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Summixis, Spermata and Nous: Anaxagoras' pluralistic Ontology

Claudia Rosciglione

1. *Summixis, Spermata, Mixture and Dissociation: beyond Parmenides' Monism*

The aim of this paper is to construe Anaxagoras' thought as a form of Philosophy of Nature which, unlike Parmenides', admits of the coming-to-be and the passing-away which are meant as the continuous mixture and dissociation of the matter the natural world consists of. Consequently, I will emphasize the naturalistic and anti-mythological character of Anaxagoras' thought.

To be sure, Anaxagoras stood in direct continuity with the Milesian thinkers. Nonetheless, he proceeded beyond them arguing for a pluralistic ontology that can be described by the analysis of such key concepts as *summixis*, *spermata* and *nous*. Accordingly, Anaxagoras is ascribed a different stance than Parmenides. As Parmenides maintained a monistic and static concept of reality, Anaxagoras allowed instead the possibility of plurality, change and motion in the world.

In this paper, I will point out the imperishable character of the matter that derives from Anaxagoras' theory of the coming-to-be and the passing-away, of mixture and dissociation. Indeed, it can be shown that the matter is bound not to disappear, that is to pass away, just because of this process of mixture and dissociation of the multitude of parts it is composed of. This imperishable character of the matter, or more appropriately of What Is, could be regarded as a feature that is common both to Anaxagoras' and Parmenides' thought, but according to Parmenides What Is is the Being that is identical to itself and still, while according to Anaxagoras What Is is the plurality of ingredients which continuously mix and separate one another by means of motion.¹

In the fragment no. 4DK, Anaxagoras refers to a "mixture of all things", in which no colour is distinguishable, while in everything there

1. There are many other opposite interpretations of Anaxagoras' thought according to which the philosopher from Clazomene owes very much to Parmenides. See for instance: CALOGERO 1967; GOMPERZ 1933; ZELLER e MONDOLFO 1969.

is a share of everything. It is an original mixture that is endowed with a pluralistic nature just for its being a *summixis* as such. This plurality is original too, and it is preserved in all the things-that-are which indeed amount to as many composites. Therefore, What Is eternally is just this “mixture of all things” which is pluralistic by nature. Burnet and Cornford attempted to solve the problem arguing that all things in all meant that every seed contains a portion of every opposite; Raven postulated an infinite number of *spermata*, each containing a portion (*moira*) of everything; Reesor believed that the phrase “everything in everything” can be interpreted by Anaxagoras’ doctrine that there was not a smallest. Silvestre holds instead that if one assumes a more comprehensive meaning of the term *moira*, that is to say that of “part”, then *moira* may stand for both the single seed, which is the component of the thing (*krema*), and the group of the homogeneous seeds, which identify the thing and qualify it as a whole.²

Even assuming that it can be unclear how to Anaxagoras in everything there should be a share of everything, as one can deduce from the variety of the interpretations, it is possible anyway to claim that the argument of an original *summixis* clearly articulates a pluralistic conceptualization of the cosmos which is never questioned by Anaxagoras.

On this ground, I agree with Gomperz who defines the *summixis* a sort of original chaos that bears as such the character of plurality.³ Anaxagoras’ imperishable matter corresponds to the collection of manifold, different elements, which is originally indistinguishable, and it is just for this reason that it can be said chaotic. Starting from this point of view, one can claim that this chaotic *summixis* is completely different from both Parmenides’ Being and Anaximander’s *apeiron*.

Actually, Anaximander’s *apeiron* is indeterminate, undifferentiated, and homogeneous, but it is not a *summixis*, hence it lacks the character of plurality that Anaxagoras ascribed to the original matter. On this ground, I disagree with Aristotle’s interpretation that is inclined to neglect the difference between Anaxagoras’ *summixis* and Anaximander’s *apeiron*. As far as Anaxagoras’ thought is concerned, Aristotle uses the

2. Cf. BURNET 1920, 263-264; CORNFORD 1930; RAVEN 1954; REESOR 1960; SILVESTRE 1988, 217.

3. Cf. GOMPERZ 1896-1909. On this issue cf. also SISCO 2010, 449 f.

term “one” as more suitable than such expression as “all things were together”.⁴ But Aristotle seems to fail to take notice that Anaxagoras used just the term *summixis*, which unlike “one” means just a collection of manifold things. It is just this meaning that allows Anaxagoras to claim the pluralistic nature of the cosmos upon which – as I maintain – all his thought is based. Therefore, the argument that it is a sound to talk in terms of “one” rather than *summixis* for both Anaxagoras and Anaximander can be regarded as an incongruous interpretation that does not take into account the terms manifestly used by Anaxagoras and what they are intended to mean. By definition, the mixture is just the opposite in meaning to “the one”. It denotes the mixing of something and implies the plurality that is not a constitutive feature of “the one”, which is meant instead as an ungenerated and uncorrupted metaphysical principle (*archè*) that rules every thing.

Actually, the fact that Anaximander is the first thinker who talks about the *archè* and identifies it with the *apeiron* allows Aristotle to construe this principle in a metaphysical sense. It is the first cause that is not caused, an ungenerated and uncorrupted principle which depends on no other principle. Rather it is the principle of all things.⁵ According to this view, the *apeiron* transcends all things of which it is a principle and by which it can not be corrupted. Then, the difference between the *apeiron* and Anaxagoras’ *summixis* can be outlined so that it becomes more and more clear-cut. The *summixis* is not segregated from the things that arise in nature. On the contrary, it is the material ground upon which all things take shape as composites of the original ingredients, which in the mixture are not distinct from one another until the motion brings about their distinction and distribute them in various ways, hence giving rise to different things. The qualities, the properties are immanent and constitutive features of the things because they are physically present in the things themselves. Therefore there is no difference between things and qualities in Anaxagoras’ thoroughly physicalist view.⁶

4. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, XII, 2, 1069 b 20-24.

5. Cf. Aristotle, *Physica* III, 4, 203 b 4-15.

6. As far as this issue is concerned, Meinwald states that "Anaxagoras thought of the basic constituents as having the very qualities they contributed to composites. Thus the Hot – the totality of heat in the world – was itself hot"(MEINWALD 1992).

In the same fragment no. 4DK, Anaxagoras claims that “there are many different things present in everything that is being combined”, and calls *spermata* the many things, whereof there is a share in every composite. In my view in Anaxagoras’ cosmology it is not important whether such *spermata* are atomic or not,⁷ rather the fact that they represent within the *summixis* just the diversity and the multiplicity that make the mixture a composite, an aggregate instead of a unity.

Therefore, the *summixis* is never cancelled in the process that gives shape to things. Rather, it is maintained by being realized in the things that are distinct from one another. This distinction is due to the higher concentration of some ingredients of which every thing is composed, as Anaxagoras spells out at the end of the fragment no. 12DK.⁸ Hence, what prevails allows to distinguish the things from one another, although these things continue to be a plurality and a multitude of ingredients.

Accordingly, to this view all that which exists has the properties of unity and homogeneity, because of its being a plurality of ingredients, that is a composite in which motion causes some ingredients to prevail over the others, thus making every composite different from one another.

It is the reason that induced Anaxagoras to claim that although things differ, they are neither separated out nor completely detached from one another since they are mixtures endowed with a pluralistic nature. The distinction of things is only a matter of the predominance or of the different organisation of the ingredients that constitute them. On the other hand, the process of shaping things is never ultimately accomplished, and that allows the continuous motion, that is the becoming, to occur since there is actually no coming-to-be and passing-away, rather a process of mixing and separation of the ingredients.

As far this question is concerned, the reference is obviously to be made to the fragment no. 17DK, in which Anaxagoras charges the

7. There are indeed many scholars who reject the atomistic interpretation that the *spermata* are divisible bodily particles. See for instance: CORNFORD 1930, 14-30 and 83-95; BURNET 1920; MONDOLFO 1970, 105; GIGON 1936, 14 f.

8. Reesor said that “The particularization of the entity was derminded by the componens which predominated. The components wich determinated the individuality of the entity predominated over all other component entities” (Cf. REESOR 1960, 7).

Greeks with not thinking correctly what the coming-to-be (*ghinestai*) and the passing-away (*appollustai*) actually are. According to him, no thing is actually born and then dies, rather everything takes part in mixing-together (*summisgestai*) and dissociating (*diakrinestai*). Therefore, the coming-to-be and the passing-away should be more correctly called the being mixed together and the being dissociated.

I will now try to connect what Anaxagoras claims in this fragment to what he maintained about the *summixis* and the relationship it holds with the things-that-are as composites that preserve the original mixture and turn it into an arrangement. This connection allows giving an interpretation of Anaxagoras according to which his thought owes nothing to Parmenides. On the contrary, it can be argued that he developed a thought which is opposite to Parmenides, who ruled out the coming-to-be and the passing-away to state the motionless and unitary character of Being. Instead, Anaxagoras ruled out the coming-to-be and the passing-away only inasmuch as they are not correctly understood as the continuous mixture and dissociation of the matter.

Let us grant that Anaxagoras admitted of Parmenides' principle that whatever is, is (being) and whatever is not, is not (notbeing), according to which to talk of what is not yields a contradiction, since the characteristics of existence would be ascribed to what is not. It is not coincidence that according to this view Anaxagoras talked about an eternal matter, hence of a cosmos which neither begins nor ends.

This argument does not compel Anaxagoras to admit of the denial of the manifold and plurality of the things-that-are and, above all, the dualistic opposition between the Being and the Notbeing. Indeed, in Parmenides' view the Notbeing corresponds fairly to the plurality that Anaxagoras ascribed to the things-that-are and hence to the Being, as the interpretation of this paper maintains. Therefore, the closeness between Anaxagoras and Parmenides can be restricted only to the agreement on the logical reasoning that the existence can not be ascribed to what is not. In Anaxagoras' view, there is no opposition between the unperishable, unique and motionless Being and the Notbeing which entails the contrary, that is the coming-to-be, the passing-away, the becoming, the multitude, the motion. According to such a dynamical construal, what is not does not correspond to the

Notbeing, that is to what is not, rather it amounts to being something else, that is something which is different from that thing which is.⁹

I suggest that in the fragment no. 17DK the aim of Anaxagoras is on the one hand to claim and preserve the imperishable character of the original matter, by denying the coming-to-be and the passing-away, and on the other to maintain the *summixis*, which characterizes the original matter, along with the plurality, the motion, the diversity, which all characterizes the cosmos, by defending the concepts of mixture and the dissociation. According to this interpretation of fragment no. 17DK, as opposed to Parmenides' thought, the cosmology of Anaxagoras is based on an original matter which is itself dynamic and plural. If that is the case, the fragment no. 17DK should not be construed anymore as it articulated the belief in Parmenides' view of the Being and the Notbeing. On the contrary, Anaxagoras could be acknowledged to introduce really an innovative argument, because he claims a pluralistic view of the ontology and the becoming so that to avoid the logical contradiction laid bare by Parmenides.

When he defends the mixture, the dissociation and the motion, Anaxagoras ascribes to the Being just those characteristics which Parmenides ascribed to the Notbeing and to which he consequently denied the existence. The opposition between the Being and the Notbeing holds no more from the standpoint that regards the natural world as a collection of composites which change and transform continuously according to the principle of the predominance of the original and imperishable ingredients of the *summixis*.

Furthermore, the question can not be eluded about whether a Parmenidean construal of the meaning of the fragment no. 17DK would be consistent with the claims of other fragments of great importance such as the 4DK, the 12DK, and so on. If Anaxagoras would have meant to affirm the Parmenidean Being, by denying any existence to the becoming, the change and the plurality, why should he have talked elsewhere in terms of original mixture, composites, motion of the original ingredients? It is more reasonable that since the beginning Anaxagoras meant to affirm a pluralistic and dynamic view of the cosmos, and accordingly that the fragment no. 17DK articulates such

9. Cf. FURLEY 2002.

a *Weltanschauung* by taking into account just Parmenides' logical argument about what is and what is not.

This interpretation brings more the argument of the mixture and the dissociation to the fore than the argument of denying the coming-to-be and the passing-away, implying that the becoming is not ruled out rather explained by the original *summixis* that is set in motion by the *nous*.

I maintain that Anaxagoras can be reasonably ascribed the view that the matter is imperishable. Indeed, the matter is bound not to disappear, that is to pass away, but it keeps on living through the continuous process of mixing and dissociating of the manifold parts it is composed of.

The thought of Anaxagoras outlines a Philosophy of Nature that is founded on the primacy of such a unity that derives from multiplicity in opposition to a motionless and undivided unity.

Hence, Anaxagoras' thought exemplifies a logic that opposes Parmenides, since everything exists just by means of what to Parmenides is what is not, that is the becoming that derives from the motion of the multitude of ingredients which things are composed of. The matter is imperishable because it is an arrangement, that is it binds different ingredients that kept endlessly on moving and never come to be ultimately separated out or detached from one another.

Therefore, all that Parmenides conceived of as the world of Not-being, of illusion and ignorance changes into what Anaxagoras claims instead to be the foundation of Being: the original mixture, the mixing and the dissociating, the motion. According to this construal of Anaxagoras' thought, the unity is not so much opposed to the multiplicity as it is rather derived from the multiplicity as well as from the continuous process of unification and separation of elements of which the natural matter is made.

The commitment to the multiplicity and the becoming does not imply ruling out the unity. Instead, that means a different understanding of what unity actually is, that is the organisation that arises out of the continuous mixture, which from being undifferentiated turns into being a particular composite that is distinguished from others. *Spermata* are what the original mixture as well as the distinct composites preserve. In the fragment no. 4DK, Anaxagoras claims that "many different things present in everything that is being combined and seeds

of all things”. *Spermata* are the manifold ingredients of which the imperishable matter is made. They are originally undifferentiated in the *summixis*, but by means of the motion, which is imparted on the mixture by the *nous*, they turn into composites that are distinguishable from one another, even though nothing ever comes to be ultimately separated out or detached from anything else.

As I suggested above, in the fragment no. 12DK Anaxagoras claims that the process that gives shape to things is never ultimately accomplished. This means that the things change continuously their shape, because they transform since the rate varies continuously at which various ingredients combine in them according to the principle of predominance. It is the reason that justifies Anaxagoras’ claim that the Greeks are wrong in talking about the coming-to-be and the passing-away, because it is only a matter of mixing and dissociating the ingredients, the *spermata* which are the original matter.

These arguments suggest the innovative and complex view of the natural world as something that is caught in continuous motion and is brought to life through transformation, which is not an obscure or unexplainable notion since it amounts to the emergence and the submergence of ingredients in relation to one another that take place within the various composites.¹⁰ Every thing takes shape as a composite, as it stems from the relations that their constitutive different ingredients hold with one another. Any constitutive ingredient of a composite owes its existence to the relation to the other ingredients and is constrained by it. This is the meaning that according to my interpretation should be ascribed to the fragment no. 3DK where Anaxagoras claims that “Nor of the small is there a smallest, but always a smaller (for what-is cannot not be) — but also of the large there is always a larger”. The large and the small are not as such absolutely, rather always in relation to another thing which on its turn can be either larger or smaller.

The natural world seems consequently to be a relational dynamic system whose fundamental entities are not always the same and do not obey always the same function, which instead can vary according to the context and the composite they are going to shape. As Anaxagoras

10. Cf. CURD 2007.

claims that things are never separated out from one another in this single unique cosmos,¹¹ it ensues that there must not exist an ultimate and permanent reality which is always identical to itself. The original ingredients, the *spermata*, are the material elements that constitute this single unique cosmos, but their nature varies accordingly as the predominance and their relations to one another vary. Finally, I suggest that the well-known Anaxagoras' principle that "in everything there is a share of everything" too should be interpreted within this conceptual framework.¹² If everything as well as the original ingredients are related to all the other things-that-are, any new thing which is given a shape amounts to a transformation of a preceding thing whose relation of predominance among elements was different. This means that the parts of any thing are included in every thing into which it turns and transforms itself, and at the same time that every thing preserves the traces of the parts of any of the preceding things to whose elements it keeps on being related although it realizes them in a new balance. This system of dynamic relations can explain such natural processes as the formation and the development of biological individuals.¹³ From this specific point of view, these phenomena might be understood as complex forms of transformations and becoming by means of the motion that is imparted by the *nous* to the original mixture (*summixis*). This kind of *nous* and his function in the dynamic cosmology of Anaxagoras will be the topic addressed in the next section.

2. The *Nous* and the a-teleological motion of the cosmos

The following questions are now in order: what is the *nous*?; which role does it play in Anaxagoras' philosophy of nature as it is construed in this paper?

I am aware of the somewhat equivocal nature of the concept of *nous*, which can be easily identified with a divine, metaphysical principle. I think it is appropriate to assess whether the divine nature, which is presumed to characterize Anaxagoras' *nous*, can be justified as one of its original features or instead acknowledged as a feature

11. Cf. Fr. 8DK

12. Cf. Fr. 6DK.

13. Cf. GUTHRIE 1965; FURLEY 2002.

that was superimposed on it later, in particular by the well-known interpretations given by Plato and Aristotle.

In the fragment no. 12DK, Anaxagoras defines the *nous* as “the finest of all things and the purest”. Earlier in the same fragment, the *nous* is claimed to be self-ruling. Maybe the description of the *nous* as something which is self-ruling and mixed with no other thing is likely to have induced Plato’s Socrates to believe that the *nous* is a metaphysical principle, an immaterial mind that is also relevant to ethics because it is able to cause everything for the best.¹⁴

However, Socrates himself admits that this wonderful hope got more and more distant till it shattered as he carried on reading Anaxagoras’ treatise¹⁵ in which the *nous* did not have the seeming of a metaphysical principle, that is the transcendent cause of the order of things in the world, because everything found out its explanatory reason in the material ingredients of the original mixture and in the ways of their combinations by means of the motion that is caused by the *nous*. Apart from the failed attempt at making the *nous* something divine and metaphysical,¹⁶ Plato’s criticism brings maybe to the fore an improper use of language of the term *nous*. By this term, Anaxagoras refers to something that can be said a principle only in the sense that it puts the original mixture in motion. The material ingredients of the cosmos dispose themselves in various arrangements through motion according to the role they play in relation to one another giving thus shape to manifold different natural composites.¹⁷ As Plato’s disappointment attests, hence, Anaxagoras suggests a rationalistic governing principle, which is free from the mythical or theological characteristics of prior cosmogonies, but also from the metaphysics and the teleologism of the platonic-aristotelic tradition.

14. Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 97c-98b.

15. Cf. *Ivi*, 98 b-c.

16. Most idealistic and spiritualistic interpretations of the *nous* in Anaxagoras’ thought derive from Plato’s interpretation such as that proposed by Zeller. Zeller claims that the explanation of the generation of the world by means of the *spermata* requires the action of an ordering and driving force, which Anaxagoras would identify with the Thinking Being, the Spirit. Cf. ZELLER e MONDOLFO 1969; CALVETTI 1950, 438.

17. Cf. GOMPERZ 1896-1909.

Actually, Aristotle's judgment on Anaxagoras is critical. The Stagirite claims that Anaxagoras introduced the *nous* as an inconsistent mechanical means to yield order in the universe, that is as an unmotivated expedient *deus ex machina*.¹⁸ Aristotle did not seem to accept that Anaxagoras' *nous* can be only an efficient cause that is devoid of any teleological character. Both Plato and Aristotle expected to find in Anaxagoras not only a description of how the cosmos originated (efficient cause), rather the explanation of the reason and the purpose for which the cosmos originated (teleological cause). Instead, Anaxagoras seems to restrict himself to a mechanistic explanatory principle without admitting of a mind that moves the world causing everything for the best. From this standpoint, therefore, the fact that Anaxagoras' *nous* has not a teleological nature, that which would be something negative for a platonic-aristotelic interpretation,¹⁹ is instead perfectly consistent with the cosmology that has been now attributed to Anaxagoras.

In the fragment no. 13DK, Anaxagoras maintains that the *nous* inaugurates the motion (*kinein*), and from what is set in motion by it the dissociation begins which leads to the shaping of all things that are mixtures. Hence, the *nous* is what the distinction stems from and what imparts the motion, the rotation to the original *summixis* as undifferentiated mass of a multitude of *spermata*.

In the aforementioned fragment no. 12DK, the *nous* is described as what controls the rotation, that is of what comprehends anything altogether. The rotation is what causes the process of the distinction and accordingly of the shaping of things to obtain.

Accordingly, the *nous* and the original *summixis* are not in opposition to each other in such a way that they would cancel each other out. On the contrary, the *nous* preserves the manifold and pluralistic nature of the *summixis*, since the motion it imparts, by means of which

18. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.*, I, 4, 985a 18-23.

19. As far as this issue is concerned, Zeller claims that although Anaxagoras greets the *nous* the role of the cause of the becoming, the attribution of this role is incomplete because the teleological interpretation of nature falls within the scope of the mechanistic one (Cf. ZELLER e MONDOLFO 1969, 388). Paul Tannery submits too a negative construal of the *nous* as mechanistic causality (Cf. TANNERY 1886, 255). Giorgio Galli held also that the limitation of Anaxagoras' position is the missed discovery of teleology (Cf. GALLI 1984, 314 f.).

the distinction and separation obtain, does not eliminate the *spermata*, rather it changes them into the ingredients everything is composed of. Therefore, the *nous* and the *summixis* belong to the same unique cosmos. They are neither opposite nor irreconcilable. In fact, they represent the diversity that lies inside the natural world.

According to this interpretation, the manifold nature of the world is allowed for because it does not depend only on the motion, whose physical cause is the *nous*, but also on the original *summixis* that any motion is bound to imply. Furthermore, it becomes more understandable the reason that justifies Anaxagoras' claim that nothing achieves an ultimate shape and that things never reach out a final stage of separation. The motion caused by the *nous* changes the mixture of elements into a continuous process of mixing and separation that does not obtain once and for all, because it is rather carried ceaselessly on.

Though being the purest and most subtle among the things, the *nous* is still a thing (*krema*) which belongs to the nature. Anaxagoras claims it to be *apeiron* and *autokrates*, that is unlimited and self-ruling. Anaxagoras seems thus to affirm both the immanent character of the *nous*, its being part of the natural world, and the fact that, although the *nous* is a thing, it is different from what it moves as well as from those composites which are shaped just by means of this motion.²⁰ The *apeiron* and autonomy, which Anaxagoras ascribes to the *nous*, are the features that show its unpredictability, indeterminateness and arbitrariness with respect to the possibility that men have to define it in a teleological view

It can be likely conjectured that Anaxagoras reasoned naively that were the *nous* mixed with the other things, it would have lost the independence, which is requested to obtain a clear understanding of the whole process. Consequently, he describes the *nous* as something that is distinguished from what it puts in motion. But at the same time, Anaxagoras cannot go beyond that, because his materialistic and pluralistic view does not allow him to understand the *nous* as a transcendental metaphysical principle that is teleologically driven, as instead Plato would have rather had it.

20. Cf. Fr. 12DK. As to this issue, I agree with those interpretations that consider Anaxagoras' *nous* more as a special type of material stuff than as an immaterial substance. Cf., for example, BARNES 1996, 407-408.

Finally, I think that it is reasonable to conclude that a fair amount of ambiguity can be indeed detected in Anaxagoras' concept of the *nous* which is somehow affected by a philosophical weakness, but also that this remark is not a sufficient justification to undermine the pluralistic ontology that Anaxagoras put forth in such an innovative way – as I tried to show above – or to invalidate the completely ateleological character of the motion that is imparted by the *nous* to the original elements of the *summixis*.²¹

The motion caused by the *nous*, which characterizes every thing in nature, can be qualified as not teleologically determined, because the *nous* is imperishable, as much as all the matter is, and that which is set in motion by the *nous* never gets an ultimate shape, rather it keeps continuously on mixing and separating. In connection with Anaxagoras' explanation of the formation of world as it is structured in ever changing composites, the *nous* stands out as a mere efficient cause that triggers a complex motion made of composition and dissociation, mixture and separation, which is as eternal as the cosmos. Therefore, I contend that the essential role in the pluralistic ontology of Anaxagoras is not played by the *nous* rather by the motion that the *nous* imparts to the original matter. Only to this extent, this claim can conform to Aristotle's definition of the *nous* as an expedient *deus ex machina*, which is not divine and transcendent since it initiates mechanistically a motion that is not teleologically driven.²²

This motion amounts to the eternal becoming of the original mixture through the composition and dissociation of the ingredients (*spermata*), which combine and separate continuously with one another giving thus rise to the different things in the world.

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21. According to this interpretation one should go beyond the dualism between those who suggest a theistic and metaphysical nature of the nous and, on the other hand, those who support the thoroughly materialistic view. Among the former, Guthrie who is certain about the divine nature of the nous, Calogero who holds the absolute purity of Anaxagoras' Intellect, and Gigon, who regards the nous as a principle antithetic to the matter, are worth mentioning (cf. GUTHRIE 1965, 279; CALOGERO 1967; GIGON 1936, 40). Among the latter, one may cite Burnet, who regards the nous as the material motor principle (Cf. BURNET 1920, 267 f.).

22. Cf. GOMPERZ 1896-1909.

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