Menelaus, contributing much to his cause at Troy. Therefore, both

⁸ It is well known that the semantic shift in the subjectification process "goes from the world being talked about to the views on that world uttered by the speaker in her/his act of speaking" (Ramat & Ricca 1998: 243 and references therein; on subjectification see Traugott 1989).

⁹ Bakker (1997: 75) considers δῆ as a marker of evidentiality, which marks "the narration as deriving from a common experience that binds the narrator and listeners as if they were witnessing a given scene".

Menelaus and Antilochus know what Antilochus has really suffered during the war. For this reason, the modal particle δὴ indicates not only that Menelaus believes in the truth of his assertion (subjective epistemic modality), but also that he shares such a truth with his addressee (i.e. common ground), at a pragmatic or interpersonal level.

(11) ὡς δὴ ἐγὼ γ' ὄφελον θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν
 ἦματι τῷ ὅτε μοι πλεῖστοι χαλκήρεα δοῦρα
 Τρῶες ἐπέρριψαν περὶ Πηλεΐωνι θανόντι.
 τῷ κ' ἔλαχον κτερέων, καί μεν κλέος ἦγον Ἀχαιοί· (*Od.* 5.308–311)
 'I wish I had died and faced my destiny
 on that day when most of the Trojans threw bronze spears at me
 around the dead son of Peleus. Then I would have obtained
 funeral honours, and the Achaeans would have celebrated my fame.'

The protasis of the past counterfactual construction in (11) shows the injunctive ὄφελον: if Odysseus had died in Troy during the war, his glory would have been everlasting among the Achaeans. He is now scared of the terrible storm that Poseidon, the Earth-shaker, has stirred up. He is afraid to face death at the hands of the god. Thus, he addresses himself being aware of the fact that if only he had died in Troy, he would have received honours and fame. Here, the particle δὴ expresses the high commitment of the speaker (Odysseus) to the truth of his proposition. It is worth noting that both (10) and (11) are examples of direct speech: as has been pointed out recently, “the most natural reading is that δὴ marks the intensity behind the utterance, and does not function to intensify one of the constituents in the act. Therefore, δὴ has scope over at least its entire act, and its force modifies the act of uttering” (Bonifazi et al. 2016: 3.3.1).¹⁰

3.3 *The particle που*

The modal or attitudinal particle που derives from the indefinite spatial adverb meaning ‘somewhere’ from which “is developed the sense ‘I suppose’, ‘I think’, the particle conveying a feeling of uncertainty of the speaker” (Denniston 1954: 490). It is attested only once in the protasis of past counterfactuals (12):

¹⁰ Note that this function of ὀφείλω is not restricted to injunctive forms, cf. e.g. (without epistemic particle) *Il.* 3.428 ἦλυθες ἐκ πολέμου· ὡς ὄφελες αὐτόθ' ὀλέσθαι “You have come back from the war; I wish you had died there.”

- (12) καί κε θάμ' ἐνθάδ' ἐόντες ἐμισγόμεθ'· οὐδέ κεν ἡμέας
 ἄλλο διέκρινεν φιλέοντέ τε τερπομένω τε, [...]
 ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν **που** μέλλεν ἀγάσασθαι θεὸς αὐτός (*Od.* 4.178–181).
 'And, living here, we would often have met together, nor would
 anything else have separated us, loving and joying in one another, [...]
 but of this, I suppose, the god himself must have been jealous.'

Menelaus is telling Telemachus how he would have rewarded Odysseus for his services during the Trojan war, if only the god had not been jealous of this. Indeed, since Odysseus was prevented from returning home and benefiting from Menelaus' gifts, it can only be supposed that a god is jealous of the strong friendship existing between the two heroes. As already discussed in Section 2 with reference to example (5), the protasis is introduced by the adversative conjunction ἀλλά. The speaker does not know the real reason why Odysseus cannot return home. Thus, the particle **που** is meant to express the low commitment of the speaker to the truth of his proposition (subjective epistemic modality): Menelaus can only hypothesize that a god is responsible for that. Note also the use of unaugmented μέλλω 'be likely' discussed in detail in Section 4: both particle and verb mark the proposition as the speaker's conjecture about the state of affairs.

3.4 *The particle γε*

The particle **γε** is usually defined as an emphatic or focus particle (Sicking 1986: 125; Wakker 1994: 308), but also as "a particle of conversation" (Denniston 1954: 116). As has been pointed out recently, "γε's function is to reflect the speaker's personal involvement by emphasizing a certain element of the discourse. This is true even if γε's scope is limited to a noun phrase; [...] the emphasis *per se* brings the author's presence to the foreground" (Bonifazi et al. 2016: 5.3.2). Although this particle takes initially its scope over a single phrase, it nonetheless may have an impact on the whole proposition (on scope increase of Greek particles see Allan 2017b). Let us consider the following examples (13)–(14).

- (13) εἰ δέ τινι ἐξ ἄλλου **γε** θεῶν γένεω ᾧδ' αἰδηλος
 καί κεν δὴ πάλοι ἦσθα ἐνέρτερος Οὐραυνίωνων (*Il.* 5.897–898).
 'But if you were born from any other god, you so destructive,
 then long since had you been lower than the sons of heaven.'

In (13), Zeus is very angry with his son Ares, who is always looking for a fight. Although its scope starts off over the PP ἐξ ἄλλου γε θεῶν ‘from another among the gods’, the particle γε here emphasizes the degree of truth of the whole proposition (protasis) as perceived by the speaker. In fact, both speaker (Zeus) and addressee (Ares), but also the poet and his audience, *surely* know that Ares is Zeus’ son, and not the son of another god (a similar example is *Od.* 23, 21–22).

(14) εἰ γάρ μιν ζῶν γε κίχεις Ἴθάκης ἐνὶ δῆμῳ,
τῷ κέν σ' εὖ δώροισιν ἀμειψάμενος ἀπέπεμψε
καὶ ξενίῃ ἀγαθῇ (*Od.* 24.284–286).

‘For if you had reached him alive in the land of Ithaca,
he would have sent you away happily repaying with gifts
and good hospitality.’

The passage in (14) is taken from Laertes’ answer to the question posed to him by his son Odysseus, who has just arrived in Ithaca but has not yet revealed his identity. Twenty years ago Odysseus had left Ithaca, and now Laertes can hardly believe that his son is still alive. As seen in the case of example (13), here the use of the particle γε, which initially takes its scope over the AP ζῶν ‘alive’, is meant to bring the speaker’s presence to the foreground, by emphasizing his commitment to the truth of the utterance. In fact, it is evident to all the inhabitants of Ithaca that Odysseus has not been living on the island for many years.

3.5 *The particle τοι*

From its etymological meaning as (ethical) dative of the second person pronoun (Denniston 1954: 537), the particle τοι has developed the epistemic meaning of reinforcing the speech act “by signaling to the addressee to pay special attention to the speech act (‘note that’, ‘mind you’)”, thus showing a scope increase from the representational to the interpersonal level (Allan 2017b: 109). The passage in (15) below shows how already in Homer the particle tends to such a development, while still retaining its original dative meaning.

(15) [...] ὡς ὄφελόν τοι
νεΐατον ἐς κενεῶνα βαλὼν ἐκ θυμὸν ἐλέσθαι.
οὔτω κεν καὶ Τρῶες ἀνέπνευσαν κακότητος (*Il.* 11.380–382).

[...] I wish I had taken your life away
 after hitting you in the lower abdomen.
 So the Trojans would have recovered from their miseries'

Alexander is addressing Diomedes, after having hurt him with his arrow. In this example, which exhibits the only occurrence of $\tau\omicron\iota$ in the protasis of Homeric past counterfactuals, the dative $\tau\omicron\iota$ can be considered as referring to a participant (recipient) of the state of affairs described by the verb $\acute{\epsilon}\xi\alpha\iota\rho\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ 'take away (your life)', at the representational level. However, the context of this dialogue clearly shows a defiant attitude by the Trojan hero toward Diomedes, who has got just a scratch on his right foot at the hands of Alexander. The speaker wants to reinforce the impact of the speech act by using $\tau\omicron\iota$ (= 'note that / mind you that I almost killed you'), which increases its scope involving the illocution at the layer of the proposition (interpersonal level).

3.6 *The adverb μάλα*

The degree adverb $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha$ 'very' appears to have developed already in Homer the epistemic function of expressing the total commitment of the speaker about the truth of his proposition, meaning 'certainly'. According to LSJ (*s.v.* $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha$), it can be used in the Homeric poems to reinforce the strength of an assertion. This is hardly surprising, as it has been shown how the same adverb may perform different functions at different layers (Ramat & Ricca 1998: 193). This adverb, which can modify adjectives, adverbs, verbs, sentences, is attested only twice in our sample, and is used to mark the speaker's assertion expressing the highest grade of likelihood of a state of affairs (cf. Nuyts 2001: 55). Let us examine both the occurrences in (16) and (17).

(16) ἀλλὰ **μάλα** Τρῶες δειδήμονες· ἦ τέ κεν ἤδη
 λάϊνον ἔσσο χιτῶνα κακῶν ἔνεχ' ὅσσα ἔοργας (*Il.* 3.56–57)
 'But certainly the Trojans (are) fearful: surely by this time you would have
 worn a coat of stone because of all the evil you have done.'

The passage in (16) is taken from the speech Hector is addressing to Alexander, who is proving to be a coward in battle. The Trojan hero closes his speech with a counterfactual construction: if the Trojans had not been fearful, you would be dead by now = the Trojans are fearful, otherwise you would be dead. Here protasis and apodosis are presented as alternatives, given the logical equivalence

between counterfactuals and disjunctions (Krisch 1986: 14–15). On the one hand, the protasis is introduced by the adversative conjunction ἀλλά and appears as a nominal sentence in which the injunctive of the verb ‘to be’, as expected, is *zero* (Praust 2003: 140). On the other hand, the particle ἦ combined with τε opens the apodosis, as is frequently attested in Homer (Denniston 1954: 281). Now, although the adverb μάλα in the protasis could be interpreted as an intensifier adverb at the lower adjectival phrase layer (modifying the adjective δευδῆμονες), we hypothesize that here it develops an epistemic meaning at the higher propositional layer. This hypothesis is supported by syntactic evidence. In fact, in the Homeric poems, when it is a degree or intensifier adverb, μάλα tends to immediately precede the adjective it modifies, while here there would be a discontinuous adjectival phrase μάλα [...] δευδῆμονες.¹¹ The reason for such a shift is plausibly to be ascribed to the different scope the adverb takes over the sentence. Hector not only shows a high confidence about the truth of his proposition, but also wants to strengthen the illocutive force of his assertion at the pragmatic or interpersonal level (illocutionary modification), in front of both Alexander and his soldiers.

(17) [...], οὐδὲ κέ τις μιν
 κλαῦσεν Ἀχαιῖάδων· **μάλα** γὰρ μέγα μήσατο ἔργον (*Od.* 3.260–261).
 ‘[...], nor would any of the Achaeans women
 have mourned him; surely indeed he planned a serious deed’

¹¹ The degree adverb μάλα usually precedes the adjective it modifies, cf. μάλα πολύς, πολλή, πολύ (50×) (in *Il.* 19.265; 20.247 and in *Od.* 1, 278, 292; 2.197, 223; 11.280 μάλα immediately follows πολλά in emphatic position), μάλα πᾶς, πᾶσα, πᾶν (19×) (in *Il.* 15.546 and *Od.* 5.216; 9.238, 338; 11.134; 16.286; 17.547; 19.5, 558; 23.281 μάλα immediately follows πᾶς in emphatic position), μάλα μέγας, μεγάλη, μέγα (9×), μάλα καλός, ή, όν (8×) (in *Il.* 19.11 and *Od.* 15.369 μάλα immediately follows καλᾶ in emphatic position), μάλα καρτερός, ά, όν (7×), μάλα πίων, πῖον (4×), μάλα μυρῖος, α, ον (4×), μάλα νήπιος, α, ον (3×), μάλα λυγρός, ά, όν (3×), μάλ’ ἀσκηθής, ές (3×), μάλα μακρός, ά, όν (2×), μάλα παῦρος, ον (2×), μάλ’ ἀριφραδής, ές (2×), μάλα μέρμερος, ον (1×), μάλα ήδύς, ήδεΐα, ήδύ (1×), μάλα δνοφερός, ά, όν (1×), μάλα πυκνός, ή, όν (1), μάλ’ έσθλός, ή, όν (1×), μάλ’ εὔκηλος, ον (1×), μάλ’ ἴφθῆμος, ον (1×), μάλ’ ἀργαλέος α, ον (1×), μάλ’ έλαφρός, ά, όν (1×), μάλ’ δξύς, εΐα, ύ (1×), μάλ’ άφνειός, όν (1×), μάλ’ αΐνοπαθής, ές (1×), μάλ’ άρτίφρων, ον (1×). If one of the abovementioned adjectives is not immediately adjacent to the adverb μάλα, the latter takes its scope over the whole sentence, as can be seen in *Il.* 9.108 (μάλα γάρ τοι έγωγε πόλλ’ άπεμυθεόμην), *Od.* 1.301 (καί σύ, φίλος, μάλα γάρ σ’ όρώ καλόν τε μέγαν τε), and 11.621 (μάλα γάρ πολὺν χείρονα φωτὶ δευδῆμην).

In (17) Nestor answers the question posed to him by Telemachus about Agamemnon's fate. He refers to Aegisthus, who, after having seduced Agamemnon's wife, murdered the king of Mycenae upon his return from Troy. As every Achaeon, Nestor definitely believes that Aegisthus is guilty of an awful murder. Here, although one might consider *μάλα* as a degree adverb modifying the adjective *μέγα* (lit. 'a very big deed'), it seems that the adverb increases its scope from the adjectival phrase to the whole proposition. Besides the fact that also in this verse the metrical necessity does not seem to play a crucial role in the adverb's shift to the beginning of the sentence, there is syntactic evidence for this hypothesis. Specifically, as observed for (16), *μάλα* does not immediately precede the adjective it modifies, as is usual in Homer, but is located before the connecting particle *γάρ*, which introduces the whole proposition. Furthermore, the same event, i.e. the murder committed by Aegisthus, is described with the very same words (*μέγα ἔργον*) a few verses later (3.275) and again in 11.272. In both cases, however, the adjective *μέγα* is not modified by the degree adverb *μάλα*. Additionally, in this specific expression (*μέγα ἔργον*), which is quite frequent in the Homeric poems (21×), the adjective *μέγα* is never modified by *μάλα*.¹² Given these considerations, it is likely that Nestor uses *μάλα* at the beginning of the sentence as an epistemic adverb expressing his total commitment to the truth of his assertion. And indeed, the gradient character of adverbs as linguistic categories that "are not isolated compartments with no links or overlaps" at the various layers of the linguistic organization has been widely recognized (Ramat & Ricca 1998: 189).

3.7 *The distribution of epistemics with injunctive vs indicative*

After having described the role each single particle and adverb plays in the protasis of Homeric past counterfactuals, we now focus on the main point of the paper, namely the distribution of such epistemics with injunctives and indicatives, with the aim of finding the relationship, if any, between particles and verbs in the expression of epistemic modality. As seen in table 1, there are 116 instances of past counterfactuals *Iliad*, *Odyssey* and *Homeric Hymns*. The protasis, which refers to the factual state of affairs (*realis*), contains aorists (or imperfects) of both injunctive (60×) and indicative (56×). However, against this quite balanced distribution of injunctives and indicatives, the distribution of epistemic particles/adverbs is the following (note that

¹² The phrase *μέγα ἔργον* is also found in *Il.* 19.150, with a comparable syntactic and metrical structure and a sentence adverb in initial position: cp. *ἔτι γὰρ μέγα ἔργον ἄρεκτον* and *μάλα γὰρ μέγα μῆσατο ἔργον*.

the epistemic particles/adverbs co-occurring with injunctives are more frequently found in the *Iliad* than in the more recent *Odyssey*, with a ratio of 63% vs 37%):

Table 3. The distribution of epistemics in the protasis of past counterfactuals.¹³

	epistemics		no epistemics	
injunctive	19	32%	41	68%
indicative	6	11%	50	89%

As is expected in a typological perspective, these results suggest that, while the *irrealis* (apodosis) is always marked with the modal particle $\kappa\epsilon(v)$, the *realis* (protasis) is more often left unmarked (68%). However, if the *realis* is (lexically) marked, it turns out that the frequency of epistemics significantly decreases when the verb of the protasis is an indicative rather than an injunctive. Table 3 shows that injunctives co-occur with epistemics more than three times as often as indicatives. In terms of percentage, notwithstanding the overall low frequency of occurrences, a ratio is found of respectively 76% vs 24%. This suggests that the use of epistemics could initially have been the only (lexical) means to mark the speaker's commitment to the truth of a proposition, while the indicative tensed forms rendered them redundant or less functional, since the verb is already inflected according to modality.

4 A focus on the epistemic verb μέλλω

As pointed out in the introduction (cf. Section 1), the attitude of the speaker toward the propositional content of the utterance may also be expressed by a verb. In what follows, it will be argued that μέλλω 'be likely' shows an interaction with epistemic particles comparable to the one discussed above for injunctives and indicatives.

The verb occurs 88x in *Il.* and *Od.* (μελλ- prs. 22x, impf. 8x; ἐμελλ- impf. 58x). It is probably derived from μέλω, as proposed *inter alios* by Gray (1947: 287), Ruijgh (1985: 332f.) and recently Allan (2017: 60f.).¹⁴ This verb construes

¹³ It is worth observing that the number of epistemics is somehow underestimated in this counting, as we have decided to consider as single occurrences those five cases in which the protasis actually shows two particles at the same time (e.g. $\delta\acute{\eta}$ and $\gamma\epsilon$ co-occurring in *Od.* 5.308).

¹⁴ Differently, less likely, Szemerényi (1951), who connects μέλλω with βλώσκω, ἔμολον 'go', supposing an original *going-to-future* (cf. in the same sense recently Stüber 2019), but this meaning is likely to be secondary. Cf. also the criticism in Basset (1979: 16–23).

with a nominative stimulus and a dative experiencer, translatable roughly as ‘something is of concern to somebody, something is on somebody’s mind’, as can be seen in (18):

- (18) ὦ πόποι ἦ δὴ παισὶν εἰκότες ἀγοράσθε
 νηπιάρχους οἷς οὐ τι μέλει πολεμήϊα ἔργα (*Il.* 2.337–338).
 ‘Well, now! You are holding assembly
 like silly boys that *care not for deeds of war.*’

Μέλλω may be a present in *-*iel/o-* (**mel-iel/o-* > *μελλε/o-*), in which the suffix serves to delete the experiencer argument.¹⁵ The remaining nominative stimulus thereby becomes a matter of “general concern”, since no experiencer for this concern is specified. This meaning may have developed into ‘[NOM] threatens (to be/do), is likely’, cf. the similar use of *κινδυνεύω* ‘take a risk’ (19) and semantically bleached ‘be likely’ (20) via the general implication ‘danger’ > ‘likelihood’:

- (19) ἀντιπέμπει πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ Φαιδύμη φαμένη **κινδυνεύσειν** μεγάλως, ἦν ποιῆη ταῦτα (*Hdt.* 3.69).
 ‘Phaedyme answered by messenger that she would *run very great risk by so doing* (for if it should turn out that he had no ears, and she were caught feeling for them, he would surely make an end of her; nevertheless she would do it)’
- (20) **Κινδυνεύεις** ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγειν (*Pl. Smp.* 205d).
 ‘You are probably right, I said’¹⁶

This seems to fit the synchronic description of μέλλω by Ruijgh (1985: 327) and Allan (2017: 59) who stress that with μέλλω the speaker’s judgment is not subjective, but presented as an objective one as the evidence imposes itself on any potential observer. It may thus be paraphrased as in the *LfggrE* s.v. (Wakker): “alles deutet(e) darauf hin, daß ...”, and in Allan (2017: 59): “objectively observable indications lead to the inference that the proposition referred to by

¹⁵ Cf. the description of *-*iel/o-* as anticausative suffix / passivizer by Schrijver (1999), e.g. Vedic *kṣiṇāti* ‘y destroys x’: *kṣīyate* ‘x perishes’.

¹⁶ Cf. also NE *to threaten*, e.g. Dickens *Dombey & Son* (1848) iv. 25 *It threatens to be wet to-night* (cf. *OED* s.v. [www.oed.com, accessed 26.7.2019]), Germ. *drohen* ‘to threaten; be likely’ ins *Das Boot droht zu sinken* “The boat is likely to sink”, etc.

the complement infinitive is the case”.¹⁷ This epistemic meaning can be seen in instances like the following:

(21) ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τάχ’ ὁ μοχλὸς ἐλάϊνος ἐν πυρὶ μέλλεν
ἄψεσθαι, χλωρός περ ἑών, διεφαίνετο δ’ αἰνῶς
καὶ τότε ἔγῳν ἄσπον φέρον ἐκ πυρός (Od. 9.378)
‘But when presently that stake of olivewood *was about to catch fire*,
green though it was, and began to glow terribly,
then it was I who brought it near from the fire’¹⁸

The focalizer of the event is Odysseus, hence the judgement ‘the stake is likely to / will catch fire soon’ may be attributed to him.¹⁹

4.1. From injunctive to indicative: semantic developments starting from the epistemic meaning

From the epistemic use further meanings have developed already in Homeric times: a) “predestination” (cf. Allan 2017: 62), by the omission of the feature of directly perceivable evidence. The state of affairs (SoA) is inferred by the speaker, mostly in hindsight, from present evidence, from the result of an event to its non-perceivable cause; b) intention (cf. Allan 2017: 65), which may have developed via an implicature of the epistemic use ‘x is likely to’ in bridging contexts in which x is a human agent, which invites the inference that x also intends to V. An instance of such a context could be the following passage (cf. Allan 2017: 65):

(22) Σκαιάς, τῆ ἄρ’ ἔμελλε διεξίμεναι πεδίον δέ,
ἔνθ’ ἄλοχος πολύδωρος ἐναντίη ἦλθε θεούσα
Ἄνδρομάχη (Il. 6.393–395).

‘When he had passed through the great city and come to the gates, the Scaean

¹⁷ Cf. also Basset (1979: 75): “probabilité présente ou passée”.

¹⁸ Cf. Allan (2017: 60): “But when the olive-wood stake was expected to catch fire.”

¹⁹ There are two more instances of the unaugmented imperfect μέλλε/o- with epistemic meaning: Od. 4.181 ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν που μέλλεν ἀγάσασθαι θεὸς αὐτός “But of this, I suppose, the god himself must have been jealous” (cf. 3.3, ex. 12), Od. 1.232 μέλλεν μὲν ποτε οἶκος ὄδ’ ἀφνειὸς καὶ ἀμύμων / ἔμμεναι, ὄφρ’ ἔτι κείνος ἀνήρ ἐπιδήμιος ἦεν “Our house once bade fair to be [I must have been] rich and irreproachable, so long as that man was still among his people.” These few attestations do not allow firm conclusions as to the interaction of injunctive vs. indicative and particles.

gates, by which *he was about to go out* to the plain, there came running to meet him his wife, wooed with many gifts, Andromache'

Andromache sees Hector returning to battle, being about to pass through the gate. Hence μέλλω may be understood both as 'Hector *was likely* to pass through the gate.' and, as the subject is human, the observer may ascribe intentionality: 'Hector *intended* to go through the gate.'

In other contexts, the epistemic meaning is probably excluded, i.e. μέλλω describes the intention of the subject or predestination only, as shown in (23):

(23) ἐκ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ μέλλε παλίωξιν παρὰ νηῶν (van Thiel, West: ἔμελλε)

θησέμεναι Τρώων, Δαναοῖσι δὲ κῦδος ὀρέξειν (*Il.* 15.601–602).

'For from that time on he [*sc.* Zeus] *was to make* a driving-back of the Trojans from the ships, and to grant glory to the Danaans' (namely, as soon as he would see a Greek ship burning).

The next verse τὰ φρονέων νήεσσιν ἔπι γλαφυρῆσιν ἔγειρεν Ἴκτορα Πριαμίδην 'With *this intent* he was rousing against the hollow ships Hector son of Priam.' indicates that the projected SoA is seen as intended by the subject.

Such a reading is excluded with non-animate subjects, as in the following case, in which μέλλεν expresses a report in hindsight about a predestined course of events:

(24) ἦλθον γὰρ καὶ κείσε, πολλὸς δέ μοι ἔσπετο λαός,

τὴν ὁδὸν ἣ δὴ μέλλεν ἐμοὶ κακὰ κήδε' ἔσεσθαι (*Od.* 6.164–165).

'For there, too, I went, and many men followed with me, on that journey on which evil woes *were to be* my portion'

This implies that μέλλω does not have epistemic meaning here, i.e. the speaker does not portray the ensuing events as foreseeable at reference time. The predestination reading is not restricted to inanimate subjects, however, hence it has become part of the lexical entry of μέλλω already in Homeric times, as illustrated in (25)–(26):

(25) [...] μίνυνθα δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἀχαιοῖ

μέλλον ἀπέσσεσθαι· μάλα γὰρ σφραεας ὦκ' ἐλέλιξεν

Αἴας, ὃς περὶ μὲν εἶδος, περὶ δ' ἔργα τέτυκτο

τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν (*Il.* 17.277–280).

‘Yet for only a short time *were* the Achaeans
to *hold back*, for swiftly did Aias rally them
who in beauty and in deeds of war was above all the other Danaans’

(26) [...] γήθησε δέ μοι φίλον ἦτορ
δυσμόρφ· ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλον ἔτι **ξυνέσεσθαι** οἰζυῖ (von der Mühl: μέλλον)
πολλῇ, τὴν μοι ἐπῶρσε Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων (*Od.* 7.269–271).
‘And my heart was glad,
ill-fated that I was; for truly *I was still to have fellowship* with great woe,
which Poseidon, the earth-shaker, sent upon me’

In the examples discussed so far, three out of a total of eight augmentedless imperfects have epistemic meaning (cf. fn 19). The ratio drops markedly with the augmented forms: there seems to be only one possible case of augmented epistemic ἔμελλε, but even this is formally ambiguous, as one might also read σε μέλλε instead of σ’ ἔμελλε:

(27) ἦλθες ἔπειτα σὺ κείσε· **κελευσέμεναι** δέ σ’ ἔμελλε
δαίμων ὃς Τρώεσσιν ἐβούλετο κῦδος ὀρέξαι (*Od.* 4.274–275).
‘Then you came there. A divinity, who planned to grant
glory to the Trojans, *must have urged* you on’

The augmented form thus usually has either one of the meanings described above (a, b), or, as a further development (c), it may function as an immediate future-in-the-past.²⁰ This seems to imply that while in the augmentedless forms the presumably earlier meaning is still preserved in a few cases, the augmented forms show innovative meanings (cf. the discussion about the gradual replacement of injunctives by indicatives in Section 3). In turn, since ἔμελλε/ο- no longer conveys epistemic stance by itself, this function is taken over by particles, e.g. in the frequent combination of ἔμελλε/ο- with ἄρα, as in (28):

(28) ὡς ἐνός, ὅς τέ μοι ὕπνον ἀπεχθαίρει καὶ ἐδωδὴν,
μνωομένω, ἐπεὶ οὐ τις Ἀχαιῶν τόσσ’ ἐμόγησεν,

²⁰ A similar sequence of development is assumed in Basset (1979: 98): “Les trois valeurs homériques de probabilité présente ou passée, d’imminence et de destinée sont donc issues d’une même et unique valeur de probabilité.”

ὄσσ' Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐμόγησε καὶ ἤρατο. τῶ δ' ἄρ' ἔμελλεν
αὐτῶ κήδε' ἔσεσθαι [...] (*Od.* 4.105–108).

'(Yet for them all I mourn not so much, despite my grief) as for one only, who makes me loathe both sleep and food, when I think of him; for no one of the Achaeans toiled so much as Odysseus toiled and endured. But for himself, *as it seems* (ἄρα), *his portion was to be only woe*, [...]'

ἔμελλεν + future infinitive here conveys the meaning of predestination (cf. the similar phrasing in ex. 24), while ἄρα marks the speaker's (Menelaos') assessment of the past events.

Bridging contexts for the future-in-the-past meaning may be those in which the intentionality of the subject is only partly responsible for the ensuing state of affairs, e.g. 'to reach, arrive at', which can be understood as not completely controlled by the subject, as can be observed in (29):

(29) ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τάχ' ἔμελλεν ὑπὸ πτόλιν αἰπύ τε
τεῖχος ἴξεσθαι, τότε δὴ [...] (*Il.* 11.181–182).

'But when *he was just about to come* beneath the city and the steep wall, then...'

The numbers for the combination of epistemic particles with injunctives and with past indicatives are quite similar, as shown in table 4:

Table 4. Injunctive and past indicative of μέλλω combined with epistemic particles.

	μέλλε/ο- (12.5%)	ἔμελλε/ο- (87.5%)
+ particle	6 = 75% ²¹	39 = 67% ²²
– particle ²³	2 = 25%	19 = 33%

This might seem to speak against the distribution discussed in Section 3, viz. a higher number of epistemic particles with injunctives (cf. table 3 above). The

²¹ *Il.* 15.601 δὴ ... μέλλε, *Od.* 4.181 πού μέλλεν, *Od.* 6.165 δὴ μέλλεν, *Od.* 9.378 δὴ ... μέλλεν, *Od.* 17.412 δὴ ... μέλλεν, *Od.* 7.270 ἦ γὰρ μέλλον.

²² 1× ῥά (*Il.* 2.36), 4× γάρ (*Il.* 2.39, 11.700, 15.612, 16.46), 1× περ (*Od.* 2.156), 23× ἄρα (*Il.* 5.205, 5.686, 6.393, 6.515, 10.336, 11.817, 12.3, 12.34, 12.113, 17.497, 18.98, 22.356, *Od.* 4.107, 6.110, 7.18, 9.230, 9.475, 10.26, 10.275, 11.553, 13.293, 24.28, 24.470), 8× δὴ (*Il.* 6.52, 10.365, 11.181, 23.773, *Od.* 4.514, 8.510, 13.384, 20.393), 2× ἦ τοι (*Od.* 21.98, 22.9). In some instance more than one particle occurs.

²³ Excluding μέν, δέ, γε.

reason for this is probably that the epistemic reading of $\mu\epsilon\lambda\lambda\epsilon/o-$ in the past tense is recessive in Homeric times, probably restricted to the unaugmented forms, while the augmented forms have developed the meanings of intention, predestination and of an immediate future-in-the-past, i.e. the epistemic function originally expressed by the lexical meaning of the verb is gradually taken over by epistemic particles added to the past indicative.

The development of $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$ might then be understood as a repetition of the history of the augment discussed above: modally unmarked injunctives preferably take epistemic particles to mark the speaker's attitude toward the SoA, while indicative forms convey the speaker's view of the SoA as real *qua* augment. With the latter's gradual spread and the complete loss of injunctives (except for the epic language where it is maintained as a typical feature of this genre), the augment becomes a past indicative marker that no longer conveys epistemic meanings (note that in Classical Greek the imperfect, i.e. an augmented form, occurs in the protasis of counterfactual conditionals, i.e. it marks a non-*realis*). For these, as formerly in the case of the injunctives, epistemic particles are used (i). Similarly, with the gradual loss of its epistemic meanings, $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$ is used increasingly with particles (ii). The few instances of injunctives of $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$ with epistemic meaning are thus likely to be archaisms, cf. table 5:

Table 5. Injunctives replaced by indicatives + epistemic particles.

(i) injunctive + epistemic particle	augment + injunctive = indicative
→	indicative + epistemic particle
(ii) $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron/\epsilon-$ [epistemic]	augment + $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron/\epsilon-$ = indicative
→	$\acute{\epsilon}\mu\epsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron/\epsilon-$ + epistemic particle

5 Concluding remarks

The analysis of past counterfactual constructions may provide new insights into our comprehension of the expression of epistemic modality in the verbal system of Homeric Greek. In fact, the dual meaning of past counterfactuals, which express a supposition in the apodosis while implying the factual state of affairs in the protasis, show a combination of *irrealis* and *realis* marking respectively. Our investigation has focused on the *realis* marking that, in a typological perspective, has been shown to be compatible with the protasis of past counterfactuals. Data

from Homeric Greek are consistent with cross-linguistic studies showing that in past counterfactual constructions it is the apodosis that prototypically attracts the modal marking (of *irrealis*), whereas the protasis is more often left unmarked. However, the data have also shown that, if the protasis is modally marked, particles and adverbs assume an epistemic function, expressing the speaker's commitment to the truth-value of his/her proposition. The interesting datum is that the frequency of such epistemic lexical items decreases when the verb in the protasis is an indicative. Vice versa, their frequency increases when the verb is an injunctive. Thus, the question as to how the attitude of the speaker toward the content of his/her utterance was expressed with the modally underspecified injunctives can be answered by resorting to the lexicon. The epistemic particles and adverbs co-occurring with injunctives in the protasis became less frequent during the passage from the zero-mood stage of the injunctive to the inflectional-mood stage of the indicative. The latter has indeed been defined as an 'epistemic mood', which expresses a high confidence of the speaker about the truth of the proposition he puts forward for consideration. Put in other words, the replacement of injunctives by indicatives made epistemic particles and adverbs less functional or redundant in the sentence, since the use of the indicative mood in the protasis already implied the speaker's attitude toward the proposition. With the gradual loss of injunctives in post-Homeric (non-epic) Greek and hence the loss of this original opposition, epistemic particles started to co-occur also with indicative forms. In a similar fashion, the development of μέλλω 'to be likely' seems to imply that with the rise of the secondary meanings of predestination, intention, and immediate future(-in-the-past), particles became the regular expression of epistemic meaning which, beside the present, is preserved only in a few injunctive forms of μέλλω in Homeric Greek.

Additionally, our analysis has taken into account the perspective of Functional Discourse Grammar, showing how these particles and adverbs show a semantic development in terms of scope increase, from the lower single phrase layer to the higher proposition and pragmatic layers of the speech act. This study has been intended as a first step toward the comprehension of the mechanisms that are at the basis of the emergence of modality in ancient Greek. Needless to say, further research is needed on the role of epistemic particles and adverbs co-occurring with injunctives in different syntactic constructions attested in the Homeric poems.

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