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Manipulation of landscape as an Exercise of Unfair Power: the Case of Qalqiliya in the Occupied Palestine

La Manipolazione del paesaggio come esercizio di un potere illegittimo: il caso di Qalqiliya nella Palestina occupata

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Dedication

To all martyrs who fall on the land of Palestine

To those who suffer from oppressive and unjust regimes

To my dear parents Mohammad Atiya & Widad

To my beloved wife Rana and sons Basel & Sara

To my dear brothers and sisters

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Abstract

Planning, as emphasized by planning theories, is supposed to contribute to the progress of mankind through always developing policies, regulations, methods, and concepts, to support the welfare of individuals and their communities. Therefore, themes such as ethic of planning and the issue of just city have been discussed intensively in planning theories and the main dominated question is: what is the good planning? Many planning theorists answer this question by addressing various types of planning such as collaborative, deliberative, radical planning and so on as good tools to achieve progress and prosperity. However, Palestine is a case where the contradiction between theory and practice is obvious, because planning is used as an oppressive tool and not as a progressive one.

No sign is needed to indicate well-developed Jewish colonies' urban spaces from neglected built-up environment inhabited by people of Palestine; that specific difference reveals that planning may have the role in changing place identity, and demography of the land. In this sense, planning is often incomplete and misleading, advancing the interest and agenda of the occupiers at the expense of those who have been occupied. Planning is a 'double-edged weapon'; on one side it can be a progressive tool, while on the other hand it can be a tool for repression, consolidating fragmentation and control on a group of people.

Consequently, the landscape of Palestine is constantly being changed by means of planning, including new fabricated laws used as pretext of land confiscation. In addition, the occupying power deploys the model of exception (emptiness of laws and suspension of norms) to produce urban and regional confinements (prisons) in which people of Palestine experience land confiscation, restriction of movement, and exclusion from their private lands. This transformation results in disorder of spatialization process that led to a clear gap between spaces of oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and exploited, and occupier and occupied.

This thesis focuses on the transformation of the landscape of Palestine starting from the British occupation in 1917, highlighting the role of planning and laws as instruments of this transformation. This study approaches the spatial knowledge specifically landscape planning as a way of control rather than an aesthetic improvement, and also it criticizes frameworks and domains such as (laws invented by the occupation) which are used to neutralize and normalize the landscape of control. This thesis offers both conceptual and empirical contributions about the way in which the landscape can be manipulated to have the role of exercise unfair and illegitimate power.

Abstract Italiano

La disciplina della pianificazione, come sottolineato dalle sue basi teoriche, dovrebbe contribuire al progresso del genere umano attraverso lo sviluppo di politiche, regolamenti, metodi e concetti e, allo stesso modo, sostenere il benessere dei singoli individui e delle loro comunità. Per tali ragioni, temi come l'etica nella pianificazione e la questione delle “*just cities*” sono stati oggetto di intensi dibattiti all'interno della disciplina con la finalità di dare risposta alla seguente e ricorrente domanda: cosa si intende per “buona” pianificazione? Molti teorici del campo hanno tentato di dare risposta a questa domanda, contrandosi su vari approcci alla disciplina pianificatoria come quello collaborativo, deliberativo, radicale visti come potenziali strumenti utili per raggiungere progresso e prosperità.

A tal proposito si è ritenuto interessante analizzare il caso della Palestina in cui la contraddizione tra teoria e pratica diventa evidente nell'uso che si fa della disciplina pianificatoria, spesso utilizzata più come strumento repressivo, che per il progresso.

Risulta molto semplice distinguere la buona qualità' dello spazio urbano delle colonie ebraiche dal trascurato ambiente costruito delle aree abitate dalla popolazione palestinese. La radicale ed evidente differenza rivela come le politiche pianificatorie possano avere un ruolo importante nel trasformare le identità dei luoghi, le loro caratteristiche e influenzare la crescita o decrescita demografica. In questo contesto, la pianificazione è risultata spesso incompleta e fuorviante, promuovendo gli interessi e il programma dei colonizzatori a scapito della popolazione indigena. La pianificazione rappresenta quindi “un'arma a doppio taglio”: da un lato strumento utilizzato per il progresso, dall'altro per la repressione, che contribuisce alla frammentazione della società e al suo controllo.

In merito a tali osservazioni possiamo osservare come lo stesso paesaggio della Palestina, dal 1948 a oggi, sia stato trasformato sistematicamente attraverso l'uso dello strumento pianificatorio, compresa la creazione *ad hoc* di numerose disposizioni legislative utilizzate come pretesto per la confisca di immobili e terreni. In aggiunta, gli occupanti hanno utilizzato il modello dell' “eccezione” (nei termini della creazione di un vuoto legislativo e sospensione delle norme vigenti) per dar vita a zone di “cofinamento” (reclusione) urbane e regionali, in cui il popolo Palestinese ha subito l'espropriazione delle proprie terre, la limitazione della libertà di movimento e l'esclusione dalle stesse proprietà private. Queste trasformazioni spaziali, risultanti dall'utilizzo della pianificazione come uno strumento di oppressione, esprimono tutta le loro contraddizioni in quelle aree territoriali in cui il conflitto si sta verificando tra oppressori e oppressi, sfruttatori e sfruttati, occupanti e occupati.

Questa tesi analizza la trasformazione del paesaggio della Palestina a partire dall'occupazione britannica, agli inizi del XIX secolo, mettendo in evidenza il ruolo della pianificazione e delle sue

leggi come strumenti fautori di questa trasformazione. Il presente studio è caratterizzato da un approccio spaziale e in particolar modo da quello caratteristico delle disciplina della geografia e della pianificazione del paesaggio. Lo studio fa una disanima delle strutture e dei domini, come quelle leggi emanate per permettere l'occupazione che sono utilizzate per neutralizzare e normalizzare il “paesaggio del controllo”. Questa tesi vuole offrire sia un contributo concettuale che empirico riguardo il modo in cui il paesaggio può essere manipolato per esercitare un potere illegittimo.

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Prologue

In this prologue, I would like to write about several main points of interest which led me to write and develop this doctoral research. My attention was directed towards the gradual vanishing of indigenous landscape in Palestine as a result of occupation. Indeed, with the passage of time the landscape of Palestine has been changing at a rapid rate through a variety of mechanisms. Palestine has a beautiful landscape and a large variety of nature from seashores to desert and hills covered with olive trees. During the last century the original landscape of Palestine has been vanishing and losing its indigenous character.

Generally, the production of space is influenced by various factors; socio-economic, politics, power relations ...etc, but the production and reproduction of space in Palestine are accompanied with strategies of territorial colonization. In Palestine, the occupation is not just a matter of control over physical geographical land and exploitation of natural resources, but a matter of production of new paradigm (models) in which knowledge has been manipulated and misrepresented in many various levels. It is also a matter of making contexts and realms to produce a “new culture”, narratives, system of laws, devices, and tools for the desire of colonization, resulting in subjection of people of Palestine. Accordingly, this study argues that the landscape planning (which is a branch of spatial knowledge) has been manipulated to subjugate and control Palestinians.

In *Al-Quds*, no sign is needed to indicate the well-developed Jewish colonies built-up environment and the negligence in the part inhabited by people of Palestine. The inequity in ‘built-environment’ in terms of services and quality of spaces forced me to think about the production and reproduction of landscape and the dark side of planning. Personally, as a planner and as a lecturer of planning courses in Palestine Polytechnic University, I began to think about the gap between the theory and the practice which I experienced in *Al-Quds* –Jerusalem- where I grew up and live.

This approach was addressed by Oren Yiftachel who published in 1998 an article titled “*Planning and Social Control: Exploring the ‘Dark Side’*” in the *Journal of Planning Literature*. In which he shows that planning is a double-edge sword. However, the article did not address two important questions; why planning is used as a control tool? What is the relation between the occupation and deployment of planning as a repressive tool?. Therefore, I decided not to limit my thinking under the framework of the misuse of knowledge, instead I started thinking about domains and frameworks that planning as a field of knowledge has been produced.

This gap in planning theory pushed me to critically approach geography, landscape, and planning and also to criticize frameworks and models in which disciplines of spatial knowledge such as planning and geography is produced and reproduced. This critical approach will lead to conceptualize new

interpretations of planning and landscape disciplines that focus on structure of things, rather than accepting things as it exists.

Despite that through this approach, I highly criticize “borders”, knowledge, contexts, and domains, it is an appropriate approach for explaining the context of the occupied Palestine that I am searching and studying. Therefore, I began to read the work of Michel Foucault who approached the relation between knowledge and power not as homogeneous parts but as contradictory parts. Then I started to read *Critical Geopolitics* book which was written by Gearóid Ó Tuathail who highlighted the way in which colonial powers seek to manipulate geography for the desire of control.

Reading about the relation between knowledge and power helped me to understand how geography, landscape, and epistemology may be incrementally reformulated to invent new narratives, new image, new laws, new maps, and new structure of power relations which serve the occupying power in Palestine. I kept reading about the relation between knowledge and power, until a meeting with my co-supervisor prof. Marco Picone who suggested to me to read the book *State of Exception* written by the Italian Philosopher Giorgio Agamben.

State of Exception enlightened me about an important issue which I have to take into consideration, mainly the use of “legal structure” for the purpose of colonization. State of Exception answers a central question: how can a power fabricate and misrepresent a system of law for its own desire and how a power can be itself the law?. The law which is also (a paradigm of knowledge) in occupied Palestine has been used to normalize the confiscation, subjection, and control. In fact, it is a mask behind it the process of territorial colonization occurs.

Many ideas had flooded as a result of thinking, reading and discussions with my supervisors Prof. Arch. Francesco Lo Piccolo and Prof. Marco Picone, such as planning as an instrument of oppression, vanishing of Palestinian landscape, elements of control, legitimization of control, space of exception ... etc. Therefore, the spatial focus of the study is suggested to be on landscape, while the conceptual focus is on an exercise of unfair power. With my supervisor and co-supervisor help, the theme of the research was developed to be; **manipulation of landscape as an exercise of unfair power.**

After that, I began thinking about an appropriate case study to be analyzed and explored. During the last decade Palestinian’s life in the West Bank and Jerusalem has been dominated by new element of control in the Landscape (the apartheid wall). Personally as I mentioned, I have grown up in Jerusalem and I have experienced the difference between the way of life before and after the wall. Today, I have to pass through military checkpoints established by the occupying power “Israel”. It is an exercise of unjust power when my time and movement are under control. Despite the exercise of unfair power over people of Palestine (who live in Jerusalem), I did not select it as a case study because my research focuses on the interrelation between landscape and power. The case of Jerusalem

may be used when the focus of research on the relation between power and urban spaces. Accordingly, I selected Qalqiliya district as a case study where colonies, the apartheid wall, bypass roads have fragmented the landscape of Qalqiliya, influencing harshly the whole life of its inhabitants.

The work on my doctoral research during three years had been very valuable and also stressed. Without the encouragement, support, and the constructive feedback of my supervisors this research would not get to light.

Chapter 1

Research Approach

Chapter 1: Research Approach

1.1 Introduction

The “visible features of an area of land”, that is how landscape described in oxford dictionary. The definition tells us that the landscape is the scene of mountains, valleys, agricultural lands, and built-up environment. According to this definition, landscape “is a combination of elements such as fields, buildings, hills, forests, deserts, water bodies and settlements” (Steiner, 2008, 4). However, landscape was seen by many scholars and theorists as a field that goes beyond an aesthetic appearance of a region to include perceptible expression of social, political and ideological sets as well as geographical scene.

An understanding of the landscape as a scene, including nature and man-made built-up environment is very narrow. Therefore, the concept of the landscape exceeds material considerations (which is, of course, a cornerstone of understanding the meaning of the landscape), to include symbolic and physical representation of power relations. In landscape paintings in English Landscape in eighteenth century, artists painted the scene of rural area, representing it as a place for leisure or as a place of agricultural laborers (Zukin, 1993, 16).

Landscape and social practices are inseparable, because landscape consists of natural environment (created by Allah) and man-made environment. ‘Landscape’ is defined as "an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors" (Europe, 2000, chap.1, art.1). Not only, the landscape is a natural environment (forests, valleys, trees, and mountains) and man-made environment, but also (as many studies explained) it is medium highly linked to culture, history, and identity.

Over the decades, the study of landscape has been broadened to include political and cultural issues. O’keeffe (2007, 9-10) argues that the landscape is a social-ecological realm in which communities invest in the landscape formation, locating their identities within landscape. Zukin indicates that landscape can represent social relations and social practices. According to Zukin (1993, 16) landscape is a mediator which represents social and race relations. Thereby, the transformation of the landscape could produce juxtapositions between many images especially the struggle between the image of powerful and the image of powerless.

W.J.T. Mitchel views the landscape as a verb rather than a noun. Consequently, researchers should ask not just what landscape is or means but what it does and how it works (Duncan & Duncan, 2010, 237). Mitchel (2002) indicates that landscape has the ability to exert power over people, even with slight influence. He defines the landscape as a 'cultural medium' like a language or painting, which plays a great role of communication and expression, emphasizing that the landscape is a physical and multisensory medium in which cultural meanings and values are encoded. 'Culture' in Mitchel's definition is a general term that includes the culture of a nation such as traditions, and conventions and also includes the culture of domination, control, and colonization.

The landscape in some cases exerts power over people. In this sense the meaning of landscape is stretched from the geographical meaning and physical surrounding to a power meaning. For example, the scene of high skyscraper near slums reflects the dominancy of economic capital power over the scene. Accordingly, the scene contains juxtaposition image between the space of poor and space of economic power. According to Zukin (1991, 16) the scene combines both the landscape of powerful; factories and skyscrapers, and the landscape of powerless; shantytowns and tenements. Consequently, a power have the ability to force its view on the landscape, "it was normal for such activities as landscaping the grounds of a country estate and drawing maps of the world to distort, obliterate, and rearrange geography to serve the interests of the viewer" (Ibid, 17).

According to all above, the concept of landscape is not just related to a material (tangible object), it is a medium of representation and practice, having multiple interpretations. The landscape as a scene in some cases around the world is not a neutral. So, the landscape in turn may be a medium of colonial order in which the landscape is articulated to have the ability to exercise unfair power over its users. In this context some elements of the landscape are designed intentionally by an occupying power to play the role of exercise of unfair power over people who inhabit the landscape. Therefore, this thesis shift the focus from what landscape is to what it does, what it means and how it works.

Achieving the harmony between human being and the environment shapes the discipline of the landscape planning which aims (as an academic discipline) to minimize the negative impact of human activities upon it and to preserve the nature. This idea was emphasized (in planning field) after the industrial revolution which is one of main driving forces of transformation of cities and landscape in the Nineteenth Century; cities expanded and new cities founded which affected the surrounding environment. Sprawl, pollution, shrinkage of agricultural lands, urban and environmental deteriorations became features of that era in Western Communities. As a reaction to ill of urbanization, planning discipline emerged to deal with environmental problems, and for the aim to

achieve progress and prosperity for human life. Planners and theorists thought about good and workable cities, such as Lewis Mumford and Ebenezer Howard who proposed the garden city¹.

Planners seek to direct the growth of cities towards sustainable development. They believe preserving green zones and green belts, as well as increasing green cover, are central and suitable policies for sustainable development. In spite of preserving natural parks and planting trees are encouraged and suggested as guidelines for sustainable development and good planning, in some cases around the world environmental and ecological concern may be used as an indirect way to exercise unfair power as this thesis explores. This deviation of the basic role of green zones are highlighted by examining cases in the occupied Palestine in which agriculture and green areas have been used to impose a colonial control.

The main driving force of meaning shift of landscape is the type of regime power. When a power is a colonial power, its dealing with spaces is different from a legitimate power which aims usually to satisfy the needs of people, enhance the quality of spaces and achieve progress in urban life, while a colonial power always tries to control both the people and the space, neglecting the essential needs of people and denying their rights. Ó Tuathail (1996) points out that imperial system through history exercised power to impose particular order and meaning upon space. Moreover, colonial powers reorder spaces to fit their cultural visions and material interests.

Therefore, viewing the role of planning as a reform tool is narrow and too idealistic. Spatial planning is a multidisciplinary field, many conflicting interests are in the pool of planning; politicians, sociologists, and environmentalists. Thereby, there are rare conditions in which planning is neutral as Forester points out: "planners do not work on a neutral stage, an ideally liberal setting in which all affected interests have voice; they work with political institutions, on political issues " (Forester, 1989, 3). Planning is a twin of politics and an executive arm of a government. Consequently, planning can be used as a negative and repressive tool. Moreover, 'planning as oppression' does exist in a variety of settings.

The context of occupation affects spatial knowledge such as planning, spatial organization, as well as aesthetic of landscape. In Palestine, the discipline of planning and geography are employed and exploited by the occupying authority as means for constructing colonial subject, in order to reorganize and reshape the landscape to satisfy the view of the occupier and control the occupied people, trying

¹ The increase of the environmental problems, deforestation, desertification, biodiversity losses, and climate change that threatens the quality of life and the future of our planet -The Earth- led to the emergence of the concept of sustainability which becomes the goal of many disciplines such as urban planning, urban design, architecture and landscape. The Brundtland Commission (1987) defined sustainability as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". Planning and environmental policies in many countries were changed to reconsider the new environmental challenges to achieve the sustainability.

to create new facts on the ground for serving Jewish settlers while at the same time limiting and choking Palestinian community spatial development. Since the occupation in 1948, "Israel" began to build colonial existence with different forms; adopting systematic policies to create new demographic and geographic realities on the ground.

The landscape of Palestine, including the West Bank has been changed dramatically; the original and indigenous landscape has been changed. A tour between main cities of Palestine, Jerusalem, Yafa, A'ka, Nablus, Jericho and Hebron, one can watch colonial settlements spread out over hilltops, giant concrete wall encircling cities, and steel fences with surveillance cameras. There are steel gates and solid concrete blocks in some villages' entrances, checkpoints where many people wait to pass. Spaces are full of unjust, and exploitation meanings with the suspension of original norms of planning principles, influencing the whole life of people of Palestine, threatening their existence, limiting their movement through their land.

This study investigates the mechanism and modalities of colonization in which the landscape has been manipulated and transformed. It analyzes the role of occupying power in the formation of fully controlled space and in the production of new image and meanings of the landscape. It focuses on how landscape and planning can be articulated and circulated as tools of control.

The landscape transformation is "legitimized" by creating new "statutory" planning system, and by creating new laws and regulations for the space. Additionally, new narratives of the landscape have been made, denying the indigenous narrative of the space, resulting in new colonial vocabularies. The stories of the place, its history, its image, its identity are reconstructed to hide, abolish, and deny the land of Palestine and its Islamic identity. Altout (2006) investigated the occupation environmental narratives, arguing that water scarcity was the narrative of the occupation for justifying its control over water resources.

New maps have been produced in which the name of Palestine was erased; the Arabic names of eradicated Palestinian villages, valleys, and places were renamed to be given Hebrew names. De-islamization, de-arabization, and judaization of the geography and the land aimed to produce new colonial narratives, hiding the indigenous narrative of the landscape. Meron Benvenisti in his book '*Sacred landscape*' points out that a new map for Palestine prepared in 1948 with Hebrew names; mountains, valleys, and springs were given Hebrew names replacing the Arabic ones. This map is considered one of the "intellectual weapons by which the power could be gained, administered, given legitimacy, and codified" (Benvenisti, 2000, 13).

Consequently, the occupying power has eliminated knowledge and destroyed the landscape that might remind people of Palestine of their history. This process is associated with proliferation of new linguistic expressions which aims to memocide of geography, history, and culture. The following section is an introductory section which highlights the political background that was the main driving

force of transformation of space. It also explains the turning points in history that have affected the current landscape of Palestine.

1.2 Preface to the Research Problem

The analysis of the current situation of the landscape change in the selected case study will be incomplete without unveiling the historical and cultural context regarding the question of Palestine. The existing situation in Palestine has been shaped during historical phases; many key events have been articulating the current situation. Palestine before 1917 was part of Islamic Ottoman State (*Al Khilafah Uthmaniyah*) in which all the Arabic countries are part of it about five centuries. According to the late administrative system in the Ottoman State, the north part of Palestine belonged to the province (*Wilayet*) of Biuret. *Alquds* (Jerusalem) was considered a special district which was directly subordinate to the capital of the state (Istanbul). It (*Sanjaq* of Jerusalem) includes Jaffa, Gaza and Hebron (fig. 1.1) (Aldabag, 1991, 13).




Fig. 1.1: The last administrative system of Palestine in the Islamic Ottoman state. Source: <http://scottthong.wordpress.com/2012/06/16/1873-ottoman-empire-map-no-palestine-noted/> (edit by: Halawani).

Following the collapse of the Islamic Ottoman State in the First World War (in which it allied with Germany against Allies), the whole region was changed, resulting in colonization and division of the region into weak national states according to so-called Sykes–Picot agreement between France and Britain. During the British colonization of Palestine, Britain encouraged Jews to go to Palestine. Between the years 1922 to 1946, the increase percentage of the Jews was about 9% annually, in the year 1927 alone the increase reached about 28.7% and in 1934 the increase percentage was about 25.9% (Said, 1992, 17-18).

In November 1947 the United Nations proposed the so-called resolution number 181 to divide Palestine between Jews and Arabs, and Jerusalem to become an international city, the Jews accepted this plan; however, Muslims and Arabs refused this partition plan. They did not accept that any part of their country should be given and ruled by Jews (Tamari, 1999) (fig.1.2). The Zionist Movement saw the “resolution” as a chance and a beginning to control the whole Palestine while Muslims have seen and still see the plan as a colonial plan to control their lands and prevent their unity again (Salabi, 2001).




Fig.1.2: Palestine between 1917 -1967. Source: Halawani, 2014, based on atlas of Palestine, issued by Arij

After that the war of 1948 erupted, resulting in the occupation of the first part of Palestine. According to Pappé' (2006, 41) the ethnic cleansing of Palestine began in early December 1947 and then continued during the war. As a result Jewish militants groups demolished about four hundred eighteenth villages in which the vast majority of them inhabited by Muslims (Khalidi, 1992), forcing about 750,000 Palestinians to leave Palestine (Said, 1992, 45), later these expelled citizens (over half of them villagers) will be known as Palestinian refugees, the majority of them lives in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, counting now more than five million persons (see appendix A). From that moment, the villages disappeared from the map (fig.1.3).

The Arabic names of destroyed villages' sites were replaced by Hebrew names. In some cases no physical evidence of a village remains. Al-Shakhina (located 5 km to the north of Baysan) is an example. Today, it cannot be identified because the entire area has been plowed and turned into agricultural land belonging to Jewish settlers living in Nir David colony (Khalidi, 1992, 58).




Fig.1.3: Destroyed Palestinian villages in occupied Palestine in 1948. Source: Halawani, 2014, based on atlas of Palestine, issued by Arij.

Many massacres were committed by Irgun, Stern and Hagana (Jewish militant groups) such as Deir Yasin massacre. The plan of the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians was ready on March, 1948, as written in the book *The Ethnic Cleansing in Palestine* “On a cold Wednesday afternoon, 10 March 1948, a group of eleven men, veteran Zionist leaders together with young military Jewish officers, put the final touches on a plan for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine” (Pappe’, 2006, xxi). Peppe’ mentions that the same evening military orders with detailed description were given to prepare for the systematic expulsion of Palestinians². The descriptions included “laying siege to and bombarding villages and population centers; setting fire to homes, properties, and goods; expelling residents; demolishing homes; and, finally, planting mines in the rubble to prevent the expelled inhabitants from returning.” (ibid, xxi).

One of those villages that was destroyed by Jewish militant groups is Saffuriyya (the village was located in the Galilee) (fig.1.4). What had remained of the village are only remnants of destroyed buildings and pine trees (unhistorical trees). Today, the site is a park³. Indeed, when one visits most of the sites of the destroyed villages, ancient stones and walls scattered on fields, or abandoned houses and destroyed mosques, are visible features. This scene indicates that people of Palestine lived there before the year 1948.




Fig. 1.4: Saffuriyya, Palestinian village that was demolished and erased from the map in 1948⁴

² A report published in New York times in August 2, 1988 mentioned that the victims of the massacre are as the following: “a total of 254 dead were counted by an International Red Cross official, including 145 women, of whom 35 were pregnant”.

³ Source: <http://smpalestine.com/tag/saffuriyya/>

⁴ Source: <http://www.palestineremembered.com/Nazareth/Saffuriyya/Picture1277.html>

The character of the indigenous landscape of the land 1948 has been changing due to; the destruction of the villages which (after that) were replaced by fabricated landscape consists of massive colonies. These colonies are part of territorial and demographical strategies to strengthening the existence of colonizers (Jewish settlers). In spite of the high level of the manipulation of knowledge regarding the occupied 1948 land of Palestine, this study will not analyze this part or select it as a case study because the inability to access to the data.

In the year 1967, after the six days war between “Israel” and the Arabic countries, the West Bank was also occupied. Immediately after the occupation, “Israel” began to strengthening its territorial colonization by issuing laws and constructing colonies as part of the Judaization project. Usually, the colonies have been constructed on the hill tops to be functioned as places of surveillance. Today, the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is about half million settlers.

In 1991, the negotiation between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and “Israel” was started in Madrid. And thus, the so-called Oslo agreement was signed in 1993 (which is viewed by many intellectuals as a liquidation of Palestinian case). The first application of the so-called Oslo agreement is called Gaza-Jericho agreement, meaning that the control of these two cities would be transformed to Palestinian Authority (P.A.). In 1995 the Oslo agreement B was signed in Taba in Egypt, by which major Palestinian cities in the West Bank were handed to P.A. According to




Fig.1.5: Division of land in the West-bank (A, B, C). Source: Halawani, 2014, based on map produced by Palestinian Ministry of Planning

this agreement Gaza Strip and the West Bank were divided into three Zones:

‘Zone A’: in this area, the “Palestinian Authority” has full responsibility of “security” and civil affairs. This zone includes Jericho and seven major Palestinian cities in the West Bank. It is worth to mention that a special protocol and arrangements related to Hebron city was signed on January 17, 1997. The city has been divided into two areas: ‘H1 area’ where Palestinian Authority has the responsibility of “security” and civil affairs and ‘H2 area’ where “Israel” has the full responsibility of “security”.

‘Zone B’: in this area “Palestinian Authority” has just the full responsibility of civil affairs, and do not have the responsibility of “security”. ‘Zone C’: in this area, “Israel” has the responsibility of “security” and the responsibility of civil affairs, including land administration and planning. ‘Zone C’ is a contiguous land area in the West Bank, while ‘zone A’ and ‘Zone B’ are fragmented and without any contiguity. ‘Zone C’ covers about 60 % of the West-Bank.

The mentioned division was made to confine part of Palestinians into two zones A and B, while keeping their agricultural lands in ‘Zone C’. It is worth mentioning that all the Jewish colonies in the West Bank, in addition to 149 Palestinian villages are located totally within the ‘Area C’.

The policy of constructing and expanding Jewish colonies -after the so-called Oslo agreement- has never stopped. The continuation of the control of Palestinian lands has taken many shapes and modalities; colonial settlements, roads network, apartheid wall, and demolishing Palestinian buildings ... etc. In the following sections, only three modalities of control (colonial settlements, bypass roads, and the apartheid wall) are highlighted as the following:

- **Colonial Settlements**

Since the occupation of the West-bank, the “Israeli governments” have adopted the policy of establishing a Jewish existence by building colonial settlements. The first plan that prepared to implement this policy was Alon plan which proposed to establish colonies in the Jordan Valley and the area around Jerusalem. By 1977 about 55,000 settlers were living in colonies established in the West Bank and “East Jerusalem”.

New strategy was adopted at the end of seventies; its aim was to build colonies around Palestinian towns and villages. After Oslo, the expansions of colonies have never stopped. Statistics show that the number of housing units for settlers in the West Bank and Gaza strip between September 1993 till September 2001 (excluding East-Jerusalem) rose from 20,400 to 31,400 – an increase of 55% in seven years (Lein 2002, 16).

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2010), the total number of colonies in the West Bank is 133 and another 100 random colonies known as ‘outposts’. The table (in the next page) shows the increase of settlers since 2005.

Year	The West Bank (including “East-Jerusalem”)
2005	448,489
2006	465,419
2007	482,211
2008	501,354
2009	511,739
2010	518,974

Table 1: Number of settlers between 2005-2010

Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/>

Through the framework of occupation, “Laws” have been invented to confiscate lands from people of Palestine. When the occupation fails to confiscate lands by fabricated laws, it issues military orders for the purpose of confiscation. For example, Ma’ale Adummin colony located near Jerusalem was constructed on confiscated lands. Several years before confiscation, the “Israeli military commander” declared most of the land as military zone, forbidding Palestinians people from entering or using it (Shalev, 2009). Today, its built-up area is about 4 km², where approximately 38,000 Jewish settlers live (Paz-Fuch, Cohen-Lifshiz, 2010).

- **Bypass Roads**

The ‘bypass roads’ is a term to describe the street network that connects colonies together in the West Bank. Travelling through this network is allowed for settlers, while Palestinians are prevented to use. There is no written “law” that prevents Palestinians from using bypass roads, this executive action implemented by verbal orders from “Israeli soldiers” in checkpoints located in the streets.

The separation and restriction of movement is not the only result of bypass roads. If one is traveling by car through one of those roads near *Bir Nabala* (Palestinian village on whose land the road is established), one can see the street with concrete edges with a suitable height that prevent drivers from seeing what is behind this street. The view of the village has been concealed behind the concrete edges. In other cases, the concrete edges disappeared showing an empty land. As a result the settlers can drive and never see the indigenous people and their built-up environment. The Palestinian villages were canceled from the scene of drivers.

In the article titled ‘you can drive long and never see an Arab’, Hass (journalist) wrote about the vanishing image of the Palestinian villages while driving through the bypass roads "a person could travel the length and breadth of the West Bank without ever knowing - not only the names of the villages and cities whose lands were confiscated in order to build the Jewish settlements and neighborhoods, but even the fact that they exist. Most of their names cannot be found on the road signs. And from a distance, the calls of the muezzins and the streets empty of people (after all, there is nothing to go out for) seem like an aesthetic decoration “(Hass, 2003).

Accordingly, the bypass roads are features in the landscape and they are not only limit the expansion of Palestinian cities and villages, but also they create a new perception, new fabricated image, and new fabricated narratives.

- **The Apartheid Wall**

The third control element explored in this chapter is the apartheid wall, because of its devastating influence on the landscape. The construction work of the wall was started in 2002; its total length will be approximately 700 kilometers. The wall in some areas is an electronic fence with two trenches on both sides and patrol paved road, in other areas it is an eight-meter high concrete barrier.

The wall (which was built on confiscated lands from people of Palestine) is seen as an act of oppression that isolates cities and villages from its natural geographical surroundings, and agricultural lands, forming regional prisons. Qalqiliya town, located about 70 km to the north of Jerusalem is a clear example.

The construction of the apartheid wall in Qalqiliya was begun in 2002, isolating the city from about 5,000 dunums (one dunum equals 1000 m²) of its agricultural lands and 22 ground water wells. The wall separates the city from surrounding Palestinian villages, dividing and destroying farmlands, and restricting the movement of inhabitants. The farmers found themselves facing extremely severe situation that limits access to their lands and their farms. The sense of rupture and prohibition casts its shadow on farmers as they cannot reach their lands freely (chapter five details the impact of the wall in Qalqiliya District).




Fig. 1.6: The Apartheid wall around Qalqiliya City.
Source: Halawani, 2014

1.3 Researcher's Observations

The fragmentation and territorial colonization of the landscape of Palestine is clear. Features of control have been implanted in its landscape which transformed according to the Judization project. This section details my personal observation regarding the transformation of the landscape of Palestine. There are four themes; vanishing of the indigenous landscape, the relation between devastation of space (Spacio-cide) and power, planning as a control tool, and the last theme is the mechanism of legitimization of territorial colonization. These observations constitute the first step of understanding the existing situation and they are essential to clarify the problem of research.

- **Vanishing of the Indigenous Landscape**

- The glorious landscape of Palestine has been re-produced, with devastating consequences to its original inhabitants (people of Palestine). The Palestinian villages were erased in the year 1948; more than four hundred villages faced deliberate destruction and urban annihilation. At the beginning, the Palestinian refugees lived in tents, after that they built brick and concrete buildings which called now refugee camps and they are now very visible features in the landscape of the West Bank and Gaza strip.
- The original scenery (in many areas of Palestine) which consists of the integration of villages, olive orchards, and wavy rock fences over hills is no longer dominating the landscape. The beautiful hilltops around Palestinian villages have been changed and were used to build colonies.
- The original landscape has been converted to another fabricated landscape, holding a colonial image, new meanings, and a new story, which denies and obliterates the narratives of the original people. The occupying power changed the names of valleys, hills, and places in order to enhance its existence and give itself confidence. The names of destroyed Palestinian villages were disappeared from maps prepared by "Israel", and the villages that survived were given symbols marking them as ancient ruins (Benvenisti, 2002, 41).

- **Spacio-cide as Colonial Politics**

- The occupation targets the space in which Palestinians live. The systematic destruction of the living space is termed spacio-cidce (Hanafi, 2009). Colonies are not static space, but they expand horizontally on confiscated land owned by Palestinians.

According to the table1 (in the previous section), colonies continued significantly to grow and settler numbers have grown. They control space which is not limited to the built up area, but exceed that including surrounding vacant lands. An obvious example of that the Ma'ale Adummim colony which has built over just 8% of its jurisdiction area. The spacio-cide was done by “Israeli planners”; planners who know very well about imperial strategies and understand the relation between power and space (fig.1.7).

- **Planning and Controlling Space**

- Historically, understanding of planning discipline is limited to land-use planning which is based on technical experts and professional planners. In this sense, planners suggest various zoning (such as housing, commercial, and industrial zones) and focuses on physical aspects of built environment. However, planning in the case of Palestine has not been used as a technical or professional tool; instead it is used to set vast area of land for establishing colonies in order to enhance the existence of Jewish settlers while at the same time chocking Palestinians communities leaving them with minimum possible spaces
- Most of Palestinian communities in the West Bank have been classified as so- called ‘Area A’. These areas are dispersed geographically, separated by area so-called ‘Area C’ which is connected geographically. Therefore, the land on which cities and villages exists transformed into cantons, forming obstacles for the expansion of Palestinian villages and cities.

- **The Legitimatization of Territorial Colonization**

- The system of planning in the West Bank is a dual system; one for establishing colonial settlements and another for Palestinian villages that are located in ‘Area C’. This system is centralized and headed by a military commander (fig.1.8).
- The main and first step of building new colonies is land confiscation which is “legitimatized” by invention and fabrication of laws (the details are in 4.7).




Fig. 1.7: Jewish colonies in the West-Bank (2012). Source: Halawani, 2014. based on B'tselem maps




Fig. 1.8: “Statuary” planning system in the West-Bank. Source: Alexander, 2010

The emergence of the occupying power has led dramatically to urban and landscape transformation on regional, local and neighborhood scales. This continuous change, articulates the space in different form and meaning, shaping the life of Palestinians in terms of their movements, worship, social relationship, and economic situation. Once a colonial settlement or elements of control such as fences and gates are built, new zones emerge called buffer zones. Palestinians are deprived from entering their lands in buffer zones. The feeling of fear controls them when they approach these areas, because they are unsafe spaces for them. This type of space as this thesis argues is ‘space of exception’. The following chart shows the process through which ‘space of exception’ is produced (fig.1.9).




Fig. 1.9: Power, planning, landscape, and space of exception interrelations. Source: Halawani, 2014

1.4 Problem Identification

The original landscape of Palestine consists of villages that are usually located on slopes of hills, agricultural lands, orchards, hills covered with olive trees, stone terrace walls with grape-draped gardens, cities on seashore, and tent of Bedouins in the desert. In the last century, however, the landscape of Palestine has been transformed dramatically; losing its natural rhythm and harmony.

The transformation has been caused by political, economic, demographical, cultural, and social changes. However, the main driving force for this transformation is the practices of occupation which controlled all urban activities in terms of planning and regulations. Since 1948, the landscape of Palestine has been reproduced by the occupation; planners have deployed methods, tools and mechanisms for the purpose of seizing land of Palestine and colonising it with Jews from abroad.

On natural preserved sites some colonies were constructed. A significant example is the Shilo colony that contains 45 caravans and 2 concrete buildings. It was built totally upon land classified as a natural preserved area (fig. 1.10). The destruction of the unique landscape by a systematic use of planning deprived the Palestinians from their cultural, social and natural heritage.



Fig. 1.10: Shilo colony was constructed on natural preserved lands. Source: <http://peacenow.org.il> & <https://earth.google.com>

The construction of colonies negatively affects the environment. Historically, peasants utilized hill slopes for their agricultural needs using stones terraces which integrated in a unique way with lands cultivated with olive tree and almond, and with streams forming cultural landscape. But, as a result of occupation the landscape has been reorganized and reshaped; the elements of control have fragmented the landscape, creating closed spaces filled with the meaning of oppression and unfair power.

The people of Palestine are witnessing the change of their landscape image. Continually, Palestinians observe new control elements dominating their landscape; colonies near their farms and houses,

concrete walls eight meters height saturated with observer towers, and new roads passing through their lands. Consequently villages and cities have been suffocating as a result of these elements which immobilize the way to surrounding agricultural lands and water resources which constitute one of the most important pillars of the their economy.

The scene of integration between Palestinian villages and the landscape has been threatened and in some places vanished. Buffer zones have been produced around elements of control which create new image of the space and new spatial morphology (fig 1.11). Buffer zones may be viewed as a spacio-cide mechanism because farmers are prevented from using these zones.




Fig.1.11: Buffer zones around indigenous cities. Source: Halawani, 2014

Accordingly, Palestinians think about their lands emotionally and mentally, but not physically.

Palestinian planners found themselves facing fragmented landscape with different classification (A, B, C) according to the so-called Oslo. There is no authority on natural and water resources, or on the main and regional roads of the West Bank. All these circumstances are set of obstacles facing planners who can develop outline plans on very limited area of land. They are allowed only to plan on 'Area A' which constitutes only about 11% of the West Bank, and 'Area B' which constitutes about 26% of the West Bank. This geopolitical context has resulted in shrinkage of lands, limitation of urban expansion, and squeezing Palestinians communities into small and closed spaces. Therefore, the whole Palestinian life including their social relations is influenced harshly.

The discipline of planning is in the hand of occupying power, maps and planning laws are produced to create a "legal geography" for settlers. Foucault points out that a power can take the role of production, and produces certain type of knowledge (Foucault, 1994, 31). Thus, colonial knowledge and colonial power go hand by hand and cannot be separated, since the occupying power produces knowledge, concerning its existence, continuity, and expansion. This is called by Michel Foucault '*culture industry*', meaning that language, intellectuals, and scholars can be deployed and functioned for the favor of unfair power.

The deviation of the use of spatial knowledge influences the character of spaces which (as a result) loses its livability, aesthetic, unity, original image, and normal settings. It can be called a space of exception that characterized by a void of law. Agamben (2005) explored the meaning of exception, mentioning that its main character is the emptiness of law and order.

A case study will be selected to be examined. Two main criteria are taken into consideration in the selection of the case study. Firstly, it should reflect the theme of the research; secondly, the data should be accessible at several levels from overview to details. Qalqiliya district is found a suitable case study to be analyzed. It is located about 75 Km to the north of Jerusalem. Around 92,000 inhabitants are living in the district, while approximately 42,000 are living in the city. Obviously, this case represents a significant example of the way in which the landscape transformed from a delightful scene to a scene that exercises unfair power upon its users.

The apartheid wall was built adjacent to the built-up area, forming a siege around the city, reducing the lands that are essential for future urban growth, grabbing most of the fertile agricultural lands, controlling the natural resources, preventing and limiting the accessibility to farming lands (fig. 1.12). At the same time, vast areas of land have been joined with the colonies to facilitate their future expansion.



Fig. 1.12: Agricultural gates in the apartheid wall in Qalqiliya city, limiting the accessibility to farming lands.

1.5 Hypotheses

- The context of occupation extends to multi-levels; from the discipline of knowledge until the daily life of people. New frameworks (such as new laws), pseudo-scientific approaches and arguments are created for the desire of justification of occupation.
- The occupying power employs planning and landscape planning to strengthen the demography of Jewish settlers while weakening the existence of people of Palestine. In this

context the goal of planning discipline is twisted from a reform tool to a control tool, despite that planning emerged out to make better environment and improve people's life.

- As a result of landscape transformation in Palestine, new spaces appeared and can be called 'spaces of exception'; spaces of emptiness of laws and norms, and space of control and surveillance.
- The occupying power do not just control the space, but the socio-economic and cultural sectors become also under control, aiming to weaken the economy of Palestinian cities and villages that depend on agriculture through re-division it into two spaces: one for Palestinian built-up areas, and another for Jewish colonies and natural resources together. Thus, exiling the farmers from their main income and their original work.
- The elements of control form a major hurdle for achieving regional and urban development in Palestinian towns and district. These elements are threatening the environment, eliminating the natural reserve zones, depriving towns from natural resources such as water, endangering the living conditions of people, and decreasing land for urban expansion.

1.6 Research Objectives

After clarifying the problem identification and researcher observations, the following objectives of research come to surface:

- To develop a conceptual model and framework to understand the manipulation of the landscape as an exercise of unfair power. This model highlights domains that are used as frameworks for the purpose of exercising disciplinary power. This model facilitates for decision makers and researchers the way in which to view and analyze landscape in situations of oppression and injustice.
- To define how the landscape can be approached as a subject of power exercise.
- To develop an understanding about the way in which landscape may be transformed to play a role in symbolizing colonial meanings such as dominancy and subjection.
- To investigate the territorial control that has been practiced by the occupying power, focusing on the role of planning in occupied Palestine.

- To analyze the chronological changes of the landscape in the case study as an impact of the planning policies, and its consequences upon Palestinian citizens focusing on socio-economic and cultural aspects.
- To explore the challenge of planning to counter or resist hegemonies of colonial landscape features.
- To investigate policies and spatial modalities used to normalize the occupation and “legalize” the territorial colonization. And to highlight the way in which it attempts to legitimize its practices of oppression and subjection against those who have colonized.

1.7 Research Questions

After exploring the research problems and tracing the objectives of dissertation. Several questions have been raised to provide a clarification of the purpose of this study; they are centralized around the relations between occupying power, space, planning and landscape. The questions are divided into two groups: main question (grand tour question) and sub questions.

The main question of the research is: How are landscape and planning manipulated as an exercise of unfair power in the colonized zones?

Sub-questions are traced, narrowing the focus of the study, as the following:

- What are the mechanisms and modalities (used in local and regional scales) in which landscape is transformed in the case of Palestine?
- What are the characteristics and identities of new emerging spaces, as a result of landscape transformation?
- What are the consequences of occupying power practices upon people of Palestine who live in controlled and closed zones?
- Does the occupying power produce new narratives concerning the landscape as part of legitimization process?
- What are the new meanings of the landscape as a result of elements of control and apartheid wall?

- What are the recommendations to support the existence of people of Palestine on their land and in the closed zones?

1.8 Research Methodology

According to the researcher's observation and literature review, the research problem and hypotheses are written. Alan Bryman (1998, 2) points out that the personal observation is a useful step for the research and a procedure for developing hypotheses. However, it is very restricted technique in a certain stage in the research.

Indeed, the landscape offers a domain for observation of the spatial manifestation of power relations, motivating us for a comprehensive analysis about the change of landscape from homogeneous to heterogeneous and from ordered to disordered. Despite that the image of landscape is helpful to unveil the way in which the production and reproduction of the landscape have been occurred but we cannot theorize that transformation without theories, thus in this thesis the works of Foucault, Agamben, and Lefebvre are employed to construct a conceptual framework to understand the landscape manipulation and landscape transformation. Therefore, this thesis operationalizes some theorist's notions such as the notion of exception in the analysis of the case study.


Drawing on theorists' work and practical analysis, I have tried to show that the analysis of landscape transformation is similar to the analysis of a discourse which may (in some cases) deceive people for the purpose of domination, control, and exclusion. This study will show that the change of the landscape is something further than physical and spatial change; it is about a power that tries to build a new mind regarding the landscape.


This analysis unveils the role of the spatial image and landscape that play in the context of occupation and the way in which the narrative of the landscape is used as a discourse of occupation to naturalize the *status quo* and features of control. This analysis seeks to relate landscape and planning to a larger domain and field of knowledge which was structured in a specific way. This is useful to understand the way in which colonial knowledge is formulated and used.

The analysis of the data will be on two levels; regional level and local level. At the regional level the analysis focuses on two themes; firstly the territorial colonization of the landscape, secondly the procedural control of the space such as the laws used to control the space and reproduce it. At the local level, territorial analysis will be conducted and the impact of the landscape transformation on the city of Qalqiliya in terms of socio-economic and cultural aspects will be investigated. Moreover, the daily-life changes (after the construction of the wall) will be examined.

This study views landscape as a medium, holding meanings that are created through a process. This perspective shows that the production of landscape is a process for inculcating meanings of domination and control in the space. For this purpose, interviews with farmers and key persons will be conducted to investigate new perception concerning the space. The samples will take into account different locations of Palestinian communities.

The West Bank consists of eleven governorates and eleven cities. The researcher will visit these cities and governorates in order to observe the landscape transformation. These visits are important for the researcher to collect a preliminary data that is essential for assessing the landscape transformation occurred after 1967 in the West Bank and to specify the case study. The selection (as mentioned) is based upon the correspondence between the theme of the research and the case study, and the availability of the data. The following chart explores the methodology of the research:





1.8.1 Research Mode

The general mode of writing in this dissertation (writing method) is critical approach. This mode of writing does not focus on the basic ideas of knowledge that emerged and has continued to participate in prosperity of communities; but the study seeks to illustrate knowledge deployed to function in a

different way of its original purposes. The critical thinking is to think differently about meanings of spaces, geography, and landscape, in order to reach more accurate and concrete diagnoses of the problem of spatiality.

Edward Said adopted the criticism approach; he criticizes the orientalist text which was created to construct 'the orient'. His criticism of the text unveils the purpose behind it (the desire of writing) and examines the way in which knowledge is made by a power for the purpose of domination, control, and obliteration. Soja (1996) reassures the importance of this way of thinking by noting: "it thus becomes more urgent than ever to keep our contemporary consciousness of spatiality- our critical geographical imagination- creatively open to redefinition and expansion in new directions; and to resist to narrow or confine its scope" (Soja, 1996, 2).

Foucault (2000, 1989a) approached the society from the point view of dichotomy between groups of people. That critical thought led him to detail mechanisms that were used for the purpose of domination (see section 2.2). Similarly, this thesis criticizes the production of the landscape, detailing the mechanisms that have been used by the occupation to control those who have been occupied to a degree to prevent them from essential and basic needs of living (land and water).

Adopting critical approach means to think differently about the landscape; its meaning, production, and reproduction. This way of thinking does not just focus on the material of the landscape (physical features), but it aims also to unveil in details the way in which the landscape is produced and the reasons behind the reproduction process. Consequently, this dissertation unveils domains in which the landscape is transformed, highlighting the new meanings of landscape acquired. In this sense, issues such as oppression, subjection, tyranny, injustice take more attention than issues of development, enjoyment, and beauty.

This approach is an attempt to re-conceptualize some aspects regarding the discipline of the landscape and suggests a new interpretation of its role in occupied zones. Through this mode of thinking the research can highlight an interpretative framework from which can experts and researchers view the landscape transformation in other zones around the world where oppression is embedded in the process of landscape production. This approach is very helpful to establish relations between the discipline of landscape and (power, law, planning).

1.8.2 Data Collection

Data were collected using qualitative method. The main research method is in-depth interviews in order to explore the ability of landscape elements to exercise unfair power over its user. Direct observation is also a method used to observe human activity influenced by the new features of landscape imposed by the occupation (specifically the wall). Therefore, visits to the Qalqiliya district and staying long time with people in different communities (inside and outside the wall) familiarized

the researcher to the new way of life that people face after building the wall. There are three main sources of data: interviews (see appendix B), spatial data, and documents. Winchester (2000) points out that there are three main types of qualitative research: oral, textual and observational.

- **Interviews**

The selected sample for the interview consists of twenty farmers who experience the exercise of unfair power through landscape. The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 45 minutes, and some of them were recorded using video camera. Questions were prepared before as guidelines, so the interview sample may be described as a 'semi-structured' interview which has some degree of order but it is also flexible.

The interview questions were structured and developed based on the researcher's observation and literature. An important point regarding the interviews is to explore the change of daily life in terms of (economic situation, movement, time and so on) before and after building the wall. The main sample condition is that a farmer must have experience of work in his agricultural land



before and after building the wall.

Fig. 1.13: The interview with one of those farmers who has faced the change of the landscape of Qalqiliya before and after building the wall. Source: Halawani, May, 2013

The questions include five components, general information, exposure to the wall (its impact, passing through ... etc.), control over time, economical status information, and the way in which to support their life. The Farmers narrated their everyday life stories; problems they face during passing gates to farming lands, and hardship of working due to the building of the wall. Thomas Kaplan (1993) emphasizes the usefulness of storytelling, pointing out that this device can offer a powerful tool to an analyst. Stories are not only present facts and express opinions and emotions; they also reconstruct selectively what the problems really are (Foster, 1993). Consequently, in this research the field work which consists of interviews, group discussions, and site observation forms an important step to unveil in details and make visible the way in which the landscape transformation and manipulation influences the user of space (Palestinian farmers).

Two group meetings were conducted to discuss the issues of colonies and the wall and their impact on water and agriculture (fig. 1.14). Both were held in the Qalqiliya municipality. No quotations were used in this research based on these two meetings but they were useful to understand the general problem (especially socio-economic issues) that farmers face because of elements of control in the landscape.



Fig. 1.14: Meeting in the Qalqiliya Municipality Hall. Source: Halawani, June, 2013

- **Spatial data**

The spatial analysis is based on the geographic information system (GIS) which is a tool of analysis. The spatial data includes master plans and aerial photos. The analysis is found in chapter five which explores the case study (Qalqiliya). The base map is an aerial photo produced in 2011. There are various spatial layers which were collected from Land Research Center and Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture.

- **Documents**

The documentary sources include newspapers and reports from different institutions regarding colonies and the apartheid wall. One of the main sources of non-spatial data is Palestinian Central Bureaus of Statistics (PCBS). It is governmental institution, conducting statistics about Palestinian matters since 1997.

1.9 Research Structure

The dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter one clarifies the research approach, highlighting the hypotheses, the problem identification, the goals, the methodology, the methods, and the data collection methods. Planning theories that examine the relation between power and planning are detailed in chapter two. This chapter also highlights the relation between power and landscape, and the role of power on landscape's narratives and meanings, while chapter three examines the theories that conceptualize the impact of power on the space, detailing the meaning of space in various conflict contexts.

Chapter four provides a general overview of geopolitical context in Palestine, examining spatial impact of occupation. It focuses on spatial colonial control over land and resources in the West Bank after 1967, detailing territorial control over lands as a result of the colonies and the apartheid wall. Chapter five are devoted for the case study analysis (Qalqilya district), detailing the territorial, procedural, soio-economic, and cultural control practiced by the occupying power. The conceptualization of the landscape as a medium of exercising unfair power, the landscape of exception, and the role of planning in the landscape of exception are illustrated and discussed in chapter six. Finally, chapter seven presents the conclusion and empirical recommendations to strengthening the existence of people of Palestine in the controlled spaces.

Chapter 2

Power, Planning & Landscape

Chapter 2: Power, Planning & Landscape

Understanding the relation between planning and power is a central point for this dissertation, which examines the landscape transformation occurring in Palestine, specifically in the West Bank. This understanding provides a framework for understanding how landscape is articulated, which is the result of a complex process of production. Specifically it provides a lens through which the researcher can view landscape manipulation in the West Bank, where the struggle is highest, and where the role of planning and landscape become controversial issues. A central point of this chapter is to construct an understanding of the relation between transformations occurring in the landscape and the practice of planning, which can be a tool used by a power in society for shaping a hegemony and dominance inside the landscape.

This chapter starts by reviewing key theoretical positions on the power relations which have an influence on planning theories by focusing on two central questions: what is the suitable theoretical approach that could be used to conceptualize the practice of the occupying power in Palestine and what is a convenient theoretical framework guiding the analysis of the case study? Reviewing the work of intellectuals and philosophers concerning power relations paves the way to understand the meaning of the landscape in colonial, conflict, and struggle situations and its relation with power. Moreover, it helps realize the influence of a power on landscape narratives and memories that are essential to know the landscape's role in occupied lands. The aim of this chapter is not just to highlight the practice of power, but also to illustrate the framework in which the practice is articulated. Accordingly, this chapter presents the landscape as a process in which spatial differences are formed. For this, it will avoid the examining of the concept of landscape as a natural scene we interact with, instead examining it as an active force, highlighting its power in expression, conveying meanings, and ability of practice.

2.1 Power and Planning in Theories

The breakdown of feudal society in the west and the emergence of the idea of the nation-state changed the structure of political systems throughout the world, producing a new structure of power relations inside societies. The new political and economic realities raise new issues and new frameworks for intellectuals and theorists to understand power relations and in particular how they have been spatialized. One of a significant issue that has been attracting scholars to investigate is the issue of

power relations due to its great importance for providing a comprehensive understanding of the concepts of colonization, inequalities, and oppression.

Investigation the meaning of power in theories forms a base to acquiring a deep understanding of the relation between planning theories and power. Planning, in its simplest form as a normative task seeks to work as a reform process, aiming to produce environment that satisfies the need of its users and provides a healthy circumstances for them (Friedman, 1987). However, the practice and actual reality of planning as practice is often far from such ideas and can be corruptive, technical or reformist. The negative role of planning is intimately connected with the misuse of power which is clear in the work of Nicollò Machiavelli who wrote *The Prince*, early in 16th century. *The Prince* answers a central question: how can power survive? It is a book detailing methods and tactics to preserve, protect, and strengthen the power of the ruling political regime, but at the same time disregards the negative and unjust consequences of maintaining that power.

Some theorists began to address this dilemma by exploring alternatives such as Paul Davidoff (1965) and his concern for representation in western states and societies. He argues that planners should play a representative role, especially for the powerless groups. In his paper 'Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning', he emphasizes that planning must be pluralistic to be effective and that in order to achieve this pluralism; the urban planner must be a representative (advocator) of groups who lack the technical power and knowledge of state. According to Davidoff, advocacy planning is an effective process to provide better opportunities for development, especially for poor people: "Pluralism and advocacy are means for stimulating consideration of future conditions by all groups in society. But there is one social group which at present is particularly in need of the assistance of planners; this group includes organizations representing low-income families" (Davidoff, 1965, 334).

Later, a wide range of planning theories draw on a Habermasian approach have tried to deal with power inequalities and exploitation by cooperation with different unequal powers, but not by a transformation of power structure. This approach shares their concern in preserving the structure of power in societies and making it more effective with the philosophical trend of Weber (1947). According to Weber (1947) power can dominate a given group of persons, but at the same time it takes a compulsory and imperative form. He thus links the concept of power with the idea of *authority*, and how the legal authority can be established and given a legitimacy of domination, focusing on the state as a form of social guidance. Therefore, his approach emphasizes the role planning practice in making the power of the state more effective (Friedman, 1987).

Habermasian analysis of social actions led him to propose *communicative action* theory. This refers to at least two subjects or two actors for establishing interpersonal relations, seeking to reach an understanding about their plans of action, in order to build agreement, consensus, and cooperation between them. It focuses on building a consensus by open public debate rather than power exercise

(Habermas, 1984). This approach stresses that people can ‘make sense together’ despite their differing lifestyles (Healey, 2006, 50).

Habermas inspired planning theorists' such as Forester and Healey in conceptualizing power relations and power inequalities. Forester (1989) illustrates that planning is not an utopian process. Planners cannot work in an abstract manner or as if in a vacuum because the world is full of conflicting interests and inequalities of power. Despite this, according to Forester, the proper role of urban planners is to treat all interests and stakeholders equally and to make planning more equitable. He emphasizes that planners are not problem solvers, as they are not dealing with machines to which they can input data and gain the out-put in a systematic way. They deal with communities full of varieties, contradictions, different interests, and different groups with different values. Consequently, planners should know and gain skills from which they can identify and understand the position of different stakeholders.

Drawing on Habermasian communicative action theory, Healey (2006) views the most effective treatment of dealing with power relation is by collaboration. Healey introduces collaborative planning as an instrument to co-existence and as a tool to build understanding and consensus. However, Planning is a ‘double-edged weapon’; on one side it can be a progressive and communicative tool, while on the other hand it can be a tool for repression, consolidating fragmentation, normalizing and legalizing the control and oppression. Planning is inseparable with politics, since planning policies and strategies are set by governments. And planning is also part of a political system; governmental initiations and ministries are involved in shaping planning policies.

Thus, political power plays an influential role in shaping the planning system and power relations, leading planning to be an executive arm of the state (Yiftachel, 1998). Moreover, when planners work in the state institutions, they usually behave as a servant to them, trying to promote the institution's interests even if this requires them to be deceptive (Flyvbjerg, 1996). Moreover, the dark side of planning which is unavoidable practices in some situations, occurring under the guise of rationality (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Based on this point of view, the communicative approach neglects the context in which planning is used, instead it focuses extensively on the process of building consensus and management of inequalities and differences.

Thus, it can be said that the communicative approach ignores several points. First, this approach neglects the relation between planning and politics; it can often act as an arm of the government and as an alternative form of politics, it may be employed to “legalize” the regressive practices of occupying power or hegemonic power. In addition, the communicative approach focuses too little on the structure of power and its executive role in shaping inequalities. Finally, it neglects the role of occupying power or hegemonic powers, which have an assured role in producing spatial inequalities and meanings of domination and foster marginalization and exclusion. (Bond, 2011, 162) criticizes

this approach because it preserves the status quo rather than transforming the inequitable power relations.

Consequently, the communicative approach leaves a void in planning theories when a power is not progressive but it is an oppressive because this approach simplifies contradictions and struggles to the degree of ignorance. Another approach which explores the concept of power is Foucauldian approach. Foucault, who was concerned with the concept of power: its mechanism, its practices, and its role in society. His approach invites us to contemplate the oppressive practices by a power. He interested in how knowledge (that should be constructive) is used negatively in the service of power. Then, the misuse of power becomes part of the structure of society, and also becomes acceptable to those whom it is practiced upon. The following text written by Foucault shows the importance of examining power in contemporary society, namely because of the fact that power has infiltrated all social sectors in society, influencing the network of relations and the daily life of people.

“In feudal society the control of individuals is based on local insertion, on the fact they belong to a particular place. Feudal power was exercised over men insofar as they belonged to a manor. Local geographic inscription was a means of exercising power. Power was inscribed in men through their localization. In contrast the modern society that formed at the beginning of the nineteenth century was basically indifferent or relatively indifferent to individual's spatial ties: it was not interested in the spatial control of individuals insofar as they belonged to an estate, a locale, but only insofar as it needed people to place their time at its disposal. People's time had to be offered to the production apparatus; the production apparatus had to be able to use people's living time, their time of existence” (Foucault, 2000, 80).

From that perspective, a power is no longer exercised in relation to location in society, instead proliferating until it becomes parts in the cells of society, influencing every aspect of human life. In this sense, tools and devices (apparatus or *dispositif* in Foucault's term) are deployed by power to sustain the exercise of power (Pløger, 2008, 54). Foucault understands the space as a *dispositif*⁵ where structures are created to serve "the needs of power". From that perspective, the practice of power in some contexts should be viewed with suspicion because it may be manipulative and oppressive.

Foucault views knowledge as a mask of an exercise of power, so again it is double edged; it may be progressive and it may act as a destructive tool. In the context of occupation knowledge becomes a mask of injustice; certain disciplines such as planning turns out to function as oppressive instrument that can be used to exercise unfair power and oppress certain groups in society. Yiftachel (1995,

⁵ *Dispositif* is defined by Foucault (1980, 194): “consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions Such are the elements of apparatus (*dispositif*). The apparatus itself is a system of relations that can be established between these elements”

1998) describes how planning is a useful tool in the hand of a power for exercising social control through four dimensions: territorial, procedural, socio-economic, and cultural.

According to Yiftachel, the territorial dimension concerns the use of space by land use, zoning, densities, land ownership, demarcation of administrative boundaries, urban expansions, allocation of settlements and social facilities. The procedural dimension determines the formation and implementation of plans and policies of the government, including statutory aspects that define the relation between authority and the public, which influence the public participation and preparation of decision making. The socio-economic dimension concerns the impact of planning actions on social and economic relations in society. The cultural dimension concerns the impact of planning's actions on culture and collective identities of people.

As noted these dimensions are all double-edged: on one hand, they could achieve improvement, progress and prosperity in people's lives, but on the other hand they could be used for control, oppression, and exclusion for certain groups of people. The use of these dimensions depend on the type of power (if it is occupying power or not) which is the main mobilizer of planning uses (as a tool of reform or as a tool of control).

What is important to note is that some theorists who inspired by Foucauldian approach, also ignore the context where the oppression is found. As an example, the work of Yiftachel (2006a) in which he describes the native people of Palestine (those who have been occupied) as minorities and he views the problem through an ethnic framework by describing the occupying regime as an 'ethnocratic' regime.

In reviewing the development of planning theories and planning practice, it is clear that the task of planners is not isolated from politics. Therefore, planning is not politically neutral, despite that planning is addressed to be "rational". Moreover, in some contexts, planning practices can be understood only in terms of vocabulary of power because it could be used to rationalize oppressive policies.

2.2 Dimensions of Power

The definition of power in oxford dictionary is "the ability or capacity to do something or act in a particular way", or "the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events", or "physical strength and force exerted by something or someone". The mentioned definitions highlight two approaches regarding the meaning of power in language. Firstly is the personal power: to do something and act effectively. This is clear in the first and the third definition. The second definition reveals the ability to influence someone or a group of people.

In the field of politics the concept of power means an authority which may be any kind of authority. In some cases it is a legitimate authority while on the other it is illegitimate. Michel Foucault, however, does not distinguish between them. He analyzes a power as a negative social phenomenon "the power is not something that is given, exchanged, or taken back, that is something that is exercised and that it exists only in action" (Foucault, 2003, 14). He views power in the manner of dominance and having an impact of control. Therefore, in the cases of colonization in which oppression and subjection is part of colonial regime this perspective is useful.

When Foucault analyzed history, he focused on the practice of power on groups in society in order to theorize about the practice of power in contemporary society. He views history not from the standpoint of politics, but from the standpoint of groups of people on whom torture and exclusion were practiced, creating a new trend in philosophical analysis. For example, in his book 'Madness and Civilization', Foucault describes the evolution of attitudes towards madness from the Middle Ages in Europe, detailing how madmen treated by the rest of society. He describes how in the Middle Ages madmen were put into a ship called the 'ship of fools' and were carried across seas and canals in order to signal their exclusion from society. When in Renaissance Period the 'ship of fools' no longer existed, this form of exclusion practiced on madmen was replaced by the practice of confinement in closed spaces called 'hospitals', described as the 'center of confinement' according to Foucault. The point that Foucault wanted to highlight is that although the treatment of the 'madness' phenomenon may take diverse forms through time, it retains the same meaning: keeping the rules of social exclusion and segregation intact. He mentions also the policies of treatment for some diseases in the Middle Ages in Europe, such as the leprosy and the plague, that spread in the Sixteenth Century. Patients were confined to special spaces with restricted rules. When the diseases vanished, however, they left behind them different social meanings "what doubtless remained longer than leprosy, and would persist when the lazar houses had been empty for years, were the values and images attached to the figure of the leper as well as the meaning of his exclusion" (Foucault, 1989, 4).

Foucault explores in his book 'The Birth of Clinic' an emergence of a particular perspective developed in 18th century towards the discourse of medicine through new modes of relations between doctor, physiologist and with patients. It has been developed in such a way that a space of disease should be under surveillance (Pløger, 2008, 60). Here this study does not discuss or criticize the discipline of medicine which is, of course, is very essential for mankind. But the idea is that in particular circumstances, the creation of a certain discipline or a certain framework may be negatively influence people. What Foucault tries to highlight is that new spaces can be created or demarcated in communities and come under restricted rules different from surrounding such as spatial cantons. The re-examination of history by Foucault reveals that demarcation of the space is bound up with discipline. Moreover, the types of people within those spaces in some cases are 'made' also by such discipline (Murdoch, 2006, 35).

According to Foucault in his works (2000, 1978), the forms of power in which people live can be classified into three types; sovereignty power, disciplinary power, and bio-power. For the purpose of this thesis, this section examines the meaning of disciplinary power and bio-power as the following:

- Disciplinary power

It is a set of mechanisms and procedures for regulating the behavior of people, including penal and surveillance practices on individuals or a group of people. Foucault linked between disciplinary power and knowledge, indicating that the knowledge which is produced to serve the disciplinary power focuses on the behavior of people in accordance with a rule "A knowledge ..., it was about whether an individual was behaving as he should, in accordance with the rule or not ... it was no longer organized in terms of presence and absence, of existence and nonexistence; it was organized around the norm, in terms of what was normal or not, correct or not, in terms of what one must do or not" (Foucault, 2000, 59). Additionally, in that context the knowledge is constituted in a selective form, leading to appearance of institutions in which the disciplinary power can be exercised (Foucault, 2003, 182-183).

According to Foucault this power forms with its penal and surveillance system a "disciplinary society". In the context of occupation, the disciplinary approaches of occupation are mechanisms of control infiltrating to daily life of people who are colonized. There are four types of punishment in order to make sure that the behavior of people follows the "rules" without breaking them in a "disciplinary society" (Foucault, 2000).

- Punishment by expelling and deporting from the social body.
- Punishment by exclusion in a place. In other words, it is not deporting from the place, instead it is isolation by forming public opinions against individuals or a group of people, practicing humiliation and condemnation on them.
- Punishment by compensation for social damage, forcing a person "who breaks the law" to perform useful activities for the society or the state.
- Punishment by retaliation.

Foucault (1977) illustrates surveillance practices by referring to the work of Jeremy Bentham, who designed a circular prison building called the Panopticon. In its center there is a yard with a tower in the middle. In the tower there is a supervisor who can see all the facades of the building through a shattered window or small holes. The circular building is divided into cells, and in each cell there is a prisoner, with glass facades overlooking the yard in which the observer tower stands. Prisoners inside cells can be monitored by an observer while at the same time prisoners cannot communicate with neighboring each other because of the presence of a wall surrounding each cell. This situation makes prisoners inside these cells feel constantly under control by the observer even when an observer does not exist, this control by supervision and surveillance being given the name 'panopticism' by

Foucault: "in panopticism, the supervision of individuals is carried out not at the level of what one does but of what one is, not at the level of what one does but of what might do" (Foucault, 2000, 70).

The Panopticon is not just a type of a prison used to imprison persons in a jail, but it has a general meaning of function, representing the function of a certain type of power in communities. Panopticon does not just have a function of surveillance, but in addition to that it is a kind of laboratory: "it could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter behavior, to train or correct individuals" (Foucault, 1977, 203). Foucault describes the mechanism of Panopticon as motif for disciplinary power and as a perfect mechanism of power exercise because it is exercised continuously by a few persons who can exercise power on a larger number of people: "it makes it possible to perfect the exercise of power. It does this in several ways: because it can reduce the number of those who exercise it is exercised spontaneously and without noise" (ibid, 206).

- Bio-power

It is a set of mechanisms and procedures for managing populations. This power is directed to control people as species, such as the ratio of birth, the fertility of population. Foucault (2005, 16) defines it as "a set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy". According to Pløger (2008) the body of human being had been viewed by Foucault as a core of space in which tyranny can be practiced over man kind's bodies.

The bio-power does not only concern with the biological features, but also it is linked to a process in which human body is treated like a machine with surveillance and control. In order to illustrate the mechanism of practicing of bio-power, Foucault investigates the plague regulations current in the sixteenth until the seventeenth century, aiming to indicate that this rule is not limited to the past but can also obviously be found in contemporary societies. He wrote "these plague regulations involve literally imposing a partitioning grid on the regions and town struck by plague, with regulations indicating when people can go out, how, at what times, what they must do at home, what type of food they must have, prohibiting certain types of contact, requiring them to present themselves to inspectors, and to open their homes to inspector" (Foucault, 2005, 24). What happens today is that the concept of the plague regulations is extended in contemporary societies and the 'rules of plague' have become applicable regulations. Moreover, with the passage of time the procedures and the techniques practiced by power become a law, and as Foucault (2005, 24) points out many aspects of exclusion took place through the legal system (law and regulations).

The problem of racism (discrimination based on races, hierarchy of races and so no) is well-matched with the bio-power. According Foucault (2003, 255) racism "is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population this allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into subspecies known, precisely, as races".

Based on what have been examined, the point is that a power may create frameworks, models and structures of orders through disciplinary approaches that aim to frame particular group of people and certain actions for the purpose of control. Mitchell (1991) invites us to acknowledge that approach, in some cases frameworks appear to order things, but in fact they are ways to exclude, surveil, and discipline people. Landscape Planning may be one of those frameworks which is organized around the concept of subjection, with the aim of making people disciplined as a power desires.

It is worth mentioning that despite the existence of different mechanism of power (such as penal, surveillance mechanisms), a power in a context of occupation (as it will be clear in the analysis of the case study) aims to ensure a well-structured activities and behaviors of occupied people inside controlled spaces. The occupying power creates modalities to oppress, exclude, deny and ultimately control the occupied.

What, however, happens to the space, geography, and landscape when a power insists upon controlling them, or when it dominates the landscape while at the same time silencing or obliterating those who are powerless? The next sections examine this and illustrate the consequences of hegemony on the landscape.

2.3 Landscape, Ideology, and Narratives

Since the evolution of the concept of landscape in arts and literature, starting from the Renaissance and up to the Romanticism (Camporesi, 1992), landscape does not uniquely refer to the aesthetic dimension (Cosgrove, 1984), although a common feeling has always brought 'positive ideas' about landscape such as beauty, harmony, enjoyment and even sublime. Landscape is a material as well as cultural artefact; it is a 'datum', but it is also a representation; it is a place, but it is also its imagine. Landscape is an artificial product, a highly complex social artefact, a mix of aesthetic (arts), nature (ecology) and humane labour (economy), in a bijective mapping between urban culture and rural activities. This peculiar and highly complex human artefact has ever been produced and maintained in a long term dynamic process: this process - in its historical dimension - has ever been made not just of (planning or design) transformations, but also (and primarily) of "maintenance" (Sestini, 1947a).

In more recent years, a wide international literature has developed a more diverse approach to landscape. The work of Mitchell (2002), in his book *Landscape and Power*, which was originally published in 1994, shifts the meaning of landscape from an object to a process by which social and subjective identities are formed. It gives a different view on the interpretation of landscape, aiming to conceptualize a meaning that exceeds its surface. Likewise Swaffield (2002, 233) describes the landscape exceeding its physical meaning, considering landscape as a social practice, "dealing with the creation, reproduction, and representation of social and cultural experience and meaning".

Landscape is like language, which has the ability to express and represent. Ann Whiston Sprin (1998) in her book 'the language of landscape' argues that landscape has all the features of language. It has the characteristic of storytelling, which connects human beings with the place. The term 'landscape narrative' has become a common term in the contemporary landscape realm. This term refers to both the story (what is told) and also to the means of telling (Potteiger, Purinton, 2002, 136). According to Potteiger and Purinton (2002) ideologies can play a critical role in creating a narrative of landscape. For understanding the narrative quality, Potteiger and Purinton classified the narrative forms and practices into three related realms:

- The story realm
It discusses the role of designer in creating meaning. The story of a landscape represents a period of time which can be accelerated, frozen, and modulated in many ways.
- The contextual/ inter-textual realm
It examines the role of the reader, communities or memory in making the landscape narratives. The meaning of the story of the landscape shifts from the intentions of the designer or author to the role of reader within a particular cultural context.
- The discourse realm
It examines the purpose of using the story of the landscape, concentrating on the role of ideologies in constructing the narrative of the landscape, because narration helps to establish systems of belief and authority.

Therefore, ideologies can play a role in creating the narrative of the landscape (such as the Zionist ideology which has fabricated certain narratives about the landscape of Palestine) (see 4.1). Ann Bermingham points out (2002) that the process of constructing a scene in the landscape is not ideologically neutral and a scene can function as a symbol for a specific ideology. Some ideologies which have the role of hegemony find through landscape a suitable tool to achieve their dominance (Baker & Biger, 1992). (Potteiger, Purinton, 2002, 142) wrote, based on the work (Parker, 1992, 20): "since narratives help to establish systems of belief and authority they reproduce relations of power in a society. Often dominant groups tell their story in the landscape, controlling interpretations as well as preventing others from making history". Thus, it is possible to argue that a landscape could be a container of ideology, representing the power relations in a space.

One of the cases where narrative of landscape aims to produce new geography and new culture is the narrative about archeological sites when a power tries to spread its own special misrepresented interpretation of the landscape. In this sense, archeological sites are exploited in order to "legitimize" claims to possess land and developing archeological knowledge which is a key of colonial cultural (Abu el-Haj, 2001). In colonized land the terms of landscape features (valleys, mountains, ruins, and archeological sites) are controlled and narrated (that is named) by dominant colonial interests who try to encapsulate colonial culture in naming landscape terms. For example, Benvenisti (2002) highlights

a process of preparing maps by “Israel” for Naqab region. He points out that all features of the landscape (mountains, valleys, springs, roads and so on) were given Hebrew names, silencing Arabic names that were currently in use.

2.4 Power and Landscape

It becomes clear that landscape has some features of the language. The meanings and narratives of a landscape are affected by the structure of power relation and wider geo-political conditions. Power can shape the landscape and its features, loading the landscape with new meanings and representations, through which new frames and domains can be articulated. For that, it can be said that the authenticity of the narrative of the landscape becomes under debate in some situations, especially in occupied geographies.

The exercise of power in the field of language was examined by Said in his famous book *Orientalism*. The main concept of his work is that power can be practiced by a body of knowledge that includes texts, poets and philosophy. Orientalism illustrates the reasons behind shaping pre-conceived ideas about people and geography and demonstrates that structure of ideas created in Europe about geographic areas around the world serves colonial purposes, forming ‘imaginary geography’ and ‘stereotyped ideas’.

What is significant in this work is that a body of knowledge has the ability to shape practice rather than being pure and abstract ideas about a specific geographic area, and also the ability to reframe a certain society in terms of negativity. For example, the Zionist narrative about the land and people of Palestine at the end of the Nineteenth Century was produced for the purpose of occupation. Another example, the narratives and metaphors produced by Elizabethan England concerning the island of Ireland was for the aim of conquest. Ireland was seen as virgin territory needs cultivation (Tuathail, 1996, 3-6). Tuathail (1996) concludes that in some cases the geographical knowledge is not an innocent body of knowledge from the desires of colonial powers which tries to function and restructure this knowledge to meet its concerns.

This form of knowledge is produced through a framework defining how it works. Foucault (1981, 2000) argues that when the power joins with knowledge, they produce a ‘discourse’, shifting the linguistic meaning of ‘discourse’ from a set of linguistic facts linked together by syntactic rules to the meaning of practice.

The role of discourse depends on the contexts in which it is deployed, it can be regarded as a reform method and in particular cases it may be used as a control method to conceal the truth. The concept of

discourse⁶ which has a double-edge role does not only refer to speech but also can be connected to other domains such as the landscape transformation. Landscape is changed in some cases to have the role of exercise of unfair power. In this sense landscape change is separated from basic reform norms.

Despite that discourse can be used for different two functions (negative and positive) the works of Foucault and Said view the discourse as part of an exercise of power. Through discourse, knowledge is governed by rules of construction and evaluation, indicating its context and purpose in order to become a useful tool of exercising power (Foucault, 2000, xvi). Discourse is constituted by the reproduction of knowledge through forms of selection, exclusion, and domination (Young, 1981, cited in Hook, 2001). Foucault (1981, 72) emphasizes that "the regular formation of discourse can incorporate the procedures of control, in certain conditions and to a certain extent". It is worth mentioning that although the term 'discourse' was created for describing a certain sort of text; it is not limited to the field of language or literary. It can be found in architecture, urban planning and landscape. The discipline of landscape planning also can be a tool of selection, exclusion, and domination just as negative discourse mechanism is.

The discourse concept has a real effect on people; on their imagination, shaping pre-conceived ideas about other people and geography. In some contexts, discourse becomes a tool of limitation; as Said illustrates "orientalist notions influenced the people who were called orientals as well as those called occidental, European, or Western; in short, orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought than it is simply as a positive doctrine" (Said, 1978, 42). The mentioned text shows the practice of 'orientalism' upon people, uncovering how knowledge consists of texts, literature ... etc., which seem independent and pure, can play a role of orientation and instrumentalities for the exercise of unfair power.

The colonial discourse theory refers to the analysis of the way in which such discourse veil and hide the aims colonization, because a colonial power constructs the knowledge in particular way to serve its aims (Ashcroft, Ahluwalia, 1999, 15). While the responses of society who under colonization are concerned to produce its own narratives which concerns about "the struggle to control self-representation, through the appropriation of dominant languages, discourses, and forms of narrative; the struggle over representations of place, history, race, and ethnicity; and the struggle to present a local reality to a global audience" (ibid, 1999, 15).

The knowledge which is supposed to be constructive may be used as a mask of injustice practices by power. Foucault (2000) insists on the inseparable relation between Power and knowledge; where ever knowledge exists there is a power behind it. Foucault indicates that "knowledge and power were

⁶ Discourse is also defined as: "complex of signs and practices that organizes social existence and social reproduction, which determines how experiences and identities are categorized" (Ashcroft , Ahluwalia , 1999).

exactly reciprocal, correlative ... there could not be knowledge without power, and there could not be political power without the possession of a certain special knowledge" (Foucault, 2000, 31). By Foucault's definition the relation between power and knowledge is viewed negatively without linking this relation with specific contexts.

The negative sense regarding power and knowledge cannot be generalized in all contexts and situations. However, the Foucauldian view of this relation is useful in particular circumstances such as the context that this study investigates, since the occupying power develops mechanisms for producing knowledge to meet certain purposes: territorial, cultural and socio-economic colonization.

The analytical work of Foucault about the relation between knowledge and power and the work of Edward Said, *Orientalism* clearly reveal how power can be exercised through knowledge. Furthermore, they help to build a concrete understanding of how power can be implemented as a practice over others. Similarly, urban planning and landscape can be instruments for the exercise of unfair power as Mitchel (2002) indicates that landscape has the ability to exert power over people, even with slight influence. He defined the landscape as a 'cultural medium' like a language or painting, which plays a great role of communication and expression, emphasizing that the landscape is a physical and multisensory medium in which cultural meanings and values are encoded. 'Culture' in Mitchel's definition is a general term that includes the culture of a nation such as traditions, conventions, and nationalism and also includes the culture of domination, control, and imperialism.

2.5 Landscape and the Exercise of Unfair Power

There is no doubt that if landscape planning⁷ is used for the aim of development such as protection of natural resources and agricultural lands will result in a delightful scene and can also contribute intensely to improve the quality of life. While transformation of landscape can produce a harmonious scene, it can also produce a meaning of domination, surveillance, silencing and exploitation of all kinds, especially in colonized zones where theme of narratives of landscape gain more attention than other themes.

Franz Fanon in his book *The Wretched of the Earth* describes a colonial space which consists of two contradictory spaces; space of settlers (colonizers) and space of colonized people. His description of the two spaces shows the way in which knowledge such as planning and architecture is devoted to serve settlers in colonized zones.

"The settlers' town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about. The settler's feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there you're

⁷"Landscape planning is defined as an activity concerned with reconciling competing land uses while protecting natural processes and significant cultural and natural resources" (Zube, 1986, 367).

never close enough to see them. His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler's town is a well-fed town, an easygoing town; its belly is always full of good things. The settlers' town is a town of white people, of foreigners”.

While the native town is described as:

“The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the native town, the Negro village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters not where, nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire”.


In India, during British colonial era, Indians experienced the meaning of domination through city spaces. Sen (2010, 205) points out that most of British architecture and urban planning in India since the late Eighteenth Century has been created to express the sense of British power upon Indians, aiming to control Indians by surveillance. Additionally, surveillance and control played an important role in guiding British planners. As a consequence, colonized cities became an expression of a domination and surveillance practiced by colonizers.

Foucault (1977) extended the concept of prison mechanisms (i.e. operational instructions) having internal tools of surveillance, repression, and punishment to other functional institutions in society. Landscape in some cases resembles the ‘mechanism of operation in prison’ concept, when landscape functions as a physical mechanism for controlling people’s time and space. It determines when they move and how they move; where they should go and where they should not go, and so on. In this case (colonized zones) the meaning of unfair power appears visibly. For example a walk between and through the landscape of Palestine clearly reveals to the beholder the impact of occupying power in the landscape. No sign is needed to indicate the imposed landscape elements to control and surveil people.

In other cases where economic power is hegemonizing the space, it alters and silences the ‘vernacular scene’ by constructing ‘iconic architecture’ such as building skyscrapers, through which many world cities have become known. When an economic power alters cities to be the centers of wealth and power, the new spaces convey to spectators an ‘impression of authority’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 98). Two meanings emerge: the powerful landscape, such as industrial towns and skyscrapers, and powerless landscapes, such as slums and shanty towns. Accordingly, it is possible for an economic power to impose its view in the landscape, reshaping, weakening, and displacing the vernacular scene. In this context landscape reflects the spatiality of capital mode of production, allowing economic power to dominate the scene (Zukin, 1993). Moreover, the narrative and representation of the landscape is also

linked to the capital accumulate and to support the strategies of capital development (ibid). So, a hegemonic power creates ‘discourse’ which aims to reproduce urban environment to serve its desire.

Thus landscape (either in urban or regional scales) can be a medium to represent oppression and exploitation. However, the practice of oppression cannot be achieved without domains in which the spatial knowledge such as planning is used as an instrument of power. The exercise of unfair power through landscape is not produced randomly and does not work momentarily. On the contrary, a power produces set structure of frameworks in which its mechanisms such as disciplinary become rules and spatial knowledge such as planning becomes a tool. Together, they articulate the meaning of power in landscape. Thereby, the landscape acquires new meanings: domination, surveillance, and exploitation and have the function of social control as shown in the following chart.



In the context of occupation, frameworks, disciplines and domains are not created to order things, but to subjugate those who are occupied and to consolidate territorial control as next chapters will detail. The mechanism is made to be convenient to the period of time people live in, assuring a full obedience of them with minimum possibility of failure. In this case, the exercise of unfair power becomes an everyday practice; because of surveillance ‘panoptic machine’ (as it is clear in the chart) is part of system of control.

This conceptual chart helps to understand the way in which the landscape is reconstructed by spatial knowledge which is also connected to the question of law as a technique to “legalize” control of society. The law as a new order does not mean that there is fix distinction between outside and inside

actions of the law because in the context of occupation as later will be explained law which is invented by the occupying power is suspended and deactivated when it is necessary to practice subjection and control over people (see 3.4).

In this way, planning in the context of occupation is not neutral and innocent from oppression as well as law. This process influences narratives and memories of the landscape, and consequently the following section examines the relation between landscape and memory.

2.6 The Narrative of the Landscape and Memory

The struggle over geography extends to the contradiction between two narratives regarding the landscape. Because as Said (1993, 7) notes that "just none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings". Therefore, colonial powers try to construct new narratives of the space to justify its actions.

One of the extreme cases that Said conceptualizes about the narratives of space, which is used by a power (specifically colonial power) as a mean to create a new identity, is an invention of memories which are not authentic (Said, 2002, 245). In this sense, Said (2002) argues that in some cases power invent memory of the past as a way of creating a new sense of identity. This means that in some circumstances, certain unauthentic memories are encouraged to appear and others which are authentic will be silenced. Said called this process a 'refashioned memory'. According to Said (2002) the role of refashioned memory is to give people who belonged to it a coherent identity, a national narrative, and a place in the world.

The field of archeology is one of the cornerstones for producing memories of the place. The archeological field is used to generate knowledge, exceeding its academic discipline in order to build narrative of a place, and in some cases to legitimize colonization of a land (Abu el-Haj, 2001). For example, following the 1967 War and the occupation of "East Jerusalem", almost immediately after the end of the war archaeological excavation began in the old city of Jerusalem, concentrating on building biblical narratives regarding Jerusalem (Ibid). Hence, in some particular cases the inventions of memories are not created arbitrarily, but rather for the desire of control.

Therefore, the territorial colonization goes in parallel with different narratives to justify the attempt of changing of landscape which change the perceptions that people has about the environment (Piquard, 2011). That attempt of production of narratives is intensified by occupying powers, because narratives of a place have the power of normalizing the exploitation and oppression. Accordingly, what is so important to know is narratives can be used to reinforce the regime of an occupying power, making it appear as the rightful owner of the territory.

2.6.1 Landscape and Urbicide

Urbicide in language is made up of two words: 'urban' and 'cide'. The epithet '-cide' refers to killing or slaughter, while the 'urban' derived from the Latin word *urbanus* that means "characteristics of, occurring or taking place, in a city or town". So the meaning of urbicide linguistically means 'killing the urban' (Coward, 2004, 165).

This term describes the deliberate destruction that a city faces in a time of occupation, crisis, and wars. Through history in the time of wars, urbicide occurred against cities. Through history cities were protected by walls and the war happened around them. However, recently since the development of military technology, human being acquires high ability to destroy cities. This was visible in the Second World War when the Japan's two cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed and destroyed.

Stephen Graham describes the practice of urbicide, reveling the history of urban destruction by writing: "strategies of deliberately attacking the systems and places that support civilian urban life has only become more sophisticated since the mass, total, urban annihilation that characterized the twentieth century" (Graham, 2004).

Generally, the physical destruction of cities and urban annihilation are accompanied with ethnic cleansing, population transfer and expulsion. Martin Shaw connects the concept of urbicide with the concept of genocide and politicide, emphasizing the difficulty of separation between these concepts, concluding the difficulty of separation between the destruction of urban fabric with the destruction of social relationship. He wrote "urbicide was part of the war that also involved genocide" (Shaw, 2004, 148). The destruction of the indigenous architecture and places of memory can be considered as an early signs of ethnic cleansing (Piquard, 2011). And also the destruction of indigenous architecture alters the indigenous landscape in which re-invention and re-making of new landscape can be found, leading to abolishing the indigenous history and landscape.

2.7 Conclusion

In planning theories, it can be seen that there are two main trends in the analysis of the power relations which affect the planning approach. The first one is the Habermasian approach, concerning the communicative theory and consensus building. The second one is the Foucauldian approach, concerning the practice of power which has been integrated into all parts of society, constructing disciplinary rules for people to determine their attitudes, modes, and behaviors in everyday life.

The Foucauldian approach to theorizing the mechanisms of power and its role in producing and manipulating knowledge will be helpful partially in the analysis of a case-study (Qalqiliya district). This district is divided between zones A, B, C after "Oslo", and its landscape has been highly changed. Moreover, the construction of the apartheid wall isolates Palestinian people and

communities from their lands. It functions as a disciplinary power of occupation, determining who may reach his/her land, how he/she can use lands, when and for how long can stay in lands.

This chapter clearly reveals the potent ability of planning used by a power for landscape transformation, transforming landscape from a medium of development to a medium of control. It shows also that the landscape is not a fixed environment but it is a dynamic medium in which various cultural and political practices can be articulated, transmitting signs, holding narratives and memories. However, these signs depend on the system of power that produces the landscape.

The exercise of unfair power is a process which does not occur arbitrarily, but it is an organized process created by the fabrication of new system of law, and new morphology of landscape, through which meanings of exclusion, domination, and surveillance are consolidated. Moreover, colonial powers can reshape and articulate landscape for the desire of conquest to consolidate their political leverage in the space.

The transformation of landscape meaning is highly pertinent in colonized geography, where landscape becomes a medium of power exercise. Through landscape transformation, an occupying power could silence and degrade certain memories and narratives in order to invent and fabricate new memories of the landscape, deviating far from the authenticity of the place.

Investigating the relations between power, planning, and landscape forms the basis for the examination of the consequences of these relations upon geography and people. The main consequence according to the researcher's observation is the creation of spaces where exclusion, domination, and control exist. As shown in this chapter, planning can incorporate the meaning of control through four dimensions: the territorial, procedural, socio-economical, and cultural dimensions, leading to landscape transformation and the production of spaces of exception. Accordingly, this chapter paves the way for the researcher to examine and crystalize the concept of space of exception, which will be investigated in depth; its relations with law, and practice of power, and social dimension in the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Power, Space & Space of Exception

Chapter 3: Power, Space & Space of Exception

The previous chapter has demonstrated the connection between geography and power and that attitude to landscape depend on the kind of a power that controls a land. Following this debate, this chapter will seek to make an understanding of the relation between power and space in many and different contexts where the space becomes domain of control, subjection and exclusion.

The chapter is divided into three parts; the first illustrates the meaning of ‘space’ and its relation with variables involved in its production, shaping its morphology and meanings. This part goes beyond a shallow understanding of space as physical/material structure, giving another view (mainly based on Lefebvre’s theory of the production of the space) to understand its components and their relations together. Then, this part focuses on the meaning of fragmentation which is considered one of the main consequences of the territorial colonization and control of a hegemonic power.

The second part examines the meaning of space of exception and what it means, how it is produced and for what purposes? Accordingly, this part delves into the meaning of the concept of exception, based on the work of Agamben and Carl Schmitt, extending the discussion of exception from politics to a spatial domain. In this thesis, interpretation of the meaning of the space in the context of occupation depends on the analysis of the meaning of exception. Since the transformation and change of the landscape in Palestine is occurred in the name of the law which is invented by the occupying power “Israel”. The concept of exception and its relation with the manipulation of landscape will be discussed in chapter 6, in order to suggest a model to understand the transformation of landscape in the context of occupation.

The third part concerns with the mode of thinking that influenced by the analysis of spatiality. In other words, this part explains theoretical trends that gained high concern in planning theories to deal with negative themes that exist in the space such as oppression and hegemony. These trends such as the right of the city aim to build environment free from control, fragmentation, and oppression. However, this study will highlight these concepts just to explain the gap between theory and real spaces in the case study, because these concepts do not help in offering spatial alternatives.

3.1 Theorizing the Meaning of the Space according to Lefebvre's Theory

Decades ago, space was commonly understood as a geometrical meaning (Lefebvre, 1991, 1). Therefore, spatiality had been neglected as an important pillar in western critical social studies (Soja, 1989, 15). Until the mid of 20th century, spatiality was not a debated concept in western philosophy as an important approach to interpret the human behavior (Soja, 1996, 71). According to Soja (1989, 15) this approach had been peripheralizing the spatial perspective, and made an annihilation of space in critical social thought, therefore Soja (1996) emphasizes on spatiality as an ontological knowledge which is important to be examined. A clear awareness of spatiality appeared in the work of Lefebvre, especially in his book *the production of the space* which is originally published in 1978, asserting the relation of spatiality with human ideologies. He explained that the space is not a thing but rather it is a set of relations between things and the real space is a social space, since any space contains social relationships and it is developed by human being (Lefebvre, 1991, 83). He illustrates the meaning of spatiality and gives an understanding of what spatiality means by suggesting a model that consists of three pillars, spatial practice (perceived space), representation of space (conceived space), and representational space (lived space). Lefebvre (1991, 46) emphasizes that the following three pillars of the model contribute in different ways to the production of space. In other words, they are intertwined together, influencing the reproduction and production of spaces.

1- Spatial practice (perceived space)

Spatial practice is considered as a medium and as an outcome of human activity, behavior, and experience (Soja, 1996, 66). It is the materiality of the space; the relative location of things and activities, site; in patterns of distribution, designs, and the differentiation of a multitude of materialized phenomena across spaces and places ... It is empirical space which surrounds our bodies and shapes our "action space" in households, buildings, villages, cities, regions. ... It is socially space which come as a result of the society" (Soja, 1996, 66, 75). Clearly 'perceived space' is not just the physical aspect of the space (urban reality), but it the production and reproduction of space, which is produced by complex interactions between people while they are performing their daily routines. Lefebvre (1991, 38) describes it as "it embodies a close association, within perceived space, between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, 'private' life and leisure".

2- Representations of space (conceived space)

It is "conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent – all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived" (Lefebvre, 1991, 38). It is a mental space that is imagined about a neighbourhood, and a city etc.

Lefebvre (1991, 50) points out that the representation of space is affected by both knowledge and power, leaving a narrow influence to representational space (lived space). Thus, conceived space is tied to the relation of the production through a certain order which is controlled by knowledge, signs, and codes (Soja, 1996, 67). Accordingly, the power can reproduce the representation of space to plant its dominance and hegemony by using 'systems of verbal' as Lefebvre (1991, 39) points out that "conceptions of space tend ... towards a system of verbal". "System of verbal", of course, is related to the written and spoken word (language, discourse, texts, logos and so on) (Soja, 1996, 67), and also this system touches very significantly the ability and the way in which a power can implant control upon the space.

What is important to say is that a hegemonic power is able to make its narrative a dominant one while silencing other stories and memories. And it may impose its desired image on the representation of place and make a conceived space as a dominant space, controlling both spatial practices and the lived space of representation (Soja, 1996, 80). Accordingly, a power can reproduce the representation of space to plant its dominance and hegemony. However, in the context of occupation, the occupying power fabricates stories and narratives that are not authentic, while abolishing indigenous narratives (Said, 2002, 245).

A hegemonic power seeks to create a mental image (i.e. imagined geography) about the space that represents its desire. Then the way of producing a new order of space that is highly related to the desire of hegemonic power, does not necessary go smoothly as a hegemonic power wants. Because as one may understand from the theory of Lefebvre about the space that the image of inhabitant contradicts with the image of hegemonic power. Therefore, the space may contain a struggle between two images.

3- Representational space (lived space)

It is the space of inhabitants where the imagination of people seeks to change. Lefebvre (1991) described the representational spaces as "space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users', ... space which imagination seeks to change and appropriate". Live spaces are "the terrain for the generation of 'counterspaces', spaces of resistance to the dominant order arising precisely from their subordinate, peripheral or marginalized positioning". Lived space ('Thirdspace' in Soja's terminology) encompasses the three spaces (perceived, conceived, and lived) tending to transform all them simultaneously. For Soja it is "the space of radical openness, and the space of social struggle" (Soja, 1996, 68).

'Thirdspace' is a way of thinking concerning space. Soja was inspired by Lefebvre and consequently developed the concept of 'Thirdspace' which addresses a new domain to think about peripheralized and marginalized spatial subjects (Soja, 1996, 68). It is a way of understanding the spatiality of human life (ibid, 10).

3.2 Space and Power

Understanding the relation between power and space explains the reason behind the spatial differences or inequalities in cities and regions. Lefebvre (1991) developed a framework to understand the space, through which space may not be understood as a physical space which is a shallow understanding of what space is.

It is important to note that the space is not free from politics and ideologies and that is emphasized by Soja (2010, 19) who wrote: “space is always filled with politics, ideology, and other forces shaping our lives and challenging us to engage in struggles over geography”. The space is also considered by Foucault as a domain for configuration of knowledge, affecting the human behavior, and leading to form specific social and institutional order (Pløger, 2008, 61). This unbounded relation between power and space makes the space or the spatiality strongly engaged in the contexts of occupation, conflict and struggle.

Due to the ability of space to sustain and represents ideologies, the struggles over geography are not just about the way to capture it, but they are also about ideas regarding the geography, and about underlying narratives as Said (1993) insists that "just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings" (Said, 1993, 7). The struggle over the geography leads to struggle between images about the way space should be structured.

Furthermore, space does not only reflect political ideologies but it also can be a device for control. As it has been explained in chapter two, the disciplines of planning, architecture, geography may be used as a desire of power, employing the space to practice social control. These disciplines have a potent role in shaping the space according to the desire of a power because architects are not free from external forces.

In this sense, as explained by (Teyssot, 1998) architecture can be considered as a ‘text’ and the fundamental aspects of the discourse about architecture, is logical and semantic. So one cannot ignore the analysis of semiotic⁸ forms centering around architecture or space. In the context of occupation as this thesis argues the space becomes a sphere in which the representation and symbols of domination,

⁸ Semiotic is derived from the Greek word *semeion* which refers to the “study of signs” or such as metaphor (def. by wikipedia). In architecture this study can identify signs that might represent the message of a certain work, employing it as a tool to interpret the expression of architectural forms (Ramzy, 2013).

tyranny, subjection, and oppression do exist. In other words, what the occupying power uses to control people efficiently and continuously are methods, strategies, and disciplines.

Lefebvre (1991, 77) distinguishes between the meaning of social space which according to him contains a great diversity of knowledge and the meaning of space when is used as a device or a mean of control. The case in which the space is deployed to play the role of control is called by Lefebvre an 'abstract space'. According to Lefebvre (1991, 26) the abstract space is a device of domination and control. In the 'abstract space' users of the space, their presence, and their experience are silenced (Lefebvre, 1991, 51).

Harvey (2001) illustrates that economic power in the capitalist regime tends toward hegemony through creating an appropriate physical infrastructure for preserving and increasing its profit such as building industrial plants, transportation network, and restructuring workers accommodation. According to that, under capitalism regime cities and regions structures are influenced by the capitalism principles such as the free market. In this sense, structure of cities tends towards segmentation and fragmentation of the space (Lefebvre, 1991, 93). Lefebvre (1991) uncovers the negative effects of capitalism upon the space, insisting on its role in fixing homogenization and fragmentation; thereby as he argues an abstract space is produced, "capitalism and neo-capitalism have produced abstract space, which includes 'the world of commodities', its logic and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money" (Lefebvre, 1991, 53).

The work of Foucault extensively concerned about the relationship between power and knowledge, and did not examine a detailed and comprehensive relation between power and space as Lefebvre did, nevertheless in the article titled 'the otherness space' Foucault raised the subject of space. In addition to that in the interview with him in March 1982 he explained that the space is not just essential for the communal life, but it is where the exercise of power occurs. "Yes. Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power. To make a parenthetical remark, I recall having been invited, in 1966, by a group of architects to do a study of space, of something that I called at that time 'heterotopias', those singular spaces to be found in some given social spaces whose functions are different or even the opposite of others". Foucault (1984) conceptualized the term 'Heterotopia' for describing the space of otherness by writing an article *the otherness space*. In this article Foucault discusses the way in which some spaces had been organized and the order of them had been interrupted similar to a sentence or paragraph without syntax.

Heterotopia can be a conceptual notion in the epistemological domain that represents out of order and anomalous. In other words, the way of the heterotopic space functions are different and opposite from the way of other spaces function. This analytical approach of the classification of places reveals that the space is a medium through which hegemony and fragmentation may be represented. According to Foucault (1984) 'Heterotopias' is a space where norms are disappeared and suspended.

The spatial fragmentation in theories is linked with power relations as many intellectuals and scholars linked between the unequal division of space in a contemporary city (such as the division between core and peripheries) and the capitalism. Writing on the relation between space and capitalism, unveils the negative and blatant role played by this system on changing frameworks and perspectives through which the space and geography is produced and reproduced. The point which will be explored in next section is that the establishment of domains in which fragmentation occurs is rooted in the capitalist system. Understanding that link unveils how a certain system influence the spatial structure of urban environment. This understanding in turn led to a concern on the role of a certain system in maintaining conditions in which unfair control over people is sustained. As this thesis examines how the system of occupation reframes knowledge to operate in the interest of colonizers and to maintain full control of the daily life of colonised people. Therefore, a central issue in this chapter is that some systems are concerned with shaping spatial fragmentation, however fragmentation have never been produced at the same level of oppression and torture as in the context of occupation.

3.2.1 The Production of Space and Capitalism

Many countries around the world have been connected to capitalist economic system which is seen as a system that builds and maintains disciplines, models and frameworks for the desire of its dominancy and hegemony. Harvey (1978, 124) points out that under capitalism, there are enduring tendencies to build a physical landscape fitting to capital own condition. So, physical environments are reproduced to be appropriate for the capital production, circulation, exchange and consumption (Harvey, 1978, 113). Harvey wrote: "capital represents itself in the form of a physical landscape created in its own image, created as use values to enhance the progressive accumulation of capital" (ibid, 124). Thereby, capitalist development has been caused a huge transformation of the traditional city as a response of over accumulating capital and no matter of consequences whether socially, environmentally, and politically (Harvey, 2012, xv).

Harvey (1978) presents the relation between the capitalism and urban process, highlighting the role of capital mode of production with production of the space, unveiling also its role in division of the city based on "class" considerations. Capital accumulation and social conflict are the main issues related to capitalism that Harvey focuses on as main themes influences urban process. The capitalist society is founded on the concept of accumulation for accumulation sake, and production for production sake (Harvey, 1978, Wallerstein, 1978).

Capitalism seeks to increase the production on one hand, and increases the consumption on the other hand. For this purpose, structure of city, built environment, and disciplines, and domains are created to serve both purposes whether to serve the production or consumption. Regarding the production, there is a 'built environment for production' which means "a physical framework for production" and

regarding the consumption, there is a "built environment for consumption" which means "a physical framework for consumption" (Harvey, 1978, 106). Consequently, the accumulation of capital has influenced reconfiguration of cities and their transformation towards making an ultimate profit as Harvey (2000, 121) described the way that capitalism system participates in transforming cities by noting:

"It has likewise led to a restless search for new product lines, new technologies, new lifestyles, new ways to move around, new places to colonize – an infinite variety of stratagems that reflect a boundless human ingenuity for coming up with new ways to make a profit".

Furthermore, capitalism influences the spatiality in multiple scales as Soja (1989, 34) points out "at every scale of life, from global to the local, the spatial organization of society was being restructured to meet the urgent demands of capitalism in crisis – to open up new opportunities for super- profits, to find new ways to maintain social control, to stimulate increased production and consumption".

3.3 Fragmentation of Contemporary Cities in Theory

The concept of fragmentation in the Western theories is linked mainly into three main issues; firstly the issue of economic disparities as a result of capitalism; a wide range of literature insist that with the transformation Fordist to post-Fordist leads to the flourishing of gated communities. Secondly, the issue of ethnic conflict participates in division of cities. Thirdly, as a result of the globalization which facilitates the mobility of capital, however there is uneven spatial development in cities. Nevertheless, as I will explain later in details, the fragmentation is also the result of colonial territorial policies. It is important to note that fragmentation in different contexts is different of level of repression, because each context belongs to different cultural and political conditions.

Much of world's urban fragmentation can be located within the four mentioned framework (capitalism, ethnic conflict, globalization, and occupation). However, it is important to make a differentiation about the type of fragmentation, because each type has its special features and characteristics. Given that fact, how are these types to be understood? The following paragraphs examine the concept of fragmentation in cities.

- **Fragmentation and Capitalism**

The shift from an industrial (Fordist) to a post-industrial (post-Fordist) has caused an enormous influence on socio-economic issues as well as spatial structure of cities. The industrial Fordist regime -which dates back to 1920s- depended on Tayloristic techniques of production (the assembly line). In addition, it was combined with mass production, mass consumption, the replacement of local cultures with commodified lifestyle, and welfare state (Rossi & Vanolo, 2012, 30). This regime had led to produce a spatial form to serve both (mass production and consumption) in cities as well as regions,

and caused unprecedented spatial transformation; factories were constructed around cities, urbanization was taking place, large cities exploded, and satellite cities began to emerge around large cities.

Through production and reproduction of spaces in the Fordist city, general improvements in the living conditions had taken place in Western countries and the image of industrial city has been associated with positive ideas of prosperity. And despite that some social tensions had happened around some spatial issues, the image of Fordist city was linked to the concept of progress and prosperity (ibid, 31).

As mentioned above, during Fordism, unprecedented growth of economy scale and agglomeration were taken place. During the 1970s, however, the production was no longer increasing, and consequently the economic growth was weak (i.e. Fordism resulted in an economic crisis). Moreover, a stagflation as a result of the crisis reduced the mass consumption which was related to welfare state (Soja, 2000, 171-172).

Due to the crisis of Fordism regime in 1970s, a new regime raised (post- Fordism). Fordism principles no longer worked to the enhancement of economy. So the old-style of mass assembly line was shifted to a new style characterized by a flexible accumulation⁹, welfare-state interventions policies were diminished, privatization policies were adopted, new technologies appeared (Harvey, 2001, 123). The transformation had resulted in declining of industrial activities and the increase in services employment. Thereby, it caused a loss of many jobs due to the transferring industrial factories outside previous manufacturing centers to take advantage of cheaper land and labor.

The sort of growth related to post- Fordism principles promoted uneven development; some regions in a same country developed because of good business climates and governmental investment while other regions suffered from obsolete industrial structure (Fainstein & Campbell, 2011, 9). Despite that many regions and cities have been developed in terms of economic situation fragmentation of space is obvious in many contemporary and global cities; some locations suffer from negligence and marginalization while others are well developed in terms of infrastructure and services.

The transformation from Fordist mass production to post-Fordist flexible production has increased inequalities between “different social groups” and increased spatial division in cities. This transformation consolidates fragmentation of contemporary cities in which there are many separate areas of concentration of different people all desiring to stay apart from all others (Marcuse, 2003, 168-169). Therefore, in many cities across the world, no sign is needed to distinguish between poor areas characterized by undeveloped urban environment and rich areas characterized by a well-developed urban environment. Additionally, many poor areas in European countries are inhabited by

⁹ Flexible accumulation means a very high mobility of capital from sector to sector and place to place (Fainstein & Campbell, 2011, 7).

minorities, and other parts -especially where rich people live or where business areas are located- are secured by fences and permission is needed to go in (they are called gated communities).

Concentration of power and wealth in a few hands and economic opportunities in a few locations of cities and regions increases inequalities and divisions. Therefore, many parts of cities have been a product of elite groups who have power while other parts are inhabited by those who lack the power and wealth. For example, Mike Davis (1990) examines the transformation of Los Angeles in the period of Twentieth Century, unveiling the forces that have influenced the spatial structure of the city such as social stratification. As a result the city has been changed to classist and racist meanings. He narrates the complex historical evolution of the city, focusing on the way in which the capitalist system, with all its influences, produced a tattered landscape.

- **Fragmentation and conflict¹⁰**

Fragmentation in the context of ethnic conflict can be considered spatial expression of a conflict, because the city structure is highly influenced by an ethnic conflict. Around the world there are many evidences that reflect the sectarian conflict on the physical environment. The city of Belfast in Northern Ireland is one of those cases where ethnic conflict between Catholic and Protestant is manifested in the fragmentation of the city. It contains ethnic lines or boundaries in thirteen localities where there are walls and physical barriers used to separate catholic from protestant communities (fig. 3.1).

Nowadays, Belfast city is a divided city: 98% of public housing is segregated along ethnic lines. Neighborhoods are divided by walls. On either side of the walls communities live, who have long been segregated in religion, culture, and tradition. Catholics became even more concentrated in overcrowded enclaves within the city. Protestants were more concentrated in the new suburbs and outline growth centers.

The escalation of sectarian violence increases during marches organized by Protestant in 12th of July. According to Protestants groups the marches are organized to commemorate the Battle of the Boyne fought in 1690. Marchers pass through or near Catholic enclaves in Belfast whereas Catholics see the marches as a symbol of domination. The violence, partition, and discrimination indicate the level of partition in Belfast community. Despite the political reconciliation between parties, faith in urban barricades remains firm. Petitions for new walls, or the extension of old ones, are regularly delivered to Members of Parliament (Calame, Charlesworth, 2002, 162). In addition to that, new housing developments and streets on either side were designed to avoid direct contact (Morrow, 2011).

¹⁰ It is important to note that the case of Palestine is not an ethnic conflict, despite that some international writers try to put it in that framework. But Palestine is occupied land since 1917; therefore the context of Palestine is context of occupation as this thesis explains in details.



Fig. 3.1: The barrier with a gate that separates both communities (Catholic & Protestant). Source: Halawani, July, 2014

The physical division reveals the division of cultures; most of those living in Protestant communities describes themselves as British, and similarly Catholics call themselves Irish (Murtagh, 2002, 51). The division is not just found in housing sector but it also extends into public sectors. Alexander Park in north Belfast is also divided between the two ethnic groups. There is a wall that divides the park into two parts by a sheet metal fence. The barrier which was erected in 1994 is 120 meters long and 3.5 meters high (fig. 3.2). So, the ethnic division affects nearly every aspect of residential life, schooling and the use of services. Segregation is breaking down but primarily in “middle class districts” to the south of the city whilst segregation and interfacing has intensified in poorer neighborhoods in the north, west and inner-east.

Another example about the fragmentation due to racial segregation was found in cities in the South Africa during the apartheid era (1948-1994). Buffer zones (about 100 m wide) were planned to separate white and non-white people. The cities were constructed and reconstructed under apartheid system, for the purpose of minimizing social contact between black and whites. Planning was used as a tool for the aim of apartheid separation between white and black and also to produce and reproduce residential segregation (Murtagh, 2002, 153).



Fig. 3.2: The wall divides Alexander Park into two parts. Source: Halawani, July, 2014

- **Fragmentation and occupation**

In the context of occupation, cities are not fragmented because of internal reasons but because of external forces acting to weaken indigenous morphology of cities. Unlike other fragmentation situations as mentioned which are usually internal conflict whether between ethnicities or between economic power and other actors in community. The fragmentation in the context of occupation is one of repressive strategies of colonial power to weaken and humiliate the colonised people, and to control daily life of people, leaving them behind poverty and disorder. Moreover, there is tendency to impose colonial culture onto the colonised people. And that is clear in narratives of colonizers about land and people. And then deliberately, new frameworks of knowledge may appear to normalize the context of occupation and describing the colonised as minorities or the problem of occupation as a civil war¹¹.

¹¹ Describing those who colonized as minorities were used by Calame and Charlesworth in the book *Divided Cities*

3.3.1 Globalization and Fragmentation of Cities' Structure

After the crisis of Fordism, questions of restructuring the socio-economic system in Western countries became urgent to deal with the crisis. Consequently, the regulations of the welfare state had been dismantled as it has been mentioned. In other words, educational and health care services had reduced as well as the supply of social housing (Rossi, Vanolo, 2002, 88-89). The reason of restructuring the system was theoretically interpreted by Harvey (1989) who theorized this change by arguing that urban governance transformed from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. The concept of managerialism regards the power of society embodied in social, economic, and political units and not in individuals (Enteman, 1993, 157). Thereby, urban governance (based on managerialism concept) had a significant role in provision of services which benefits urban population (Harvey, 1989). And clearly, through this approach policies had focused on provision of social welfare services to citizens.

However, during 1970s and 1980s reorientation of urban governance had taken place in Western capital cities toward entrepreneurialism, which was strongly associated with an orientation towards the private-sector. Consequently, this orientation facilitated a partnership between both sectors (public and private) and enhanced a competitive position of cities (in Harvey's terminology inter-urban competition). Accordingly, local governments tried to initiate economic growth by investments to attract consumers in order to make the city an attractive place. What is important is that this policy deploys the power of local government to attract external investments (ibid.) and thus public-private partnerships connect local economies to global framework and provides a platform for cities to compete in the global context.

The transformation from managerial approach to entrepreneurialization of urban governance was connected with the model of neo-liberalism, which was responding to the market problems and the economic crisis that hit capitalist cities in 1970s. Neo-liberalism promotes the free market, individualization, and deregulation principles. These principles which are considered part of Capitalism principles dominate the global economic atmosphere and relations. Today, Neo-liberalism principles dominate the policy of the global institutions such as the World Bank which imposes these policies on many developing countries around the world.

Neoliberalism principles which are accompanied with the atmosphere of globalization become the way to globalizing the principles of capitalism (global capitalism). In this sense, the local or national economies are integrated to the global economies and the power of capitalist institutions such as the International Monetary Fund increases. Clearly, the global economic-juridical system was restructured, facilitating the flow of capital from region to another. Thereby, corporations, banks, and individual investors can move freely across national borders (Peck, Theodore, Brenner, 2012).

The global cities are of great importance to capitalist system in which the neo-liberal market¹² rules facilitate the movement of capital beyond borders. Under the logic of neo-liberalism, many global cities have been shaped to become a fertile land to attracting external investors. What is obvious is that most of strategies of urban intervention in most of globalizing cities concern to develop iconic architecture (Sklair, 2005). Although many global cities around the world have witnessed unprecedented economic growth, they have faced spatial problems such as proliferation of urban poor areas that inhabited by marginalized social groups (particularly migrants and the ethnic minorities). As Rossi & Vanolo (2012, 89) points out that in large cities, which influenced by neo-liberal principles, there is the problem of weak groups such migrants. Another clear point about inequity is the huge gap between rich and poor which is still widening (Sklair, 2002, 48).

Oxfam reports in (January, 2014) that “85 richest people as wealthy as poorest half of the world ... they share a combined wealth as much as the poorest 3.5 billion of the world's population” (the guardian, January, 20, 2014). This problem is the result of capitalism principle which includes (neo-liberalism principles). This gap has been reflected on spatial structure of cities; there are iconic architectural projects beside slums and urban poor areas. In addition to that as Harvey (2003, 940) points out that the gap between poor and rich promotes uneven geography in cities, thereby cities become more ghettoized as rich people see themselves off for protection while poor people become ghettoized by default.

Mike Davies (2006) points out in his book *Planet of Slum* that the neoliberal capitalism policy participates in generating urban slums. He provided some statistics based on UN report and case studies around the world about the problems of slums, homeless, squat (i.e. living in a space without legal claim), in order to clarify how big the problem of slum really is around the world. For example, he mentioned that UN researchers estimate that there were at least 921 million slum-dwellers in 2001 and more than one billion in 2005 (ibid, 23).

As mentioned, the transmission of neoliberal accumulation has influenced the urban morphology of cities, causing radical changes of their structures. And consequently, many global cities have become a representation of hegemonic economic power. On one hand global cities become an arena for free market, flow of capital and information as explained, but from the other hand, they are places where marginalization, exclusion, and vanishing of indigenous identity occur. “The process of globalization is typically market by features of unevenness and imbalance: regions across the world unevenly take advantage of, or conversely are threatened by, globalization” (Rossi, Vanalo, 2011, 9).

¹² Neoliberal principle is an extension of the traditional liberal philosophy, which argues that market should be free from formal obligations of government. It assumes that according to this theory, the optimum performance of economic growth is achieved when a state have a very limited economic role.

Globalization plays a role in urban arenas; leading to scattered and fragmented spaces. In this sense globalization is a framework deployed by a hegemonic power for its desires. Consequently, this understanding gives us access to ways of seeing fragmentation as a result of certain system and not as a result of misuse of tools and methods. In the context of occupation, however, the fragmentation is a result of colonial system and also it is a tool of control and subjugation of those who are occupied. According to Palestino (2011) one of main reasons in facilitating the fragmentation of spaces is practicing the social control by power which creates ghettos in which powerless groups live in, in order to practice discriminative rules that are not authorized to other spaces.

3.4 The ‘State of Exception’ Theory, Power, and Hegemony

When a country is occupied, the occupying power invents new laws which are totally different from previous laws in order to secure its full control on both land and people. In the case of occupied Palestine, however, the previous laws were not abolished. They were manipulated. The work of Agamben in the *State of Exception* is helpful to conceptualize these actions of power. *The state of exception* answers a central question: how can a power manipulate a juridical system to be itself the law? Agamben (2005) reveals the way in which a power can move craftily to state of exception by circumventing and suspending laws. What makes Agamben tries to conceptualize the concept of exception is the point that the same power that suspends a law produces it again. He argues that when a power faces a crisis, it suspends laws and seeks to put in place another law. Under this atmosphere a power seeks to deploy the mentioned ambiguous condition for its desire of control.

The work of German philosopher Carl Schmitt influenced Agamben work about theorizing the state of exception. Carl Schmitt wrote the book ‘Political Theology’ (originally published in 1922). *Political Theology* is about the kind of the political authority that had been developed in the West.

Schmitt clarifies that the exception is different from anarchy and chaos although the context of exception is produced by the suspension of the entire legal order. According to Agamben (1998,19) chaos is necessary to produce the context of exception “chaos must first be included in the juridical order through the creation of a zone of indistinction between outside and inside”, but according to him, it is not the situation of exception. According to Agamben (1998, 18) “the state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension”. Therefore, chaos is not the result of imposing the exception, but rather it is a mean by which a power may use to produce the context of exception in which the distinction between action inside or outside law (which is in some cases illegitimate, like the case of occupied Palestine) becomes unclear.

According to Agamben, the state of siege has its origins in France during the revolution when the constitution was suspended, and that many other states also experienced it. For example in Italy “the governments of the kingdom resorted to proclaiming a state of siege many times: in Palermo and the

Sicilian provinces in 1862 and 1866, in Naples in 1862, in Sicily and Lunigiana in 1894, and in Naples and Milan in 1898, where the repression of the disturbances was particularly bloody and provoked bitter debates in parliament” (Agamben, 2005, 17).

Indeed, suspension of law makes an atmosphere in which a power seeks to do unilateral central decisions, attempting to establish a system that serves its own interest. When a power suspends the law, it continues to monopolize decisions out of law; meanwhile minor powers have no role of influence of production of new laws “What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that the state remains, whereas law recedes” (Schmitt, 1985, 12).

Given this atmosphere, a power becomes a central power and tends towards hegemony, facilitating its desire also not just to make actions out the juridical order but to be the law itself. In this context a power becomes unbounded with laws and norms, gaining unlimited authority to impose new laws and define new norms. That is similar to the character of monarchical regime that had ruled Western societies until the 19th century that Foucault (1997, 26) described in which the juridical structure was made at the demand and for the benefit of the royal power. The outcome of this process towards centrality, as Foucault (1997, 27) explained, is a proliferation of relations of subjection and domination within social body. The point which is important to highlight is that, although the way to the unfair centrality may take diverse forms through time, it retains the same meaning: keeping the rules of subjection, marginalization, and control intact.

The theory of the state of exception as has been noted by (Downey, 2009: 109) goes beyond the binary distinctions of dichotomies such as inside/outside or inclusion/exclusion, but is the matter in which ‘zone of in-distinction’ exists. Agamben (2005) clarifies the context in which there is no law and order ‘emptiness of law’ which can be used to legalize what cannot be legal. Drawing on that point, a hegemonic power finds in the situation of exception a suitable way to legalize the lawlessness actions.

According to Agamben, the context of exception is; a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie¹³, where all legal determinations are deactivated (ibid. 50). Agamben emphasizes that in the context of exception there is no clear shape, and it has a blur characteristics. However, he discussed and illustrated the features of this model (ibid, 4).

The state of exception is declared and imposed in the name of necessity which becomes source of law and used as a “legitimate” idea to make the paradigm of exception. From this perspective, it can be

¹³ According to oxford dictionary, anomie means: lack of the usual social or ethical standards in an individual or group. In other words it is a lack of values.

understood that necessity as a concept related to power may be used to justify action of oppression occurred whether by law itself or absence of law, according to Agamben (2005, 24) necessity acts to “justify a single, specific case of transgression by means of an exception”. Consequently, the principle of necessity becomes a justification base on which new structure of laws which may contradict of moral and ethical values.

Many forms of “necessity” can be used such as “rhetoric of security”. In the case of occupied Palestine this rhetoric is deployed as a pretext of violence against people of Palestine. The occupying power (especially through international media) tries to justify its actions and to make a context of exception which causes a blur situation ‘emptiness of law’ and that make an “appropriate” atmosphere for controlling and subjecting people of Palestine. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 detail the deployment of the context of exception in the case study.

Another example of deployment of concept of “necessity” to make the context of exception is the “rhetoric of fear” which is deployed to legitimate an endless series of states of exception around the world (Bellina & Paola, 2006). What is important to note that, despite the action of power transgress people they can appear “lawful” in the context of exception (Humphreys, 2006, 678).

The new fabricated laws that made by an occupying power or hegemonic power, play a role in the formation and enactment of subjection and exploitation. And that is how a power justifies its actions of control. The extreme case that Agamben (2005, 54) pointed out is the situation in which a power becomes itself the law. In this situation, a power tries to create new laws suitable for its desires and the context of exception becomes a *de facto* situation. It is worth to mention that despite the law may be used as a legal order but it does not mean that it is a legitimate order. Charl Schmitt (1985) differentiates between the two concepts legality and legitimacy and that differentiation means sometimes the law cannot be legitimate.

3.4.1 The State of Exception Theory and Bare life Theory

To consider the concept of exception as a method of control, means to explain its influence on the life of human. It is associated with a particular role in reproduction domains in which human natural life should be controlled by a hegemonic power. Therefore, through the paradigm of exception people can be oppressed, excluded and marginalized, and also categorized into groups in order to exercise unfair power over them. That can be seen by bio-politics mechanisms, when people daily life begins to be included in the mechanisms of repressive control.

Foucault (2007, 16) defines bio-politics as "a set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy". According to Pløger (2008, 61) Foucault views space as a medium through which a bio-politics is implemented by classification

of the body of human between normal and a-normal. Through the mechanism of bio-politics, a power can classify a group of people to impose subjection upon them. Therefore, discrimination based on racial considerations is well-matched with the bio-power and racism allow power according to (Foucault, 2003: 255) to treat population as a mixture of races and subdivide them also into subspecies to control them.

Giorgio Agamben (1998) in his book *Homo Sacer: Sovereign and Bare Life*, examines the relation between the exception and its devastating consequence on human life which occurs under the guise of the law. He describes the status of homo sacer in ancient Rome who is a person that may be killed (without this act being considered murder) but not sacrificed. Agamben used the metaphorical figure of the homo sacer, in order to signal the existence outside the law, exclusion, and deprivation of rights. Agamben traces that history to theorize the continuous production of the status of *homo sacer* in contemporary societies; although the *homo sacer* phenomenon disappeared, it is found nowadays, and that when an oppression, exclusion and marginalization implicate within the juridical order. The point that Agamben (1998) wanted to highlight is that those who were banned from the rights to have right; they are instantiation of the homo sacer, and also to highlight that the ban allows bare life to exist in a society.

Accordingly, the context of exception leads to include man's life in the unfair mechanism of power, transforming the normal life to bare life and certain people to *homo sacer*. People who exist in the situation of exception, their life become precarious. Therefore, the violence become in the "law". According to (Downey, 2009), the paradigm of exception turns people to the condition of bare life.

The paradigm of exception has brought out many zones of exceptions where torture and deprivation from basic rights sustained in the space. For example, Agamben mentions that Guantánamo Bay is a zone of exception which was produced by US during its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (Gregory, 2006). Agamben criticized US law that was enacted on November 13, 2001 which authorized the indefinite detention and trial by military commission (Agamben, 2005, 3). People who had been imprisoned, their legal status were denied (Gregory, 2006). Guantánamo Bay had been described as a lawless place and as a place of indeterminate time; a place where prisoners are subject to indefinite detention without trial" (ibid). Another example of space of exception is the Abu Ghraib prison (in Iraq) where torture and humiliation against Muslim prisoners were documented.

It is worth mentioning, there are many examples around the world of the spaces of exception where people are reduced to forms of bare life, but they have never been produced at the same level of oppression and torture as in the context of occupation (as the next two chapters explore).

3.4.2 Space of Exception

What are the spatial consequences of deployment of the context of exception? How the space is reproduced under the atmosphere of exception? These questions bring into focus the meaning of a space when a power invents laws for the aim of subjection and control. This investigation is crucial in this study because the occupying power “Israel” as this study will explain manipulates and misrepresented laws dating back to Ottoman regime, British occupation period, and Jordanian era to produce spaces of exceptions.

Chapter two has highlighted how a power may transform a space to secure its social control by using planning as a tool of control. As a result, new meanings may be acquired while using the space; meaning of domination, surveillance, and exclusion. Agamben (2005) argues in his book *State of Exceptions*, when a power faces a crisis, it circumvents norms and laws and a state of exception which is characterized by a void of law is produced. As mentioned this study uses a metaphor of the concept of exception in effort to analyze the manipulation of the landscape in occupied Palestine, specifically in the case of Qalqiliya, where the occupying power uses planning to transform the space into a space of exception.

Based on the mentioned analysis of the theory of exception in the work of Agamben, it can be pointed out that there are three central features of the paradigm of exception. First, the executive power dominates the context of exception "the executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power" (Agamben, 2005, 18). Secondly, juridical orders are deactivated (ibid, 23). Thirdly, norm is also suspended and the application of the ‘force of law’ transforms to application just to the force without law (Ibid, 40). In other word, the exception is the context where there is no law and order ‘emptiness of law’.

According to that under the paradigm of exception the meaning of space deviates from its basic meaning as a medium that satisfy the needs of people, to a medium that is full of control. In this context of exception the space does not function to serve people or aim to provide the essential needs of people in terms of their right in; adequate houses, their right in work and normal settings in the whole life.

The most obvious characters of the paradigm of exception are emptiness of norms and laws. Agamben wrote: "in this sense, the state of exception is the opening of space in which application and norm reveal their separation and a pure of law realize ... a norm whose application has been suspended" (Agamben, 2005, 40). Therefore, the space does not serve any more people and it becomes a space of exception characterized by ‘a void of law’.

Moreover, the space which is characterized by a void of law reflects the meaning of oppression and injustice. So, the space is produced and reproduced to be engaged in violation of the rights of people by the law itself. Agamben wrote: “violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence” (1998, 32).

3.5 Spatiality as a Mode of Change

Given the inseparable relation between social issues and spatial form, it has been reasonable by assuming that the human perception of the space could be one of those points to recognize the relation between spatial form and the human behavior. Harvey (1973) highlighted this relation which he called 'spatial consciousness' or the 'geographical imagination'. This imagination enables people to recognize the role of space in their own life, because as widely explained that a spatial form of city is meaningful; it is 'symbolic of our aspiration, our needs, and our fears' (ibid, 31). Thereby, when people perceive a space which they use, they can recognize if the space satisfies their needs or not, and how it affects them.

As mentioned in (section 3.3) many cities around the world have been witnessing proliferation of spatial division and spatial fragmentation associated with negative social consequences. Around the world many cities have a good economic situation, while paradoxically their spatial harmony has declined. For example, gentrification and fragmentation issues have become significant themes in planning studies about many cities which witnessed a high economic growth. This paradox has accelerated the reassertion of importance of spatial issues in critical social studies in which the relation between spatiality, power, and justice have been critically investigated. So the interest of the meaning of the space and how a power represents itself within it have extended to other issues concerning the rights of people in the city spaces.

The current global spatial heterogeneity (as described in this chapter (sections 3.3 & 3.3.1) has an effect to make new spatial debates about the injustice in spaces. Some scholars as I will explain later in details view the inequality as well as injustice as a threat on the original function of the space which is supposed to satisfy the needs of people. This view emerged as a result of the growing contradictory in the structure of cities between the space of poor people and space of rich, as a result the system of capitalism, which is from one hand enhances economic situation of some areas in cities and from the other hand, increases injustice and fragmentation. As an example, there are gentrified neighborhoods which are adjacent to neighborhoods inhabited by poor. Despite that many cities have a good economic situation, but spatial fragmentations are obvious. Accordingly recently the concept of right to city has acquired an increasing interest among scholars.

It is worth to note that the purpose of examining the following concepts is not to advocate them in the context of occupation, but to make use of them as theoretical indicators of negative consequences when the landscape is manipulated for the purpose of control and subjecting people. Of course, they are not useful for offering alternatives in the context of occupation. They can be useful in order to show the high level of severe restrictions on those who are colonized.

- **The right to the city**

The Lefebvre's concept the 'right to the city' is formulated in 1968, when his book *Le Droit à la ville* was published. This idea was developed in the context of his work which is an attempt to restructure social, economic, and political relations. Through the 'right to the city' concept Lefebvre aimed to counter the monopoly of decisions by a political regime over what space should be in the future. As explained in details Lefebvre triad model (perceived, conceived, and lived) shows that the production of space do not limited to the production of materiality of the space (i.e. the formation of physical aspects of the spaces). Therefore the right to the city is not limited to the right of being part of decision of articulating and re-articulating physical space but it includes restructuring of power relations that influences the production of space.

Researches on negative consequences of neoliberalism principles and globalization have made a need for dealing with the problem of exclusion of inhabitants from decisions that shape their cities. Consequently, the concept of 'right to the city' has been addressed as an approach to counteract the growing disenfranchisement of urban inhabitants (Purcell, 2002, 101). And many academics have begun to explore 'the right to the city' as an approach which may offer alternatives that empower those who are marginalized from decisions (ibid, 101). The right to the city gives inhabitants a direct voice in any decision that contributes to the production of urban space and also it means the right to appropriation; the right to use and access urban space (ibid, 102-103).

According to Harvey (2003, 939) the right to the city is not only the right to access spaces in cities but the right to change the space. Harvey (2008) views the 'right to the city' as a model and working slogan to unify social movements that are focusing on the urban questions, seeking to have voices in the atmosphere full of spatial inequalities and uneven geographies. Because according to him under the capitalist system the only groups who have 'the right to city' is a small political and economic elite "The right to the city, as it is now constituted, is too narrowly confined, restricted in most cases to a small political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more and more after their own desires" (Harvey, 2008, 38).

This theory does not offer open-ended interpretations (or one way of interpretation), instead it offers an approach to criticize the relation between powerful and powerless in many different contexts. One of those contexts where can be used as a critical tool is the context of occupation. In the context of occupation, this concept is addressed to highlight the degree of disenfranchisement over those who are occupied, but not as a domain of alternatives. Right to the city addresses questions more than solutions of exclusion; hence it is not the panacea of exclusion and deprivation from spatial rights in the context of occupation. It can be used as a conceptual notion to criticize the oppression and domination produced and sustained by occupying power in the landscape of Palestine. And to understand the high degree of oppression that people face; they has been deprived form the basic rights to the city such as the right to access to private lands.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter provides a wide range of theories to understand the relation between power and the production and reproduction of the space. Space is an outcome of a complex process, representing a type of system that rules communities. Space may be an arena of harmony, variety and coexistence, but in the context of occupation it is an arena of oppression, reflecting strategies of occupying power to implant the meaning of domination and control.

The regime system influences the structure and morphology of cities. A wide range of literature shows the persistence of fragmentation in any city ruled by capitalism. The geographical fragmentations occur repeatedly; they are reproduced and sustained by a continuous process control by the system of capitalism. However the character of fragmentation under occupation is totally different in terms of degree of oppression as the next two chapters explore.

The state of exception theory and the bare life theory are useful to understand the role of circumvention and suspension of norms in the production and reproduction of zones which represent a void of law. The paradigm of exception is deployed for the purpose of subjection and control as it will be examined in the case of occupied Palestine where the model of exception is deployed to arrest urban and regional development.

The concept of right of the city which is explored in this chapter will not answer the question; what should the space be? Instead it will serve as a critique (i.e. analytical concept) of an oppression that has been produced in the landscape of the occupied Palestine.

Chapter 4

The West Bank (in the Occupied Palestine): Dimensions of Control

Chapter 4: The West Bank (in the Occupied Palestine): Dimensions of Control

The previous chapter has illustrated the role of planning in landscape transformation through the use of planning theory and has explored the way in which planning is used to produce spatial inequalities despite being intended to be a tool for reform. In the West Bank planning is considered a tool which is deployed by the occupying power, aiming to control both land and people. Consequently, the geography and the landscape of the West Bank becomes the embodiment of colonization. The landscape of the West Bank is thus transformed to one of control, saturated by colonies, bypass roads, walls, watch towers and checkpoints.

This chapter provides a broader perspective and overview of the nature of spatial control in the West Bank. It is a comprehensive overview of the practice of the occupying power to control land by territorial means (specifically through the process of land confiscation) and procedural control mechanisms (most notably through the fabrication and subsequent use of “statutory” planning systems). The chapter is divided into four parts; part one is an overview of Palestine in terms of, historical background, physical settings, and demographic settings. Part two describes the natural environment of the West Bank, including; agriculture, natural preserved lands and water resources before next turning to examine territorial control and occupation of the West Bank through the construction of colonies, bypass roads, and the apartheid wall. The fourth part and most substantive section investigates planning policies employed by “Israel” to control Palestinians and to strengthen the existence of Jewish settlers. This part refers to decades of the Islamic Ottoman regime, British colonization and Jordanian rule eras, with a view to highlighting that “Israel” has been manipulating previous historically embedded planning laws to control the land and demography of people of Palestine.

4.1 Historical Background

To understand precisely the current situation in Palestine, specifically the West Bank, it is noteworthy to highlight briefly the historical background before focusing on the planning and landscape issues that inform the main body of this thesis. Palestine was part of the Bilad-al Sham district (Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) under the Islamic Ottoman State (*Al-khilafa AlOthmanyehah*) before the First World War. Following the First World War, the Islamic Ottoman state collapsed with most of the land

under its rule, colonized and divided between the United Kingdom and France. These colonial powers re-mapped the area more commonly known as ‘The Middle East’, under the terms of the so-called Sykes–Picot agreement. In 1920, the boundaries of Palestine were demarcated in the San Remo conference and Palestine was put under control of the “British mandate”, subsequently confirmed by the so-called League of Nations in 24 July 1922. Importantly, it was during the British colonization period that Britain played a role in changing the demographical situation in Palestine by encouraging Jewish immigration.

McCarthy (1990) who studied the statistics of population in Palestine in the late nineteenth (part of Ottoman period) early twentieth century (at the end of British Occupation) points out that there is some debate on population numbers in Palestine after the First World War, however, he estimated the population, making a correction of Ottoman and British records¹⁴. McCarthy points out that between the years 1922 to 1946 the growth of Muslims and Christians was a natural increase while the upsurge of Jews was at high rate caused by immigration rather than natural increase. This indicates that the increase of the Jews was from 12% of the total population of Palestine in 1922 to 31% in 1946. The reason for this rise in Jewish immigration includes the British government promise to establish a “national home” for Jews in Palestine, through the Balfour Declaration which led to mass Jewish immigration from Europe. In a letter to Lord Rothschild, The British Foreign Secretary wrote on 2nd of November, 1917:

“Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet ... His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of the object I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation”.

In the 1880's Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew, founded the Zionist movement. The main concept of the Zionist movement is based on uniting all the Jews on “the Promised Land”. It was decided by the Zionist movement to establish a Jewish state on the land of Palestine which considered by the movement as “a promised land” for them. In the early 1900s, refusal to this plan was declared by the last Ottoman Caliphate Sultan Abd-al Hamid II who refused that Palestine ruled by Jews or given to them. He responded to Herzl’s project with the following:

“I would not accept this at all. I have served the Islamic milla [nation] and the Ummah of Muhammad for more than thirty years, and never did I blacken the pages of the Muslims- my fathers and ancestors, the Ottoman sultans and caliphs. And so I will never accept what you ask of me”

¹⁴ British conducted its first census in 1922, dividing the population of Palestine at the basis of religious group. It recorded that the number of population as the following 572,992 (Muslim), 83,794 (Jewish), 73,024 (Christian), 7,028 (Druze), 2,446 (other). The second census was in 1931 which recorded the population as the following: 759,712 (Muslim), 174,610 (Jews), 91,398 (Christians), 10,101 (others) (McCarthy, 1990, 30-31).

The movement did not spare time in turning their colonial idea into reality and concrete plans, by expediently organizing groups to help in the immigration of Jews and encouraging them to move to Palestine. According to Edward Said in his book *the Question of Palestine*, Zionism saw Palestine as empty territory or inhabited by dispensable natives (Said, 1993, 81). Zionism described the land of Palestine - as a, “land without people to people without land”, thus encouraging immigration of Jews from other countries.

Since the establishment of the Zionist movement and the spreading of its concepts amongst the Jews, there have been waves of immigration to Palestine. Specifically, at the end of the nineteenth century (1882), Jews began to immigrate to Palestine from Russia and Romania (Holzman-Gazit, 2007, 56). In describing the incompatibility with the slogan and the reality on the ground, Holzman- Gazit (2007, 56) notes: "upon their arrival, the settlers realized that the common perception of the 'promised land' as empty of any people and waiting for over 2000 years for Zionist Jews to redeem it was not all compatible with reality".

According to Said (1993, 85) Zionism used rhetorical tools for fostering the existence of Jews by arguing and claiming that the land was neglected. Practical steps followed, with the Zionist ideas and colonial visions culminating in the foundation of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), serving as the agency of Zionist movements controlling lands in Palestine.

JNF was established in 1901 based on a decision in the fifth Zionist Congress (Holzman-Gazit, 2007, 57). The role of the JNF is to “purchase” land in Palestine for the benefits of the Jewish settlers, with the first “purchase” being made in 1905 (Said, 1993, 97). The JNF considered the “purchase” of agricultural lands the most effective way into acquiring lands, and such it invested approximately 70 percent of its resources into buying agricultural land. Between the years 1882 to 1944, there were 193 “Jewish settlements” founded by JNF in the form of a Kibbutz and a Moshav (Holzman-Gazit, 2007, 64).

In addition, the JNF planted pine forests in areas declared as so called “state land”, mainly in the Jerusalem region, to prevent Palestinian planting and to maintain land reserves for new Jewish settlements or for the future expansion of existing settlements (Weizman, 2007, 120). It is worth noting that today pine trees cover many Palestinian destroyed villages which are located in the land occupied in 1948. Ilan Pappé described the act of planting trees over destroyed villages in his book *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* by writing: “hiding their remains under vast ‘green lungs’ planted by the Jewish National Fund... Such as a forest of pine trees was planted over destroyed Palestinian village of Lubyá” (Pappé, 2006, 154-155). In other cases, parks and recreation area have been laid out over village sites (fig 4.1).



Fig. 4.1: On the right, a small park established on the site of the village school in Zir'in (Jinin). On the left, the cemetery of Salama (Jaffa), now a park (May, 1987). Source: Khalidi, 1992

The issue of agriculture and water were matters intertwined with ideological concepts of Zionism which viewed water and agriculture as tools to support the existence of Jewish settlers in Palestine (Elmusa, 1993, 10). Therefore, agriculture should not be viewed as an economic basis and something apart from the Zionist project in Palestine; rather, before 1948 agricultural activities were considered by Zionism a suitable policy for controlling lands and as a way to attract Jews to live in Palestine. In addition, Zionism saw the land of Palestine through a biblical lens which considered it the 'land of milk and honey' (Rouyer, 2000, 87). Zionism has seen the landscape of Palestine as a veil under which an historic biblical landscape exists (Weizman, 2007, 39). Even to this day, constant archeological excavations in Palestine are carried out by the occupying power to remove the veil and to search for the so-called "ancient biblical" archaeologies. Abu El-Haj (2001) has explored the relation between the discipline of archeology with the process of the enactment of colonization, noting that archeological sites are employed to produce the ideology of a "Jewish national" home in Palestine.

Following the war in 1948, "Israel" issued what was called the law of Return which allows any Jews from anywhere in the world to immigrate to Palestine and settle there. Paradoxically, Palestinians who were dispossessed from their lands (approximately 780,000 expelled in 1948) and who now number more than five millions are not allowed to return to their villages and cities. It is worth mentioning that, following the war in 1948 the Palestinian landscape has gradually vanished; not only Palestinian villages being destroyed but also fields of olives and citrus neglected and subsequently vanished. As Meron Benvensiti (2002, 7) described: "most abandoned trees were neglected or destroyed outright as the Israelis destroyed whatever the Arabs had left that could not be integrated into their framework. Most citrus groves were uprooted to make room for housing developments, ancient olive trees were left uncared for or destroyed to make room for field crops".

4.2 Geographic Character

The total area of Occupied Palestine is estimated to be about 26,320 km², including the 1948 lands, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The West Bank covers an area approximately 5844 Km², including East Jerusalem. Despite its small area, it has a diverse landscape, including the shore of the Dead Sea as the lowest point on earth, at about 400 meters below sea level. The land remains below sea level extending to the north and to the south (in an area known more commonly as the Jordan valley). The water and fertile land availability in conjunction with the high temperature throughout the seasons of the year, results in the region (Jordan Valley) being famous for its crops of dates and banana. The land rises sharply from the Jordan valley towards the east to reach an altitude of about 1000 meters above sea level. The chain of mountains which are covered with tress, in particular the olive and almond tree, extends towards west before descending again towards the Mediterranean Sea.




Fig. 4.2: The topography of the occupied Palestine. Source: Khalidi, 1992

The landscape of the West Bank Governorates was classified by the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD) into five landscape character areas, namely; the semi-coastal plain, with an altitude ranging from 50 to 300 meters above sea level- this zone has open valley specifically in the north. Secondly, the western slopes, with an altitude ranging from 300 to 600

meters. Thirdly, the mountain plateau, with an altitude ranging from 600 to 1000 meters. Fourthly, the eastern slopes, with an altitude ranging from 0 to 600 meters. Finally, the Jordan River Valley, with an altitude ranging from – 400 to 0 meters, where the weather is hot for most of year. In this zone the Jordan River flows from the North until it reaches the Dead Sea. Worth mentioning is that in this zone the Palestinian population is concentrated around Jericho city, in close proximity to the Dead Sea.

Each zone is devoted to specific crops appropriate for the specific climate. Therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture divided the West Bank into four zones having regard to these climate circumstances. The semi-coastal zone (north-western corner of the West Bank), includes Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqilya provinces and is where the average annual rainfall is approximately 600mm. The third is the middle elevation zone extending from northern Jenin to south Hebron. The fourth is an area known as the steppe zone which extends from eastern Jenin to the Dead Sea in the south. In this zone, average annual rainfall is about 150-350 mm. The fifth is the Ghor (western Jordan Valley) zone with an average annual rainfall of 100-250 mm (cited in USAID, 2002).




Fig. 4.3: The landscape Character in the West Bank.
Source: MOPAD

4.3 Demographic Sector

The West Bank is divided into eleven districts; Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Qalqiliya, Salfit, Jenin, Tulkarem, Tubas and Jericho. According to Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (2007), the estimated number of the Palestinian population in the West Bank is approximately 2.35 million. Table 3.1 outlines the distribution of population by districts in the two censuses 1997 and 2007 (the only two census done by Palestinian Bureau of Statistic after the establishment of Palestinian Authority in 1993).

At the end of 2007, the registered refugee population in the West Bank was estimated to be around 599,436. However, a more accurate reflection of the actual number of refugees was estimated to be about 642,903 persons, accounting for 27.3 percent of the West Bank population (UNRWA, 2010).

Governorate	Census 1997	Census 2007
Jenin	203,026	256,619
Tubas	36,609	50,261
Tulkarem	134,110	157,988
Nablus	261,340	320,830
Qalqiliya	72,007	91,217
Salfit	48,538	59,570
Ramallah & Al-Bireh	213,582	279,730
Jericho	32,713	42,320
Jerusalem	328,601	363,649
Jerusalem J1 area	210,209	225,416
Jerusalem J2 area	118,392	138,233
Bethlehem	137,286	176,235
Hebron	405,664	552,164
West Bank	1,873,476	2,350,583

Table 4.1: The estimated number of Palestinians in each governorate in the West Bank. Source: PCBS

The population increased by 25% between the years 1997-2007; indicating an annual average growth rate of 2.5 percent as represented in Table 7.1. The number of Palestinians in East Jerusalem was estimated approximately 210,209 in 1997, while in 2007 the number was about 225,416 with an increase 15,207. This indicates an annual population expansion rate of 0.72% on average, which is considered a low population growth compared with the total population growth in the West Bank.

4.4 Agricultural Sector

Agriculture is one of the main economic activities in the West-bank, with many traditional industries related to agriculture such as soap manufacture. Historically, Palestine has long been known for agriculture. In 1967, the West Bank exported 80% of the entire vegetable crop which it produced, and 45% of its total fruit production (Hazboun, S., 1986 cited in Butterfield, Isaac, Kubursi, Spencer, 2000). In 2008, it contributed to 8.1% of Gross Domestic Product, down from 10.3% in 2004 (MOA, 2009). Additionally, in the year 2008, around 13% of the formal Palestinian labor force was working in the agricultural sector (ibid). This sector, however, has guaranteed work for more than 39% of those who works in informal sectors (Attaya, 2005). Moreover, agriculture provides job opportunities for women and young people who work as family units in agriculture.

In 2007, the total area of cultivated lands in the West Bank and Gaza trip was estimated to be around 1,835 km² (of which 90.1% lies in the West Bank and 9.9 in Gaza Strip) (PCBS, 2007). Around 70 % of agricultural lands were planted with fruit trees, 10.2% planted with vegetables, and 26.3% planted

with filed crops such as wheat. Over time, agricultural production has been characterized by a diversity of planted crops due to the diversity of climates. There are up to 105 main crop types, however the olive tree represents the leading crop (with about half of the total cultivated area being covered by olive trees) (ARIJ, 2007). Nevertheless, fruit production is generally unable to meet the requirements of the population, with the exception being the production of both olives and grapes. A study conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture in the year 2005, concerning the production and consumption of agricultural commodities in Gaza Strip and the West Bank showed that the agricultural sector is meeting Palestinians' requirements for the main vegetables (cucumber, tomato, okra and squash). However, regarding fruit production, there is a general inability to meet consumers' demand, with the exception of olives, grapes, and citrus (cited in ARIJ, 2007).

According to PCBS (2011), in the West Bank there is a clear dominance of rain-fed cultivated lands compared with irrigated lands. The West Bank contains 212,683 dunums of rain-fed cultivated lands, producing annually 28,112 tons of crops. While it contains 8,199 dunums of irrigated land area (only 3.7% of land which is under cultivation) which produces annually 8,409 tons of crops.

“Oslo agreement” has determined quota of water consumption for Palestinians. Nowadays it is not sufficient for the requirement of agricultural production. The agreement gave the “Palestinian Authority” full control on densely populated areas by Palestinians while allowing the Authority only very limited control of the natural resources (lands and water), resulting in a detrimental effect on production and development of the agricultural sector.

In the West Bank, of approximately 5,844 km² which make up the total geographical area, only 30% is used for agricultural purposes, and about 63% of the land is located in Area C, under full “Israeli control” as a result of the ongoing occupation in terms of “security” and civilian affairs. This results in a severe restriction on the movement of Palestinians and impacts directly on their ability to enjoy the benefits of the natural resources (land & water). In addition, Area C is where number of Jewish settler colonies, practice robbery of the natural resources of the West Bank (arable lands and water) mainly in the Jordan Valley.

Land cultivated by Jewish settlers accounts for about 10.12 km² (more than 90% is located in the Jordan valley) (OHCA, 2007). The annual consumption of water to irrigate agricultural lands is 60 MCM (Arej, 2007). A report conducted by Peace Now in the year 1993 showed that in the West Bank Jewish settlers' per capita irrigated areas are thirteen times larger than the areas irrigated by Palestinians (cited in Le Monde Diplomatique, special report, 1998).

Since 1967 there has been a decline of the total area of cultivated land in the West Bank due to the occupation and restrictions of accessibility to land and water. Le monde-diplomatique (1998) reports

that, since 1967 lands cultivated by Palestinians have been reduced at a high degree, noting that “in 1967, 2,300 sq. km of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under Palestinian cultivation. In 1989, that figure had been reduced to 1,945 sq. km, or 31.5 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip”.

According to the Ministry of Agriculture (2009), the total area of the pasture lands in the West Bank is approximately 2.02 million dunums, however colonies and the apartheid wall construction have reduced grazing lands to only 700,000 dunums. The World Bank reports (2013) that, the inaccessibility of lands located in Area C in which most of pasture lands and agricultural lands are located causes economic loss to the Palestinian economy at about US\$3.4 billion.

Regarding the natural reserve areas, there are about 49,348 hectares declared by “Israel” as nature reserves in the West Bank. In 1998 according to the Wye River Memorandum¹⁵ a further 16.665 hectare were declared by this agreement as a nature reserve area inside the West Bank (OCHA, 2007, 44). Moreover, forests cover approximately 3.94% of the total area of the West Bank. Despite this, large areas of these forests are confiscated by the occupation and declared as closed military areas (ARIJ, 2010, 70).

4.5 Water Sector

Most of the Palestinian villages in the West Bank are located near springs and fountains, an important factor that determined their locations. The main source of water for Palestinians in the West Bank is from underground sources which consist of three aquifers (the Western Aquifer Basin, the North-eastern Aquifer Basin, and the Eastern Aquifer Basin). In addition, there are surface water areas in the West Bank; the Jordan River (main surface water resource) as well as number of Wadis (water of valleys) and seasonal streams. The topographic character of the West Bank influences the flow of Wadis, mainly into two directions. The first group of wadis flow towards the Jordan River and the second group flow towards the Mediterranean Sea.

This water scarcity, as many analysts have argued, could be a contributing factor in the ‘Middle East’ instability (Elmusa, 1993). American interventions began early in 1950s about the matter of distribution of water. Specifically, on 16 October 1953, when Eric Johaston was appointed to seek a comprehensive program to divide water resources of the Jordan Basin (Royer, 2000, 114).

The ground and surface water control and exploitation of the West Bank began before the occupation in 1967. It took place in two ways; the construction of water carriers to divert the upper Jordan River

¹⁵ The Wye River Memorandum: is an agreement made between Palestinian Authority and “Israel” in a summit, hosted by Bill Clinton, was held at Wye River, Maryland in October 1998. This agreement addresses specific “security” concerns which had been raised by “Israel” in the past and also it address some economic issues. Source: www.unesco.org

(water of Hasbani and Baniyas rivers) towards the desert of Negab (which is known by “Israeli National Water Carrier”), and by drilling deep wells near the “green line” to extract ground water from the western aquifer. The establishment of the water carrier had decreased the quantity of water flowing into the Dead Sea, lowering the level of water in the sea and as a result part of it has dried out. A report issued by the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) (2011) points out that there has been a huge reduction of water flow into the Dead Sea primarily because of the diversion of water from the upper Jordan of more than 500 MCM/year through the (Water Carrier)¹⁶.

After the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, many military orders -still in force today- were issued in order to limit the amount of water Palestinian’s can use from the ground and surface water reserves. As mentioned, many military orders were issued concerning water¹⁷, but three of them are considered the main orders that transferred the power of controlling water resource from the hand of Palestinian municipalities and villages councils to the hand of military commander of the West Bank. As a result the power to use of water resources is transferred to the hand of “Israeli Civilian Administration”.

The first military order concerning water (No.92) transferred all the power dealing with water including; laws, production, consumption, distribution, establishment of water projects, fixing of water allotments to be under the authority of the “Israeli military commander” in the West Bank. The order was followed by further decrees, including; No.158 & No. 291, which focused on restrictions of utilization of both ground and surface water by Palestinians. Under the military order (No.158) no person can set up, assemble, or operate water installation without a license obtained from the military commander of the West Bank. In other words, a permit is obligatory to drill a new well or repair an old well. Messerchmid (2007, 349) has noted that the order is used to deny any applications being made by Palestinians without being obliged to provide any explanation. Military order (No.291) suspended the Jordanian law (pre-occupation water law in the West Bank) which considered the water a private ownership, declaring all water resources to be “state property” (Rouyer, 2000, 47). Between the years 1967 until 1994 (the year of signing so-called Oslo agreement), “Israel” issued permissions to drill 27 water wells in the West Bank (20 wells for domestic use and only 7 for agricultural use). No permits were given to drill new water wells in the Western aquifer (ibid, 48).

During the so-called Oslo negotiations, multilateral talks were devoted to the matter of water use. According to the agreement, a specific amount of water was determined for the use of Palestinians

¹⁶ The reports also points out that historically the quantity of water that discharge into the Dead Sea from the Jordan River is estimated about 1400 MCM/year. Due to the diversion of the upper Jordan River to the desert of AL-Naqab, this amount has been decreased to no more than 30 MCM/Y.

¹⁷ In addition to the mentioned three military orders (No. 92, No.158, No.291) , there are also other military orders issued to complete control of the water resources in the West Bank; No. 291, No. 457, No 484, No. 494, No. 715, and No. 1376 – to achieve complete control over Palestinian water resources.

from each aquifer. Table 4.2 (below) details the permitted amount of water for Palestinians according to the so-called Oslo agreement, and the actual use according to statistics gathered by the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) in 2011. The table further highlights the use of water by “Israelis” in the same year.

	Western Aquifer Basin (WAB):	Northeastern Aquifer Basin (NEAB):	Eastern Aquifer Basin (EAB):	Total
Estimated yield annually	400 MCM	100-145 MCM	145-185 MCM	645-730 MCM
Palestinians/ according to Oslo	22	42	54	118
Palestinians/ the use in 2011	25	20	42	87
“Israel”/ according to Oslo	340	103	40	483
“Israel”/ the use in 2011	411	103	150 ¹⁸	664

Table 4.2: Water allocation according to so-called Oslo agreement and water utilization in 2011. Source: PWA, 2011 edited by Halawani

The agreement did not increase the access to ground-water resource by Palestinians, but it reinforces the *de facto* situation (the inequality of use of water between indigenous and colonizers). This agreement has increased the disproportionate utilization of water resources, ensuring that the Palestinians consumption at a level that “Israel” can accept and forecast (Zeitoun M., Messerchmid C., Attlili S., 2009, 157). Messerchmid (2007) points out that “Oslo agreement” did not put end to the exploitation of water in the West Bank, but on the contrary it has perpetuated the pattern of domination which established as a result of occupation. A study done by Al-Haq (2013) shows that the agreement regarding the water issue is a continuation, preservation, and consolidation of “Israel’s” exclusive control over water in the West Bank.

The Palestinians’ abstraction wells in the West Bank are characterized with low-capacity and produce about 65.5 MCM/yr (COHRE, 2008, 13-14)¹⁹. In the West Bank, there are 325 abstraction Palestinians water wells. Of these wells, around 21 are used for domestic purposes; the others are used for agricultural purposes. It is worthy to mention that since 1967 many restrictions imposed on Palestinians to not utilize the water resources in the Jordan valley area; preventing them from access

¹⁸ This includes 100 MCM used from Dead Sea Springs.

¹⁹ The so-called Israeli wells in the West Bank are deeper with high pumping capacity producing about 56.9 MCM/yr (COHRE, 2008, 13-14). There are 42 “Israeli water wells”, mainly in the Eastern Aquifer Basin, near the Jordan Valley, providing water for extensive agricultural activities done by the settlers in the Jordan valley (COHRE, 2008, 13).

to water from the Jordan River, destroying 140 water pumps and numerous water wells around Jericho city and in the area of Jordan Valley (Rouyer, 2000, 47), declaring much of lands as military zones. Thereby, agricultural Jewish colonies were established, utilizing land and water (surface and ground) for the purpose of agriculture.

Moreover, the occupying power drilled hundreds of water wells very close to the “green line” to draw underground water from the Western aquifer (fig. 4.4), at the same time it has prevented Palestinian from drilling any new water wells in the western basin of the mountain aquifer since 1967.




Fig. 4.4: Many deep water wells are near the “green line”. Source: <http://www.lifeforce.ps/english/water-in-palestine/the-wall/>

There is no gainsaying that the strategy of “Oslo agreement” is to let Palestinian Authority to control a limited area of the surface land with no authority over natural resources especially water. Consequently, Palestinians continue depending on the occupation in terms of water. COHRE (2008, 15) reports that Palestinians in the West Bank, in the year 2007, purchased 49.4 million m³ of water from the “Israeli water company” Mekerot at a cost of 34-35 million US dollars.

The discrimination policies regarding water lead to a gap between the use of water between Palestinians and Jewish settlers who consumes five times the amount of water as a Palestinians in the West Bank. Specifically, water consumption by Palestinians is an average of 73 LPCD (liters per Capita per Day) compared to about 369 LPCD for settlers residing in colonies in the West Bank. The amount of water that is consumed by Palestinians in the West Bank is less than the recommend about by the World Health Organization (WHO) which recommends a minimum domestic consumption of 100 LPCD (Al-Haq, 2013, 51). According to all above, the Palestinian water crisis is not due to the scarcity of water in the region, but rather expresses the systematic pattern of discrimination and exploitation existing as a result of occupation.

4.6 Territorial Control of the West Bank

The strategy of territorial control aims to influence heavily the demographic character of the West Bank, strengthening the presence of Jewish settlers who are dispersed in wide area to control as much land as possible. The process of that control includes construction of colonies, bypass roads, and the apartheid wall.

4.6.1 Colonies

4.6.1.1 Colonies policy

Rarely the issue of colonies in the West Bank disappears from the headlines of local and international newspapers. The decision of colonies expansion is almost monthly headlines in local newspapers. It sometimes appears as main news in international media agencies. Recently, according to BBC news, In November, 2012 “Israel” declared to build 3,000 housing units for settlers. The plan is to build 2000 housing units in area called E1 in Jerusalem in Ma'ale Adumim colony while another 1000 housing unit will be built in other colonies in the West Bank (<http://www.bbc.co.uk>).

The ongoing declarations and even implementation of building colonies without declaration have begun immediately following the war 1967. The occupying power has followed continuous steps to build and expand colonies and that process has never stopped in any “political atmosphere” such as the negotiation between Egypt and “Israel” after the Ramadan / War 1972 in which “Israel” signed an

agreement to withdraw from Sinai and also have never stopped since and after so-called Oslo agreement.

Two plans (Alon plan and Sharon Plan) were proposed to implant colonies. The major concern of the two plans is to control the Jordan Valley and top of hills and mountains in the West Bank. After few weeks of the War 1967, Yigal Allon who was the “Israeli minister of agriculture” proposed a plan which divides the West Bank into two parts; the eastern part extends nearly adjacent to Jordan River, including areas around Jerusalem and the second part was the western part extends from the “green line” to mountain ridge. The plan suggests two areas for establishing colonies, one area in the eastern part of the West Bank which is a strip of land ten to fifteen kilometers wide along the Jordan River, and the second around Jerusalem. Palestinian villagers, who were living in the Jordan valley faced expulsion and dispossession from their lands. Following the plan “Israeli soldiers” destroyed and evacuated the Palestinian villages of the Jordan valley (except the city of Jericho) and fifteen colonies were established in eastern part between the years 1967 to 1977 (Weizman, 2007). During this period about 750 million U.S. dollar were invested to develop the colonies (an average of 75 million U.S. dollar per year) (Benvenisti & Khayat, 1988, 32).

The plan (Alon plan) was a guideline for the Labor party until 1977 when the party lost power. Clearly the plan is an attempt to eliminate indigenous villagers and it may be considered as a practice of ‘Urbicide’ according to Graham’s term (2004)), and it also aims to create colonies in Jordan valley where there is a sparse Palestinian population, paving the way to declare most of the area as a military zone (fig. 4.5).

Another key actor within the process of controlling the land of the West Bank is the political Ghush Emunim movement (block of the faithful) which has played a role in establishing colonies based on the belief of Torah. It was founded in 1974 from Elon Moreh group and other Jewish religious groups. Ghush Emunim has constructed many colonies in the West Bank, seeing itself as a continuer of the Zionist dynamic (Newman, 1985).

In 1977 the “Israeli Likud party” came to power. By that date, about 5,023 Jewish settlers lived in thirty four colonies constructed exactly according to Allon plan. There were 21 of them in the Jordan valley and six established by Gush Emunim movement on the northern part of the West Bank (Benvenisti & Khayat, 1988, 32-33).

In September 1977 Ariel Sharon put a plan - called Dorblless plan-, proposing to establish colonies in the form of network on the top of the mountains of the West Bank (Weizman, 2007). Under the pretext of “security”, he argued that the linear colonies that were constructed according to Allon plan would not provide an appropriate “defense and security zone for Israel”. Likewise to the Bar Lav line in Sinai which was destroyed by Egyptian army in the War 1972.




Fig. 4.5: Allon & Sharon Plans. Source: Benvenisti, Khayat, 1988. Edited by Halawani

Clearly, the placement of colonies prevents geographical continuity between the Palestinian built-up areas. It also splits the territorial coherence of the Palestinians community and also with the surrounding Arab states such as Jordan. Large area of the Jordan valley was declared as military zones; preventing Palestinian construction and the use of this area (see 4.6).

The militarization of the landscape is intertwined with the planning system. That is very obvious in the study prepared after the war in 1967 by Arieh Shalev who worked as a commander in “Israeli army” and as the officer responsible for intelligence evaluation and then as a regional commander in the West Bank. He linked between the location of colonies on top of mountains with military purposes

by describing that these locations as "... thus the defense of that area so vital to Israel" (Benvenisti, 1984, 24).

Sharon Plan includes locations and distribution of tens of urban and industrial colonies in the West Bank. The plan promotes construction blocks of settlements to be connected to main roads of the West Bank (Weizman, 2007). According to the plan, it is noted that the groups of colonies are nearly and between heavily populated areas by Palestinians, causing restrictions of physical expansion in the future, breaking the spatial continuity of Palestinians communities and isolating them from each other.

The leading concepts behind the allocation of colonies according to both plans (Allon & Sharon) can be summarized into two concepts; fortification and observation. These two concepts derived from the way in which early Zionist colonies in Palestine constructed. As Rotbard points out (2003, 48-49) that *Homa Umigdal* i.e. the wall and the tower are basic architectural elements in the early Jewish colonies in Palestine during the British colonization of Palestine (fig.4.7).

Usually, the wall was built first then the tower, after that at the end the houses were built. Most of Jewish colonies had both elements and organized in a way to have eye contact with each other (Rotbard, 2002, 48-49). Both elements function as fortification and observation elements which they become later the main concepts (fortification & observation) regarding the location of colonies in the West Bank (fig.4.8).




Fig. 4.6: Military zones in the West Bank. Source: Ocha, 2007.



Fig. 4.7: The tower is one of main architectural element in the early Zionist and Jewish colonies.

Source: <http://www.jmesheh.com/109-daniel-zamir-shir-hashomer/#more-2487>



Fig. 4.8: The colony is located on the top of mountain surrounded with fence, having a position of surveillance. Source: Halawani, May, 2013

In 1979, three regional Jewish councils in the West Bank were created by issuing the military order number 783. They were given planning “authority” over lands in the West Bank (Coon, 1992, 183). Then other two councils were added later (Benvenisti, 1984, 39). The military order number 783 defines the jurisdictional and planning boundaries of regional Jewish councils as “the combination of all the built-up areas of the settlements belonging to each council” (Benvenisti, 1984, 40). Then the boundaries of the jurisdictional area were widely extended by the military order 848 which orders to include all lands classified as land for military purposes and “state land”. In 1981 five local (municipal) were established by military order number 982. The local councils were empowered to carry out large range of activities, such as levy taxes, “legislate” of local laws (ibid, 40).

All the mentioned colonial policies (preparing plans and establishing regional councils) have paved the way to implant more and more colonies, changing the demography in the West Bank.

4.6.1.2 Colony Models

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2012) records that the number of Jewish settlers is about 50,000 person who are living in 149 colonies in the West Bank and in about 100 outposts²⁰, including “East Jerusalem”. Most of colonies in the West Bank are on the top of the mountains and Jordan valley without urban integration with Palestinian cities or villages, except into two cases. Firstly, Hebron city where about 600 settlers live in the heart of the old city (the previous city center) of Hebron. Their existence has led to many restrictions imposed on Palestinians such as: closing hundreds of shops and forbidding Palestinian movement in some streets (OCHA, 2007). Consequently, thousands of Palestinians forced to leave the city center which transformed from a space full of commercial activity to ghost center. Jerusalem is an example where many Jewish settlers live in houses that confiscated from Muslims and located within the urban fabric of the old city of Jerusalem.

The following map shows colonies geographic location, classifying them chronologically in term of periods of construction; 1967- 1977, 1978-1993, 1993-2013. The table in appendix I details the chronological increase of settlers in West Bank and Jerusalem.

²⁰ Outpost refers to the colonies that constructed without an “official approval” from “Israeli Government”.




Fig. 4.9: The chronology of the Jewish colonies in the West Bank. Source: Arij, 2014

As study conducted by B'Tselem (2002) about colony policy in the West Bank, classifies the type of colonies into four types as the following:

- **Cooperative settlements:**

They can be subdivided into three models; kibbutz, moshav and cooperative moshav. The building of this type of colonies (in the West Bank) began early in 1970s. In the occupied 1948 land, this type was constructed before 1948. In the West Bank, most of them founded in the first two decades of the occupation and they were constructed based on the Allon plan. The common features of all three models (kibbutzim, moshavim, and cooperative moshavim), especially during the early stages of their existence in the West Bank are their agricultural character (B'Tselem, 2002). In other words, they are communal farms, but with some minor differences in terms of ownership of mode of production and socialist concepts. The key features of kibbutzim are; equal sharing in the distribution of income between members, private no property, a noncash economy (Abramitzky, 2011, 185). But, now the socialist ideology totally changed.

Cooperative Moshav consists of small separate farms which are divided into two types, the family farm unit which is the basic unit of production, and communally cultivated plots. Additionally, a multipurpose co-operative organization exists to handle joint purchasing of supplies and marketing of produce (Bittner, Sofer, 2013, 13). In other words, regarding the ownership it is a mixed between private and communal properties and marketing is done cooperatively. In the model of Moshav, people own their houses and cooperate together regarding the issue of marketing and there is no shared property.

- **Community settlements**

There are an initiative of Gush Emunim and its settlement wing (Amana). They are cooperative associations registered with the Registrar of Associations consisting of 100-200 families. Most of the members of community settlement are employed in nearby cities. There are about sixty-six colonies in the West Bank that has been classified as community settlements. Most of them are located in the mountain strip and Jerusalem Metropolis, comprising some 100-200 families (B'Tselem, 2002). Efrat colony which lies near Bethlehem on the road between Jerusalem and Hebron is an example of a community colony (4.10). The houses are mostly single-family homes of one or two stories with tiled roofs.

- **Rural & urban settlements**

The distinction between these depends on the number of persons who live in a settlement. A settlement is classified as urban if it is inhabited with more than 2000 persons; otherwise it is classified as a rural (B'Tselem, 2002). In the year 2002, there are twelve settlements defined as rural and thirteen defined as urban in the West Bank, with a further twelve urban (ibid, 24). Ariel and Ma'aleh Adumim are examples of urban colonies (fig.4.11). They have high level service standards, including commercial centers, public spaces, civic centers, high schools, and sometimes even universities.



Fig. 4.10: Efrat colony is near the road which links between Jerusalem and Hebron. Source: Halawani, September, 2014



Fig. 4.11: Ma'aleh Adumim in Jerusalem is an example of urban colony. Source: Halawani, 2006

Once a colony is constructed, it means that it will expand in the future. The “Oslo agreement” and the negotiations between “Israel” and “Palestinian Authority” have not stopped declarations of new housing units in colonies. After Oslo the number of settlers in the West Bank increased exponentially. They are doubled between the years 1993 and 2012, going from 257,700 to 500,000.

In parallel of speeding up the construction and expansion of colonies, “Israel” encourages and facilitates Jewish settlers to live in by providing “an automatic grant of a subsidized mortgage, wide-ranging benefits in education, such as free education from age three, extended school days, free transportation to schools, and higher teachers’ salaries; for industry and agriculture, by grants and subsidies, and indemnification for the taxes imposed on their produce by the European Union; in taxation, by imposing taxes significantly lower than in communities inside the Green Line” (B’tselem, 2010, 5).

In order to provide a detail view of how fast the colonies are growing, the Ariel colony located at the heart of the West Bank on series of hills provides a good example. This colony is considered one of the fast growing and one of the largest colony blocks in the West Bank. It was established in 1978. The colony's population has increased from 5,300 in 1987 to 17,849 in 2011. And the built up area increased from 1,043 dunums to 6,030 dunums in 2005 (fig. 4.12). Moreover, the apartheid wall surrounds it from three directions to be connected to other colonies in the occupied 1948 lands. Both Ariel and the wall have been limiting Salfit city from urban development. They separate seven Palestinians villages in the district from easy access to Salfit city, causing hardship of citizens to obtain their essential services (educational, medical, and commercial) and forcing them to travel long distance to reach Salfit which means that the journey that previously took five minutes, nowadays it takes more than 30 minutes (fig. 4.13).




Fig. 4.12: The expansion of Ariel colony. Source: OCHA, 2007



Fig. 4.13: Ariel colony, separating villages from the regional center (Salfit). Source: Arij.

The area controlled by the Jewish colonies does not just include the built-up area which is approximately (in the year 2009) 55,479 dunums (10% of the total area of the West bank including the area of “East Jerusalem”) but it includes surrounding areas. They are surrounded by lands classified as jurisdictional areas which consist of two types; jurisdictional area of the colony and jurisdictional area of the regional councils. Both types cover a percentage approximately 43% of the total area of the West Bank including the area of “East Jerusalem” (B’tselem, 2010, 11). The percentage is very close to OCHA analysis, concerning Jewish colonies and other related infrastructures in the West Bank. OCHA reports more than 38% of the West Bank consists of Israeli settlements outposts, Israeli military bases and closed military area (OHCA, 2007, 8)

All colonies in the West Bank are located in ‘area C’, they are woven together by a network of movement infrastructure in three-dimension space; bridges above the Palestinian lands or tunnels beneath them. In addition, the areas that surround colonies are buffer zones in which no Palestinian

can go to these areas because he/she will expose himself to risk. Actually armed outposts' settlers often violently drive Palestinians farmers off from their lands (Weizman, 2007, 4).



Fig. 4.14: Infrastructure was constructed to link the colonies together. Source: Halawani, September, 2014

4.6.1.3 Outposts

The term outpost means a colony that is constructed by Jewish settlers without any “formal approval” from the “government of Israel”. Generally, they have been built after the year 1991. By 2008 there were 100 outposts in which there are approximately 6000 settlers living there according to Peace Now organization. They consist of mobile houses (caravans) and infrastructure (roads, water, and electricity) (fig. 4.15). Since there are no real restrictions of building outposts, it is not difficult for a

group of settlers to plan and construct an outpost. Many lands in the West Bank are classified as a so-called “state land”, so the dilemma of the ownership is not a major problem for occupiers, what really they need is a bulldozer for road construction and some caravans (fig. 4.16). Actually, most of the outposts are located very near to colonies. OCHA (2007) points out that 90% of the outposts are located within three kilometers of colonies and that facilitates their incorporation together to be one urban unit. Or they can serve as pioneer colony (nuclei), which then expand. In addition to that they are also positioned strategically on hilltops of the West Bank, having surveillance positions in relation with surrounding Palestinian villages.

Despite that outposts have been set up without the required permits and considered unauthorized by the occupying power, they received indirect support of many of the “Israeli ministries”. The mechanism of building outposts can be implemented quickly by avoiding bureaucratic procedures such as official approvals of “Israeli ministers” and planning departments.



Fig. 4.15: One of outpost consists of a few portable buildings or caravans. Source: Christian Middle East Watch. <http://cmewonline.com/2012/04/04/why-all-the-fuss-about-an-outpost-called-migron/>.

Jewish settlers sometimes produce arguments for establishing outposts. For example, Weizman (2007, 1-3) narrates a story behind establishing Megron outpost, one of the biggest outposts in the West Bank, highlighting the deceptive ways that were followed by Jewish settlers to build the outpost. In 1999 many settlers asked the “Israeli military commander” of the West Bank to establish antenna

tower of a cellphone beside the route number 60, a road connects Jerusalem with the colonies in the northern West Bank. The settlers determined the location of the hill top which is the same hill top that settlers claimed that it was an archeological summit goes back to a biblical town of Migron. On the contrary the excavations showed that the archaeological site dates back to Byzantine era. For the purpose of building the antenna, the water and electricity company provided the site with both services. Then in 2001 the settlers received the permission from the military commander to hire 24-hour “security guard” who lived in a caravan and brought with him his family. After that, in March 2002, other five families joined the guard's family. Gradually, the Megaron outpost had grown, having by the mid-2006 sixty trailer houses.



Fig. 4.16: The main outpost components are roads and caravans. Source: B'Tselem, 2002

4.6.2 Bypass Roads

In parallel of colonies construction in the West bank, road network has been established to connect colonies together and to bypass Palestinian towns and villages. Palestinians are restricted to travel on certain segments. The idea of separation between the occupiers and those who have been occupied can be found in many sectors in the West Bank such as planning paradigm and is also imbedded in the road network which was designed and managed on the basis of separation between colonizers and colonized after the War 1967. It is worth to mention that Palestinians who live in Jerusalem were given blue identity cards to have a free movement on the roads network. While other Palestinians who live in the West Bank are given green or orange identity cards and they have not been allowed to enter Jerusalem or the occupied 1948 lands since 1991.

In the West Bank the main development of roads after 1967 comes to serve the colonies in order to make them more attractive to Jewish settlers. During the first decade of the occupation when the Labor party was in power (1967-1977) the planned roads was very convenient to Allon plan. During this period the roads were planned in the direction north-south to serve the established colonies in the Jordan valley. There were no planned roads in the horizontal direction crossing the West Bank, except the (so-called "Trans-Samaria road") which was established for military purposes as (Benvenisti & Khayat, 1988, 35) points out "by the mid-1970s, planning began on the Trans-Samaria road mainly for military purposes".

The bypass network influences the transformation of the landscape of the West bank; causing fragmentation of the land, making barriers between Palestinian communities, and limiting their urban development. It is worth to mention that (as clarified in the previous section) the network is not into two dimension space, but it was constructed to be in three dimensional spaces; there are tunnels and bridges, dominating the landscape such as the bridge and very long tunnels in the area south of Jerusalem.

For the purpose of construction of bypass roads, large areas from the Land of Palestine have been confiscated by two laws issued by the occupation; "requisition for military needs" and "expropriation for public use." Before 1990s the meaning of so-called military needs was defined as the presence of settlers is an aid to the army, and after 1990s the interpretation of the law altered to be defined as providing safe roads for settlers (B'tselem, 2004, 6). Laws were produced to confiscate lands from people of Palestine. When owners of lands petitioned to "Israeli court" against confiscation orders, what happened that their petitions were refused under the pretext of "security reasons".

B'tselem (2002, 50) reports one of those cases in which "Israeli army" issued orders for confiscating 4,386 dunams of private land, for the purpose of constructing seventeen bypass roads. In one of these cases Palestinian residents petitioned to the "High Court" against the confiscation orders insisting that

bypass roads could not be considered a “military need” because the roads used to serve Jewish settlers. However, the court rejected the petition in the name of "security needs”.

4.6.3 The Apartheid Wall

The construction of the wall was begun in June 2002 after the second *Intifada* had erupted²¹. The wall was planned to be about 700 km length. In January 2013, two third of the wall was constructed. UN (2010) reports that by July 2010, about 61.4% of the 707 kilometer-long of the wall has been constructed, a further 8.4% is under construction and 30.1% is planned but not yet constructed. Parts of the structure consist of concrete wall with eight meters high and there are cylindrical concrete observers towers are implanted along it. The other part consists of fence which is made up of a concrete base with three to five-meters- high wire with electronic sensors to detect movement when touched, and patrol road surrounded by coiled barbed wire. The total width that includes these components ranges from 35 to 100 meters.

The wall snakes through the West Bank to encompass colonies, separating Palestinian farmers from their farms, restricting accessibility to lands, isolating Palestinian communities from each other, dividing people of Palestine by creating enclaves and cantons, and destroying the fabric of life (fig. 4.17). Since the wall has been built thousands of Palestinians forced to cross it daily and waiting for long time period of time in front of military check points.



Fig. 4.17: The wall separates the agricultural lands from Beit Jala town. Source: Halawani, September, 2014

²¹ Second *Intifada* is a Palestinian uprising erupted in 2000 as a result of Sharon entering to Al Aqsa Mosque.

The wall influences negatively the whole sectors of Palestinians life in terms of demography, socio-economic, cultural, educational, and health sector. Importantly, the next chapter will highlight that the route of the wall was planned to allow colonies to expand in the future. This echoes the study by (Lein, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005), which concludes that under the guise of security the wall was planned to enable the colonies in the West Bank to expand. The study reviewed the planned route of the wall that surrounds sixty colonies in the West Bank including “East Jerusalem” to find that expansion plans of colonies played a significant role in determining the route “In most cases, the barrier’s route in the relevant sections was set hundreds, and even thousands, of meters from the built-up area of each settlement” (ibid, 12). Moreover, the route of the wall in some areas is nearly adjacent to Palestinians cities and villages; forming obstacles for the future development and also the wall separates people from natural resource (water and land) as the next chapters will details.

The area that is located between the wall and the “green line” termed and declared by the occupation as a “Seam Zone”, covering about 137,936.6 dunams (2.46 percent of the area of the West Bank). This zone is considered a “closed military zones”, meaning that Palestinians are required a permit to enter (B’tselem, 2012, 25-26). OCHA estimates that the number of Palestinians who live in this area is approximately 7,500 people²² (ibid, 27). In effect, they live in a closed area where no Palestinians (even farmers who owns farms) can enter to the “Seam Zone” except by an “Israeli permit”²³.

According to the map (fig. 4.18), it is noted that the wall obviously penetrates the West Bank to encompass as many colonies as possible with other colonies that were constructed in the occupied 1948 land, including the Ariel and Kedumim colonies in the north, all colonies in Jerusalem such as Neve Yacov, Ma’ale Adummim in the Jerusalem metropolitan, and Etzion block in the south. The penetrations of the wall take the form of 'fingers' into the West Bank, dividing it into three separated cantons. It separates Palestinians communities while it achieves geographical continuity between the colonies. The main casualty has been the agricultural sector because the wall cut off hundreds of Palestinian farmers and traders from their lands which are considered main economic resources. Indeed, the wall isolates thousands of hectares of agricultural lands owned by Palestinians from their villages and cities where they live. In order to have an access to go to work in their land, they have to take permission from “Israeli Administration of Civil Affairs”, which asked farmers to prove their

²² There are approximately 385,000 Jewish settlers live in the “Seam Zone” (UNWRA & UNOCHA, 2008, 6). And In this area there are 8 industrial zones and 82 colonies.

²³ There are 66 gates that organize the movement of farmers who have a permit to the “Seam Zone”. There are three types of gates; namely agricultural gates (12 gates) which open three times a day, secondly weekly gates (10 gates) which open one to three days a week only for those who own olive gardens, thirdly seasonal gates (44 gates) which open only during the period of olive harvesting , generally between September to November (B’tselem, 2013, 28). There are some gates, however, are permanently closed.

ownership by documents. Then, if they have permission, farmers have to go through gates with limited time-work in their farms.




Fig. 4.18: The apartheid wall. Source: Arij, 2014

The policy of control of land grows gradually by the wall construction; people of Palestine's lands have been confiscating to build the wall. Additionally, the original landscape of the West Bank has

been vanishing; bulldozers cleared the way on which the wall was planned to be established. As a result thousands of olive trees growing along the planned route were uprooted. Up to November 2003, there were 100,000 olive trees uprooted, some of them were over 500 years old (Hopper, 2007, 93). Between the years 2004 to 2007, there are 166 structures near the wall demolished by “Israeli Civilian Administration” and there are also an additional 754 demolition orders issued against other structures near the wall (B’tselem (website), 2008).

The continuous construction of the wall forced Palestinians to make petitions against the wall to “Israeli Courts” which ordered in few cases the “Israeli military” to provide alternatives and in many cases refused petitions²⁴. By 2012, Palestinian’s petitions against the wall reached approximately 150 petitions, but most of them were denied (B’tselem, 2012, 9).

Once the wall is constructed, and once it encompasses colonies, it becomes a sharp line and very obvious element of the landscape that separates between colonies and Palestinians communities. All changes to its route have not altered the meaning of oppression & injustice and the aim to Judaize the land.

4.7 Manipulation of Laws in the West Bank

The landscape transformation and the territorial control have been occurring through the domain of fabricated law which is playing a deceptive role in changing the character of the indigenous landscape. Through urban and regional planning laws the occupying power tries to divert the original meaning of landscape of prosperity and development to the meaning of oppression and control. In order to clarify this transformation, it is important to examine in depth, the development of planning policies in Palestine several decades ago. Because the previous planning laws that organize planning activities were not abolished; however, the occupying power made some changes and amendments to them. And on other occasions, it gave the laws specific interpretations that suit its colonial goals.

After the 1948 war, which resulted in the occupation of the first part of Palestine, the law of absentees was issued to confiscate the properties of people of Palestine who were expelled outside their home country. Then, in 1967 dual planning systems were created in the West Bank; one for establishing colonies and another for Palestinians communities. In order to legalize the territorial colonization, the occupying power used some inherited laws in a selective manner, imposing its own colonial interpretation.

²⁴ As an example in September 2005 the “Israeli Supreme Court” ordered reconsideration of the route around Alfei Menashe, south of Qalqilya. Details will be examined in the next chapter.

As a result planning laws contain manipulated laws from Ottoman, British, and Jordanian periods, as well as new laws specifically aimed at containing and controlling Palestinian communities. This section will discuss the way in which these manipulated laws have been deployed.

4.7.1 Ottoman Laws

Palestine was part of the Islamic Ottoman State between (1516 - the end of the First World War), during that era there was a tenure system organizing property and possession of land and dividing it into five categories: *mulk* (private), *miri* (state), *waqf* (reserved land), *matruka* (abandoned), and *mawat* (not usable). The occupying power made a tenure system by manipulating some of the aforementioned classifications especially the *mawat* land, which means land that is not in the possession of anybody, and is far more than a mile and a half from the borders of the inhabited zone: according to the Islamic law anyone who cultivates it has the right to possess, but if he/she neglects the land for three consecutive years without cultivating, it would be given to another one (Meron, 1981, 4).

In other words, individuals can own *mawat* lands (uncultivated and not-inhabited land located around cities and villages) by cultivating it, but the ownership of the land would revert to another person if the land is left uncultivated. This law was manipulated to make the entity of occupation the only owner of the land and suspending the individual property rights, as in Ottoman period when individuals had the right to own the un-owned land around cities and villages by cultivating it (Alexander, 2010). In other words the law was changed; however the name was kept to be used as a facade (“legal tool”) behind it oppression actions occur.

After the second *intifada* (Palestinian uprising against the occupation) in the year 2000, Palestinian farmers were prevented from cultivating their own lands near Jewish colonies, and that resulted in leaving their lands without cultivation for a period of time (three years or more) which enabled the occupying power to confiscate their lands and to change its classification into a “state land” according to the manipulated Ottoman Land Law (Weizmen, 2007, 118). Paz-Fuch and Cohen-Lifshiz (2010) points out that “Israel” declared 1.6 million dunums as "state land".

4.7.2 British Laws

During the British colonization and after the division of Palestine into six administrative districts, three regional plans were prepared covering the land of Palestine; plan RJ/5 for the Jerusalem region, plan S/15 for the north region (Nablus), and plan R/6 for the south region. Despite that those plans were on the regional scale, they were a statutory tool for the authority to issue building permits in the

villages in which no detailed plan had been prepared during the British period²⁵. The plans included some detailed regulations, concerning building permits such as specifying the minimum lot size, the maximum built-up area on a lot, and the building lines (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 55-57).

The British regional plans are still in force in these days in 'area C'²⁶, despite they are prepared in 1940s. For example, the S/15 regional plan covers the northern part of the West Bank which consists of three different zones; agriculture, development, and natural reserve zones. The development zone includes the main cities such as Tulkarem, Nablus, and Jenin, represented by a diagrammatic circle in which building permission was permitted under specific regulations²⁷, while the small circles represent the locations of villages²⁸ (fig. 4.19).

The agricultural zone does not mean a prohibition of any type of building, but it means that the development has restrictions on construction. In other words, the agricultural zone which is the main component, covering most of the area in plan S/15, directs the development towards agricultural activity. The plan authorizes to construct farming buildings, green houses, recreation buildings, stables, and dwelling housing with low density (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 60-61). However, the ability to construct in the agricultural zone depends on the approval of land subdivision by planning authorities, thereby enabling a limited construction in the agricultural zone (ibid, 73). Consequently, the British planning authorities legalized residential construction on those lands which were classified as agricultural zone.

The regional plans have never been abolished in Palestine after the end of British colonization²⁹. Paradoxically, the "Israeli civil administration"³⁰ uses regional plans to prevent any Palestinian development in agricultural zone. According to Coon (1992, 79-80), "Israel" used the British regional plans to limit Palestinians growth and indirectly to create opportunity for Jewish colonies to expand in two ways: namely, it has prohibited Palestinians from building more than one unit on a plot of land by not authorizing the parcellation of lands. Secondly, it has prevented Palestinians from development outside their villages and cities, because all the surrounding lands were classified as agricultural

²⁵ Only three detailed plans for three Palestinians villages were prepared during British period. However, master plans were prepared to all cities in the West Bank (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 79).

²⁶ 'Area C' is a classification of lands in the West Bank according to "Oslo agreement" B.

²⁷ According to S/15 regional plan the maximum percentage of building is 50% (Benvenisti & Khayat, 1988, 55).

²⁸ In some cases the plan did not mark small number of villages that existed during the British period (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 74).

²⁹ Despite that, during the Jordanian period, there was no attention given to the British regional plans.

³⁰ In 1981 "Israel" established the "Civil Administration" which is operated under the authority of military commander. Its task was to deal with the affairs of Palestinian civilians (water, electricity, planning and so on) in the West Bank.

zones, although, in legal terms, there is no obstacle to issue building permits in agricultural zone. Later on, it has been clearly unveiled that the restrictions on building construction in the agricultural zone were for reserving lands for colonial purposes.




Fig. 4.19 British regional plan (S/15). Source: Coon, 1992

4.7.3 Jordanian Law

During the first decade of the Jordanian rule, the British law (136 ordinance) was kept in force for organizing the development of cities and villages. After that, this was replaced by the 'Jordanian local authorities' law' to be applied in both Jordan and the West Bank. In the year 1966, a new law ("the law of cities, villages and buildings no.79") was enacted in the West Bank (Coon, 1992, 41-42) and it is still in force until present time in 'area C', although "Israel" amended it by issuing the military order number 418. This amendment aimed to transfer the power of planning to the "Israeli military commander" as this section explains.

According to law no. 79, there are three levels of planning authorities, on national, district, and local level. The first level (national) is represented by the High Planning Council (HPC), which is headed by the minister of interior who is responsible of declaring or cancelling planning areas based on the

HPC recommendation³¹. According to the article 6 of law 79, the roles of HPC are to declare the boundaries of planning areas and to approve districts and local plans. The second level (district) is represented by the district planning committee. The third level (local) consists of municipal or village councils.

At the Jordanian period, there were three district commissions (Nablus, Jerusalem, and Hebron) (Coon, 1992, 42). According to article 8 of law 79, the responsibility of district commission includes approving master plans, reviewing objections to regional, master, and detailed plans, and reviewing appeals against the decisions of local committees in the district. The third level (local) consists of the municipal or village councils. According to article 9 (1) of law 79, the responsibility of the councils includes, preparing master plans and detailed plans, approving the parcellation schemes, issuing building permits, and inspecting the construction of buildings. According to the law all plans (regional, master, and detailed plans) should be published for a deposit of two months, in order to give people the right of objection during this period.

The Jordanian planning law No.79 remained in force till 1971 when “Israel” amended it by issuing military order number 418. Referring to article 2(1) of the military order, the power of planning, which was in the hand of the minister of interior during the Jordanian period, should be transferred to the commissioner appointed by the “Israeli military commander”; accordingly the commissioner had the full authority to declare the boundaries of planning zones. The same article abolished District Committees and transferred all their powers to the High Planning Council (HPC). Moreover, it also abolished the village councils as local planning committees, which were replaced by sub committees known as Village Planning Committees. In this case, the abolitions of two committees were not directed toward a more efficient planning system but instead aimed to centralize power in one committee to ensure an ultimate control.

According to those amendments, the power of development and planning in 'area C' was concentrated in one central body (HPC), whose members - in addition to village planning committees - were totally appointed by “Israeli military commander”, as article 4 of M.O. 418 points out. Thus, urban planning in 'area C' had become a tool in the hand of military occupying power. According to Khamaisi (1997) the Israeli amendments to the Jordanian planning law was to restrict Palestinian urban growth.

The HPC consists of six military officers, including the demolitions committee, the settlements committee, and the general committee. The responsibility of the development of Palestinian cities and villages is devoted to the general committee, while the settlements committee has the responsibility

³¹ Source: article 4 of law 79. The law of Cities, Villages and Buildings no.79 are available in Arabic language on the web site: http://www.dft.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_dataentry&pid=12&leg_id=223 (accessed in 2 Feb. 2013).

for the development of colonies in the West Bank. The demolition committee has the responsibility for issuing demolition orders for houses built by Palestinians without building permits (Coon, 1992, 60-61). It is worth mentioning that by 1987, no planning scheme concerning Palestinians were approved except the Beit Jalla master plan (Benvenisti, Khayat, 1988, 57).

4.8 New Laws of Control

In an effort to establish a “juridical” system for the purpose of confiscation of land of Palestine and for strengthening the existence of Jewish settlers in Palestine, special laws were enacted; law of absentees and military orders. The restrictions and confiscations occur by the amendment and misrepresentation of inherited laws as explained in previous section and also by enacting new laws (law of absentees and military orders) as this section explains.

4.8.1 Law of Absentees (after 1948)

After the 1948 war, many Palestinians (about 750,000) were expelled from Palestine; from their original villages and cities to the neighbouring Arab countries or to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The properties left by Palestinian refugees were used to house Jewish settlers. And, in order to legitimize the confiscation of this property, “Israel” made a law to confiscate land of Palestine, called Law of Absentees’ Property. This law was approved by the “Israeli parliament” (Knesset) in 1950.”This law stated that any person, who at any time after November 29, 1947, had been a citizen of any Arab state or an inhabitant of one of them or of any part of Palestine outside the boundaries of the State of Israel, was an absentee, and his property was entrusted to the Custodian of Absentee Property “(Benvenisti, 1976). This law has been used also after the War of 1967, in order to possess private properties of Palestinians who were expelled outside West Bank and Gaza Strip.

4.8.2 Military Orders (after 1967)

Group of military orders, after 1967, were issued to divide the West bank planning system into a dual system: one to establish and develop the colonies and another to administrate the Palestinian communities. As an example, the military order number 783 was issued in 1979 to establish regional councils for Jews in the West Bank. The jurisdictional and planning boundaries of regional councils were defined as "the combination of all the built-up areas of the settlements belonging to each council" (Benvenisti, 1984, 40). Then the boundaries of the jurisdictional area were widely extended by the military order 848 in order to include all lands classified for military purposes and state land (Ibid, 40).

Furthermore, in 1981 five local (municipal) councils were established by military order number 982. The local councils did not just function to provide services, but they were empowered to “legislate”

local laws. The Jewish regional councils in the West bank were established in order to participate in high planning decisions in terms of economy, infrastructure, laws, and water matters in the West Bank while at the same time the military order number 418 abolished the regional committees from the structure of planning related to Palestinian communities, concentrating the power of planning in a single body (High Planning Council) in order to ensure that any planning decision is taken by the “Israeli military commander”. Additionally the same military order transferred the power of planning from a minister of interior as the previous Jordanian law stated to a commissioner appointed by the “Israeli military commander”, accordingly the commissioner has the full authority to declare the planning area boundaries. There are other hundreds of military orders issued to fully control many aspects of Palestinian life in terms of water and agriculture.

4.9 Manipulation of planning

As illustrated in the part of theories, planning emerged out as an urgent need to deal with the ills of urbanization after industrial revolution. Consequently, many planning theories tried to look for good and workable cities. However, in the case of the West Bank as this thesis highlights, planning have been deviated from its original role of development to the role of arresting development as the following sections illustrate:

4.9.1 Manipulation of Palestinian Villages Master Plans

As mentioned in 1981 “Israel” established the Civil Administration to deal with the affairs of civilians (water, electricity, planning and so on). The Civilian Administration prepared master plans concerning Palestinians villages in the West Bank. However, by 1987 “Israel” had not approved any master plan for Palestinian villages. Before Oslo (1993), the civil administration operated twenty-five municipalities excluding “East Jerusalem”, and 87 village councils in the West Bank (Coon, 1992, 38). However, after Oslo it has the responsibility of administrative aspects in the ‘area C’ where 149 Palestinian communities are located. There are also 150 villages, its buildup area are located in ‘area B’, while they have lands in ‘area C’ (Cohen-Lifshitz, Shalev, 2008, 10).

The process of preparing and approving master plans were accelerated before so-called Oslo agreement: the Civilian Administration in the West Bank approved around 400 master plans for Palestinian villages all over the West Bank. Nevertheless, after “Oslo agreement”, by 2004 no master plan was approved or deposited (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 101-102). The first step toward the preparation of master plans was to set plan boundaries. For that purpose, on aerial maps Civilian Administration's planners drew blue line as a boundary adjacent to the Palestinian built-up area, but not including the isolated building on agricultural lands (Ibid, 102). Coon (1992, 85) describes the process of preparation of the plans: "the most significant feature of these plans is the 'plan boundary': this does not, as might be supposed, define the area for which planning policies were to be prepared,

but rather the zone within all urban development is to be confined". Thus, the Civil Administration prepared master plans for Palestinian villages which were not based on reforming planning consideration but were consistent with its policy of limiting the development of Palestinian cities and villages. According to the civil administration, between January 2000 and September 2007, Palestinians who live in 'area C' applied 1,634 applications to obtain building permission. However, only 91 applications were approved which form just 5.6 percent from the total number of applications - an average of 13 a year- (Shalev & Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 10). Consequently, the civil administration restricts Palestinians from building in 'area C', leading them to build without building permits, while the colonies construction has been continuing all over 'area C'.

The following master plan of the Batillue village (fig.4.20) is an example about the way that followed by the Civilian Administration to restrict villages development. In 1994 the master plan was approved. The small village was divided into three parts in order to confine the built-up area and exclude all the areas where development has not yet taken place. Moreover, the plan boundary (the blue line) is nearly adjacent to the built-up area and was drawn in order to not include the scattered houses in agricultural lands. In addition




Fig. 4.20: The master plan of the Batillue village. Source: Batillue local Council

to that it is clear that the plan allocates no land for public services (such as schools, medical centres), and no gardens or parks. It was designed only for residential services which represented by three type of zones differs in terms of construction density; high density (blue colour), medium density (yellow colour), and law density (orange colour).

4.9.2 Manipulation of Green Zones Policy

Green zones in the discipline of planning mean lands to remain as preserved zones or agricultural lands. Practically, in the case of the West Bank, some lands that were classified as green zones whether in British regional plans, Jordanian master plans, or the occupation's planning schemes would eventually be confiscated to play a 'double edged policy' to block the Palestinian development in one hand, whereas to expand the Jewish growth on the other hand.

According to British regional plans of the West Bank, most of the areas outside the Palestinian villages and cities have been classified as agricultural zones. However, most of Jewish colonies were constructed on these lands, while the same plans were used to prohibit Palestinian construction due to the classification of land as agricultural zone.

Some colonies were built totally on the land classified as natural preserved lands such as Har Homa and Shilo. Others were built partially on the lands that were classified as a natural preserved land. What is important to say that building on green zone and uprooting trees occurred in the name of the law as in the case of 'Abu-Ghnaim' mountain. This mountain is located within the boundaries of "East Jerusalem", having an area of about three thousand dunums (each dunum equals 1000 m²). The Jordanian government considered it as a natural preserve area before 1967, and even after this year "Israel" classified this mountain as a green area in which any kind of construction is prohibited in order to preserve the natural beauty of the city.

On the sixth of June 1991, "Israel's Minister of Finance", Isaac Modu'ee, ordered the confiscation of land on and around the forested mountain of Abu-Ghnaim in order to construct Har-Homa colony. Accordingly, Jerusalem municipality reclassified the mountain to a housing zone then a master plan prepared (fig. 4.21), providing an area of about 2056 dunums with high-density housing zones. The master plan allows building 6,500 housing units, in addition to many different developmental projects such as (industrial, recreational, commercial projects and so on). The construction of this colony continues until the time of writing of this thesis.

What happened is that the scene of the green pine trees was totally removed from the scene and was replaced by a forest of concrete buildings (fig.4.22). The confiscation of the mountain was based on a British inherited law (acquisition for public purposes, ordinance of 1943), which gave to an authority the power of expropriating lands for public use. However, in the case of Har Homa, the land expropriation based on this law was for the benefit of Jewish settlers, not for the public use (as the law states). According to Holzman-Gazit (2007, 12), this law empowers "the minister of finance" to apply the expropriation without passing it through a bureaucratic process of planning.




Fig. 4.21: Har-Homa colony master plan. Source: Jerusalem Municipality, edited by Halawani, 2015




Fig. 4.22: Vanishing of green zones. Source: Jerusalem Municipality. Edited by Halawani, 2015

4.10 Annihilation of Names of the Palestinian Landscape

Valleys, cities, villages names have been affected by the context of occupation and many of them were changed from the Arabic names to Hebrew names. The annihilation of Arabic names regarding the features of landscape goes back before the year 1948 when Jews established a committee in that period to draw a Hebrew map in which the Arabic names of places and features of landscape were replaced by Hebrew names.

Maps participate to create ‘facts on the ground’ because the ‘mapmaking’ and ‘cartographic knowledge’ is a powerful method to normalize what is happening on the ground. Maps spread knowledge about geography. Hebrew map was prepared before 1948 to establish ‘facts on the ground’, as Benvenisti pointed out that “the creation of a Hebrew map was an extremely powerful means of doing so, no less important than the building of roads or the founding of settlements. It was, of course, also easier, quicker, and cheaper” (Benvenisti, 2002, 14).

4.11 The Practice of Urbicide

As illustrated the planning laws in the West Bank were developed not to promote Palestinians communities development, instead the law has been used as a vehicle of limiting their communities growth and development. In many cases, Palestinians are forced to build without “Israeli permits” then their houses face the risk of demolition. Sometimes the civil administration publishes demolition orders not for just one building, but for all buildings of a village. According to Graham (2004) the destruction of urban environment the city is termed urbicide. This violence against elements of build-up environment can be described as urbicide.

In 2011, a total of 622 Palestinian structures were demolished in the West Bank and Jerusalem, resulting in the displacement of 1,094 Palestinians (ICAHN, 2012). A clear example of the destruction a village is the Susya village which is located to the south of Hebron. It consists of 58 houses, a clinic, and a community centre in addition to that it includes solar energy panels and water cisterns because it is not connected to water and electricity network. This village was established decades ago before the establishment of the nearby colony (established in 1983) and that named with the same name of the Susya village.

Series of demolition orders issued from 1994; firstly in 1986 when the occupying power declared the site of Susya village to be a national park. Thereby, residents of Susya were expelled and transferred to nearby lands registered by their names since the Ottoman era. Secondly, in 2001, they were forcefully removed from that land. In July, 2012 the Civil Administration distributed demolition orders regarding all structures of the village. But, this order was frozen by a High Court injunction (Jerusalem Post Newspaper, 27 August 2012). The civilian administration argues that the structures of

the village were built without permits, hiding that it is impossible to gain a permit in this area. And also it did not stop building Jewish outposts nearby (Haaretz, 27 June 2012).

This village is one example of villages that are located in ‘area C’ where many restrictions on building houses have been imposed on Palestinians. “According to data obtained by Israeli NGO Bimkom from the Civil Administration for the years 2000-2007, every month it issued 60 home demolition orders, actually demolished 20 homes and issued only 1 construction permit” (B’Tselem, 29 Aug. 2012)

Demolitions are common in the Jordan Valley as “Israeli policy” is to strengthen the existence of Jewish settlers while weakening the existence of Palestinian. Large area in the Jordan valley was classified as a military zone. According to OCHA this area is about 1,919 Hectare (approximately 18% of the total area of the West Bank). Close to this zone the Palestinian Bedouin village (Khirbit Makhoul) was destroyed in 30 September 2013 for the third time, destroying dozens of tin shacks and leaving over its families homeless (International Middle East Media Centre, 30 September 2013). Usually villages in the Jordan valley have been threatened to be demolished. Indeed, they have no right to get building permissions from the Civil Administration.

4.12 Conclusion

This chapter investigates the landscape transformation of the West Bank, providing a comprehensive analysis of the relation between the transformation of the landscape of the West Bank with planning, laws, and strategies of territorial colonization. It also highlights the different tools, methods, and procedures of control that have been adopted by “Israel” to sustain its absolute control over the landscape of Palestine.

For the purpose of constructing a domain for control, “Israel” did not deactivate the inherited spatial plans and laws, but it made amendments in a deceptive way to make them suite its colonial activities. Through new planning laws (invented by the occupying power) “Israel” stripped of Palestinians properties and prevented Palestinians to build on their lands and develop their cities and villages. Through the manipulation of laws the original unique landscape was destroyed, depriving the Palestinians from their cultural, social and natural heritage.

As demonstrated, in the domain of the misrepresentative law there is unfair power exercise upon Palestinians. The occupying power determines when and where to give them permissions to move and live. To hide partially the mentioned systematic devastation “Israel” makes possible for those whose land confiscated to make petitions and finally most of them will be rejected under the pretext of “security”.

As a result of misuse of planning, the meaning of landscape is changed from the meaning of development to the meaning of control and domination; colonies locations (on top of mountains) play a role of surveillance, the apartheid wall divides the West Bank into enclaves and cantons, the bypass roads shape a barrier between villages and agricultural lands. Consequently, the new features in the landscape become an active force, exercising unfair power over its users.

Water (ground and surface water) is also under control. Under fabricated laws, Palestinians have been restricted to take use from water resources. Immediately after the occupation of West Bank in 1967, series of military orders issued to control all water resources, denying Palestinians access to surface and underground water, and limiting the future possibility of utilizing surface or ground water by Palestinians.

The strategies and methods of territorial colonization would lead eventually to elimination of some Palestinians communities from the geographic map.

Chapter 5

The Case Study Analysis (Qalqiliya District)

Chapter 5: The Case Study Analysis (Qalqiliya District)

This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Case study (Qalqiliya district) selected to be analyzed in order to explore the way in which the landscape is transformed from a harmonious scene to a medium of exercising unfair power. Although this transformation has been occurring across all parts of Palestine, of course with different levels of intensity, this chapter examines the district of Qalqiliya. There are many characteristics distinguishing the Qalqiliya district from other districts in the West Bank:

- The wall fragments the Qalqiliya district, creating enclaves and isolating villages from their surrounding environments and also from the remainder of the West-bank, causing a hard socio-economic situation for residents.
- The wall was constructed around three sides of Qalqiliya city. Moreover, it was constructed closely adjacent to the build-up, limiting the future urban development of the city.
- Agricultural lands are no longer continuous with their mother villages and cities, separating farmers from their lands.
- Water resources (springs and water wells) are also isolated behind the wall.

This chapter answers a central question about the way in which the landscape may be reconfigured for the purpose of full control over Palestinians. The chapter is divided into three parts; the first part focuses on the spatial changes that have taken place in the district after 1967, and discusses the procedures which are employed by the occupying power to sustain and expand its control over the land. It also examines the colonies development, analyzing their master plans and their future expansions. The second part is a descriptive analytical study of qualitative data gathered from the field which focuses on the impact of the wall on Palestinian communities, highlighting its role in deteriorating Palestinian quality of life in terms of economic, social, cultural, educational, and health issues. This section highlights the experience of people living in the local and regional confinements. For this purpose, in-depth interviews were conducted with twenty farmers and two group meetings. The interviewed sample covers all the communities affected by the wall. The third section examines the tactics adopted by Palestinians (specifically farmers) to alter the route of the wall at a local level.

5.1 Qalqiliya/ Overview

The Qalqiliya district is located about 75 km to the north of Jerusalem. It consists of a central city (Qalqiliya) that provides regional services for surrounding villages, in terms of commercial, health,

and administrative services. The region is attached to the so-called green line from the West, and is surrounded by the Tulkarem district from the north, from the south Salfit district, and from the east Nablus district (map 5.1). The first municipality in Qalqiliya was established in 1968. The district has never been considered a separate governorate until the emergence of the Palestinian Authority which re-demarcated all the governorates in the West Bank, adding a further two (Tubas and Qalqiliya in 1995).




Fig. 5.1: The Qalqiliya district. Source: Halawani, 2014

The district spans approximately 22 Km from west to east, covering an area of about 166,373 dunums³² in which there are (according to statistical work in 2007 done by Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics) approximately 91,200 Palestinian residents living in 34 communities consisting of three

³² Source: GIS data

categories; urban, rural, and Bedouin tribes, occupying only 11,438 dunums³³ forming about 6.9% percent of the total area of the district. The only urban populations in the district live in the city of Qalqiliya, estimated to be about 41,740³⁴. There are no refugee camps in Qalqiliya, however despite this there are 58,000 refugees who were expelled from their cities and villages in 1948 (an event called by Palestinians as *al nakba* (catastrophe) and nowadays in the Qalqiliya city approximately 36,000 refugees³⁵ live in the city. Refugees account for 80% percent of the city's residents. There are 30 rural communities in which 49,040 people live, representing approximately 54% of the population. In addition, the Bedouin group who live outside the municipality and local council borders is estimated to be about 420 residents. According to the Oslo the district is divided into three zones: zone A (3,802 dunums), zone B (9,163 dunums), and zone C (121,178 dunums)³⁶.

The district's hills in the east (700 meters above sea level) descend gradually westward to an elevation of about 50 meters above sea level. The annual rainfall is about 700 mm with the rain starting usually in November and continuing until the end of February. It is rich of ground water wells, giving a good opportunity for agricultural activity. Therefore, orchards and fields full of fruit and olive trees are a common scene. The natural flora is hills covered with olive trees, while valleys and flat lands are cultivated lands of a mixture of fruit trees (especially citrus and guava trees) and vegetables. As discussed above, the landscape of the district began to change at a rapid rate after the 1967 war, which resulted in the occupation of the West Bank, a direct result of the occupying power policy that aims to strengthen Jewish existence in the West Bank. This policy has never changed despite the signing of the so-called Oslo agreement between "Israel" and the PLO in September 1993. The expansion of colonies has continued across the whole districts in the West Bank and also in this district of Qalqilya. Nowadays (according to peace now statistics in 2011) there are about 27,200 Jewish settlers, living in seven colonies. In order to clarify the evolution of the colonies development in the Qalqiliya district, the following section focuses on two areas specifically, Tzufim and Alfe Menasha.

5.2 Territorial Control

The strategies of territorial colonization of the district have been occurring ever since the occupation of Palestine in 1948, when part of the district was separated and confiscated as a result of the demarcation of the "Green line". After 1967 the continuous construction of colonies intensified the fragmentation of the landscape. More recently, the apartheid wall has played the most destructive and active role in fragmenting its landscape.

³³ Source: GIS data

³⁴ Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2007).

³⁵ Source: United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRW, 2012).

³⁶ Source: GIS data

The continuous process of controlling people becomes an available practice by territorial or physical control of Palestinians' lands. Through this type of control, lands belonging to the people of Palestine have been confiscated to build colonies, roads and other colonial features. These new features of the landscape serve only the occupiers, producing Jewish only settlements and Jewish only roads. At this stage, it is valuable to unveil the way in which decisions are taken to build a colony in the West Bank before turning next to examine specifically the case study of Qalqiliya.

This decision is not a matter related only to the Settlement Committee of the "Israeli Government", but also a decision secured by the World Zionist Organization. Thereby, a committee which is composed of equal numbers from both has responsibility to issue the permission for the building of a colony (this committee is called Ministerial Committee for Settlement) and also the responsibility of deciding upon the location of the settlement (B'tselem, 2002, 20). In order to plan and build on the location specified by the committee, the second stage is to receive permission from the Custodian for Governmental and Abandoned Property. After receiving this permission, a contract is signed between the Ministerial Committee for Settlement and the Ministry of Construction or Housing which has the responsibility to sign contracts with a cooperative association. Then, after the cooperative association prepares the outline plan, the Ministry of Construction or Housing works secures an approval from the Supreme Planning Committee of the civilian Administration (ibid, 21).

5.2.1 Jewish Colonies in the Qalqiliya District

Since the Oslo agreement between the P.A and "Israel" in 1993, the number of settlers has doubled and the colonies are still expanding. As such there can be no debating the fact that political negotiation plays as a cover of territorial colonization. Given this atmosphere, one must say the landscape in the West Bank (including Qalqiliya district) is under continuous change with its natural environment under constant jeopardy.

In the Qalqiliya district, there are approximately 27,000 Settlers according to Peace Now statistics in 2011, living in seven colonies. The built-up environment in which they now reside is approximately 9,091 dunums³⁷ (table 5.1). Some of these colonies are distinguished by low housing density. These are more commonly known as 'rural settlements' where single-family houses are built on adjoining lots of land and the style of a house is characterized by a tiled roof with a surrounding garden. One clear example is that of Kedumim (fig. 5.2), and Zufin, located to the North of Qalqiliya city.

³⁷ Source: GIS data

Name	Established year	area (square meters)	Population 1985	Population 1987	Population 1993	Population 2000	Population 2011
Tzofim	1989	785,162.7229	0	0	474	857	1338
Oranit	1985	1,512,972.795	232	1100	3160	5070	6600
Alfei Menashe	1983	2,575,656.254	1260	1910	3720	4580	7423
Sha'arei Tikva	1983	986,989.3666	228	5262	1810	3380	4930
Ma'ale Shomron	1980	855,916.5981	0	0	360	527	860
Karnei Shomron (part of it about 30%)	1978	3,131,263.703	1,490	2,610	4,330	5,890	6,449
Kedumim	1977	2,100,054.512	1110	1390	2050	2660	3904

Table 5.1: The number of Jewish settlers in Qalqiliya District. Source: www.peacenow.org (edit by Halawani)



Fig. 5.2: Kedumim –Jewish Colony- . Source: Halawani, May, 2013

To have a detailed view about the evolution of colonies, two examples are examined (Zufin and Alfei Menashe). These two examples are particularly noteworthy because they are in close proximity to the mother city of the district, Qalqiliya and the wall totally encompasses them, influencing the landscape of the district.

- ***The Zufin colony***

In 1989 the colony was founded on the Jayyus village lands. It is located two kilometers to the north of Qalqiliya and it is not too far from Tal-Alrabea' (Tel-Aviv) (approximately 35 kilometers to the North-east of Tel-aviv). Zufin benefits from the well-developed infrastructure behind the "green line", most notably the road networks such as the high way number 6, connecting Jerusalem with the northern city of Nazareth. In addition, the high way connects also with Tal-Alrabea'. Zufin is located near the regional number 55 road which connects it with other colonies in the West Bank.

According to the Peace now association (2010) Zufin has 1251 settlers and 300 housing units. To the east of Zufin lies the Palestinian village of Jayyous which has about 3000 residents. The gaps between the two areas are obvious in terms of public services and infrastructure, with the people of Jayyous living without civic centers, sport centers, and public gardens.

The different outline plans of Zufin aim to expand it and deepen the existence of Jews beside the "green line". The jurisdictional³⁸ plan of Zufin covers an area about 2,000 dunams, while the built up area is approximately 200 dunams (ten times larger than the actual built-up area) (fig.5.3). In order to guarantee maximum potential future development for Zufin various master plans (about four plans) have been prepared since it was established in 1989. The second master plan, referred to as 'North of Zufin' has a number 149/2, and was approved in 1998 nine years on from the start of the building of the colony of Zufin (fig.5.4). It allowed for the practical opportunity to expand to the north by providing an additional area of 460 dunams encompassing over 1100 housing units, four nursery schools, an elementary school and a high school, a number of synagogues, a cemetery, and recreation and sport facilities (Lein, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005). What should also be noted is that the same area on which the Plan (149/2) covers is considered agricultural land according to Regional British Plan (S/15).

³⁸ The jurisdictional area is defined by the "Israeli Central Command", including land identified as a "state land".




Fig. 5.3: The extension plans for Zufin colony. Source: Halawani, 2014

The third master plan is a revision plan of the first (149) and an expansion of the existing built-up area to the south. It was approved in the year 2000 and covers an area 300 dunums, including the existing built up area of Zufin (fig. 5.5). No wonder, the main change in the revised plan (149/4) is that the housing density was increased in the zone classified as residential area in the original plan (149), but where construction has not yet begun. The revised plan (149/4) entails building 600 housing unit: 400 new units plus the existing 200 units (Lein, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005, 22). Another obvious change is altering zones from farmlands and open spaces use to residential use.

The fourth plan (149/5) covers almost the entire Jurisdictional area of Zufin, including all the previous master plans. It has not approved, even though it was prepared in 1999. According to this plan an industrial zone is proposed to the East of the Zufin, near Jayyous village. Later, the detailed plans for the industrial zone was postponed due to the altering the route of the wall.



Fig. 5.4: The master plan (149/2) of Zufin. Source: Bimkom



Fig. 5.5: The master plan (149/4) of Zufin. Source: Bimkom

The route of the wall was planned to secure the colony expansion. Clearly, according to the map (5.3), much of the route is alongside the border of jurisdictional area, giving planners (in the future) an opportunity to suggest master plans for the purpose of expansion. At the same time, the wall has disconnected the agricultural lands of Jayyous from the village, causing great harmful to the economic situation of villagers. Therefore, since the existence of the wall they have follow any available course against it; they did petitions to the “Israeli Courts” and engaged in weekly protest (every Friday) with other people including residents from surrounding villages and international volunteers. This pressure makes the occupation in a very few cases to change the route of the wall, but not to dismantle it.

Another point must be added that, Palestinian residents of ‘Azzun and a-Nabi Elyas did a petition against some segments of the wall (constructed to the east of Zufin) in October 2002. The court, however, denied the petition and the wall was constructed according to the planned route. Again, in July 2003, the residents applied another petition due to the problem of inaccessibility to their farms, asking for dismantling the wall or at least changing its route to not prevent them from reaching their lands. The court, however, refused the petition (Bimkom, B’tselem, 2005, 16).

- ***The Alfe Menashe Colony***

It is located three kilometers southeast of Qalqiliya and five kilometers to the east of the “green line”. It was founded in 1983 and around 7423 settlers are living in the colony (according to statistics of the Peacenow center in the year 2011). The aerial map from google earth does not reveal how many master plans were prepared for Alfe Menashe and it might be understood that there is only one master plan. After investigation, however, one discovers that series of master plans were prepared (fig.5.6).

In general, the policy of occupation is to control as much land as possible in order to securing the spatial development of colonies and to strengthening the existence of settlers. For both purposes, (in the Qalqiliya district) an industrial area was constructed, covering an area about 53 dunums and master plans have been prepared and approved. The master plan (115/8), (see fig. 5.8 & fig 5.9), which was approved in 1998, covers an area 1,008 dunams, allows to build other 1,406 housing units as a future extension of Alfe Menashe. Some of zones are devoted to housing use, allowing construction of houses five to seven stories high. Furthermore, it suggests an animal zoo (100 dunams) and commercial centers, encouraging and supporting settlers to live in Alfe Menashe.




Fig. 5.6: The series of master plans for Alfei Menashe: Source: Halawani, 2014




Fig. 5.7: Alfei Menashe Colony. Source: Halawani, June, 2013




Fig. 5.8: The extension of Alfei Menashe: Source: Bimkom edited by Halawani




Fig. 5.9: The master plan (115/8 o) of Alfei Menashe. Source: Bimkom edited by Halawani

The major goal of the series of master plans is the connection of Alfi Menashe colony with other colonies located in the occupied lands in the year 1948 (lands behind the “green line”). The plans provide large areas for high quality residential development by securing all housing components such as lots of lands, providing public service and essential infrastructure. Detailed plans were prepared, facilitating the construction of colonies. For example, the plan below is a detailed plan (known as Nof Hasharon (115/16/4)) which was approved in the year 2000 (fig. 5.10). It covers an area of approximately forty dunums. For residential purposes the plan area was divided into fifty plots of approximately 500 square meters each.



Fig. 5.10: Master plan of Alfi Menashe (Nof Hasharon which number is 115/16/4)

According to above, one of the main methods of territorial colonization is the land use plans. As explained, the continuous and fast urban development of Alfi Menashe provides and facilitates the provision of the housing (in the colony) with a high living standard. Therefore, this policy is used to attract Jewish settlers to live in Alfi Menashe. According to “Israel Central Bureau of Statistics” the number of settlers in the colony in 1995 was 4000 settlers, who (after that) have been increased gradually from 6300 in the year 2008 to 7100, and 7400 in the years 2010 and 2011 respectively.

The analysis of the master plans of Zufin & Alfei Menasha, reveals that the master plans offer a high standard of living; swimming pool, gardens, open space public services and so on. In addition, the successive expansions planned between the Palestinian communities are diluting the possibility of expansion of Palestinian communities, confining the communities to a tight geographical area, and widening the gap between colonies and the Palestinian communities in terms of services and the quality of spaces. For example, *Arab Abu Farda* community suffers from the lack of most services such as water, sanitation, paved roads, schools, and parks and so on. Such conditions have caused extreme difficulties such as overcrowding and absence of health and education facilities (fig. 5.11).



Fig. 5.11: The sharp gap of the quality of built up environment between colonizers and those who have been colonized.
Source: Halawani, June, 2013

5.3 The Unfair Confinement Mechanism

In our case, the separation between the occupiers and those who have been occupied does not mean that the occupying power is far away from controlling the resources of indigenous population, but the concept of separation is that the occupation does not take responsibility for civilian affairs, excluding occupied people from its civilian services. While, at the same time controls them and exploits their natural resources.

Neve (2008) points out that after the *first intifada* (Palestinian uprising against the occupation) “Israel” adopted other forms of control, altering its control mechanism over Palestinians in the West Bank. The previous mechanism of control was to manage the affairs of inhabitants and at the same time exploits their natural resources. After the end of the *First Intifada*, however, “Israel” altered its

mechanism of occupation by transferring the responsibility of management the affairs of some Palestinians to the Palestinian Authority (P.A.) by signing Oslo agreement, while keeping control of underground, above, and around the land classified as Zone B & Zone A. In this sense P.A functions merely as a large municipality to administer the affairs of Palestinians.

In 2002, the work of building the apartheid wall was started, representing the policy of land grab. The wall does not just separates Palestinians from settlers, it also confine Palestinians into small spaces, isolating them from their natural resources (water & land), grabbing the most fertile agricultural lands, and weakening the territorial contiguity between the Palestinian villages and cities. For example, the wall surrounds Qalqiliya city from three sides, separating it from its lands and surrounding environment. One of the worst and strangest cases of unfair confinement mechanism in Qalqiliya district is the case of Hani A'amer.

Hani's house is located in Masha Palestinian villages. Hani narrated his family's story with the land, unveiling the meaning of struggles, and steadfastness. Hani said that "the beginning of my story was the expulsion of my grandfather from his land, located in Kufr Kasem village in Palestine; he lost his land and lost his life the land robbery by the occupation has continued until today when Israeli bulldozers destroyed my tree nursery and confiscated my land".

At the beginning of the work of building the wall to separate Masha from EL-kana Jewish colony, bulldozers destroyed Hani's garden, tree nursery, and flower shop. The wall also separated him from his land (335 dunums) which handed down over many generations. The wall was build right up close to his house, and it completely surrounded his house. At the end, his house was confined between concrete walls and fences of coiled barbed wire, and the view of the village was replaced by a giant concrete wall of eight meters height (fig 5.12 & fig. 5.13).

Before building the wall, Hani refused the occupation attempts to enforce him to leave his house where he has lived before the establishment of Elkana Colony. In an interview recorded in August 2013, he said: "It is common in all part of the world that once a person owns a land, then he/she has the right to utilize it. But in our case that means a very big dilemma". He emphasized that his persistence on his right and with the help of the international and local institutions such as Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA), the risks of expulsion had decreased.

Despite his refusal of "Israeli temptation" and the help of international institutions, the prison was established and became as a fact on the ground. When it was decided to build the wall that separates his house from the colony, "the Israeli military commander" blatantly proposed to him many spatial suggestions about the ways he can enter to his house; suggesting a path surrounded with fences ended with a gate without any surrounding spaces of his house, or a gate to be opened in a very limited time during a day which only can be opened by "Israeli soldiers".




Fig. 5.12: Hani's house is sandwiched between walls and totally isolated from surroundings. Source: Halawani, Aug., 2013




Fig. 5.13: Hani's house is surrounded between walls which cut his family off from the Palestinian village of Mas'ha. Source: Halawani, 2014

Moreover, the house is under surveillance by cameras twenty four hours a day. Consequently, the family life has been transformed to be included in the unjust mechanism of bio-politics, in which they experience bare life by having been subjected to continuous surveillance and unfair restrictions.

As a result, the family (two parents with seven children) has been cut off from friends and neighbors and a few people visit the house because of fear. The family has to pass through two gates, living in isolation and in a situation similar to a jail. During the interview, Hani insisted not to stop living in his house or to abandon it under any circumstances, despite all suffering.

Persistence on his right, helped to improve the prison conditions in terms of the gate opening time. He was insisting to be given an access without any time limitation. Therefore, that put a pressure on the occupation authorities to reconsider their suggestion and then they erected a small steel door on the wall with a key given to him (fig. 5.14).



Fig. 5.14: Hani and his family must pass through gates to reach their house. Source: Halawani, Aug., 2013

The scale of unfair confinement varies between household scales to a regional scale. The so-called Seam zone (the area that is located between the wall and the “green line”³⁹) is an example of a regional scale unfair confinement system. In Qalqiliya district, this zone contains three communities where approximately 800 inhabitants live under restricted rules, and their movements depend on gates

³⁹ The route of the wall confines about 10% of the West Bank lands between the wall and the “green line”. This area has not been a just matter of control, but a matter of confinement. Palestinians who live in the West Bank have been prohibited to enter to the so-called “Seam zone” which is declared as a closed military zone.

and permit regime. Firstly, they cannot exceed the “green line” if they do that they will be punished. Secondly, they are separated from other communities located in Qalqiliya district; nobody can visit them except by obtaining a permit from the “Israeli Civilian Administration”. Thirdly, their daily needs that purchase from the regional center (Qalqiliya city) such as food are under inspection: when they pass through the “Israeli military check point” (el-yaho), they upload all things from their cars to be inspected through machines (similar to airport inspection measures). Moreover, if they need to buy electrical machines such as a refrigerator, they must apply to have a permit from “Israeli civilian Administration”. Fourthly, construction materials (such as cement, steel bars, gravel) are prohibited from entering this zone: indeed they are not allowed to build any building and even paving their roads. According to the interview held in August 2013 with Ashraf (the spokmen of A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi), he said: “we have been prevented by Israeli soldiers from paving the main street of our community by base course”. Indeed, the occupation authority deliberately lets them without planning laws. In other words they are unrecognized communities in term of planning; no master plans, and no building permits to be issued.

As explained the wall has created a closed zone where inhabitants found themselves isolated in closed area (“Seam zone”) and have been cut from education and medical services. Today, their life depends on gates, checkpoints, and permit regime. They have been forced to wait long time at the military checkpoint (El-Yaho) to reach their houses. Obviously, the occupation policy is to make life intolerable for them, and as a result, push them to leave the area and find another place elsewhere in the West Bank.

5.4 The Impact of the Wall in the Qalqiliya District

The wall was described by the occupation as a “security fence”. Many studies explain that the wall was established in the name of security for the purpose of expanding colonies such as the study conducted in 2005 by Bimkom and B’tselm titled ‘Under the Guise of Security’. Other studies describe the wall as an apartheid element that violates the Palestinians human rights. Halper (2009) describes the wall as apartheid because of two reasons; namely it supports a “privileged group” to dominate other groups. He also adds that “security” is used as a pretext to oppress and discriminate weak groups. Following this debate, this section will highlight the impact of the wall on the people of Palestine who have been separated from their lands.

As illustrated in the previous chapters, current territorial control of the Qalqiliya has been a result of a process began since the occupation in 1948⁴⁰, however the most harmful period in Qalqiliya district began with the construction of the wall and it continues to the present days. The planned route of the wall is approximately 90 Km long; of which 42.4 Km was constructed, and 4.4 km is under

⁴⁰ Mohammad Abo El-Sheikh (an administrator in Qalqiliya governorate) pointed out that in the process demarcation of the “green line”, there are 1500 dunums grabbed from the land of Qalqiliya city.

construction, and the length of the projected route is 43.2 km⁴¹. The wall separates 40,000 dunums (classified as agricultural lands) out of 170,000 that resemble the whole area of the district. Thereby, the wall divides villages in two portions: the first includes agricultural lands which were incorporated into colonies, and the second where Palestinians populated villages was remained outside the wall. Other negative influences affect other sectors such as water, social, economic, and health issues.

In urban areas, a concrete wall seven to eight meters in height was constructed, full with surveillance cameras and cylindrical observer towers (function similar to panoptic principles) (fig. 5.15). Other segments of the wall consist of electronic fences (approximately three meters high), with electronic surveillance devices, a deep trench, coiled barbed wire and a patrol road (fig. 5.16). There are also set of electronic detections and sensory system embedded in the wall. The route of the wall frequently is next to houses in the villages and city of Qalqiliya, encapsulating most of the colonies, but there are some cases in which some Palestinian communities are combined with colonies in one space without any barrier between them as it will be described in the area so-called “Seam Zone”.



Fig. 5.15: The concrete wall in Qalqiliya (about eight meters height). Source: Halawani, June, 2013

⁴¹ Source: GIS data




Fig. 5.16: The wall in Qalqiliya (fence of coiled barbed wire). Source: Halawani, June, 2013

The wall encircles towns and villages, turning them into prisons, isolating owners from their lands, and confiscating vast areas of Palestinian lands. Additionally, in the Qalqiliya district, the wall influences negatively the territorial cohesion; creating four enclaves and splitting them into cantons (fig.5.17). As a result of these drastic affects, thousands of residents have been severely affected.

Maps are not sufficient for complete understanding of landscape transformation and its impact upon people of Palestine; despite that it is a good tool to highlight the elements of restrictions which arrest the urban and rural development. Therefore, fieldwork (in-depth interviews with farmers and key persons, observation, discussions, and group meetings) have largely provided the researcher with a comprehensive perspective about the impact of the wall on agricultural, economic, social, educational, and health sector as the following.




Fig. 5.17: The wall in Qalqiliya district. Source: Halawani, 2014

5.4.1 Agricultural Sector

Since old ages the Qalqiliya district has been known for its fertile land. It is famous by being fruit and citrus basket of the West Bank; lands are planted with citrus, oranges, clementinas, and lemon trees. The agricultural sector contributes in 45% of the region economy. Farming is deeply rooted in the culture and daily life of Palestinian people in the Qalqiliya district. As an example, people in Jayyous village (one of villages in Qalqilya region) work in agriculture in addition to other professions. It is not surprising to meet people who teach in schools or work in administrative offices and in parallel, they are also farmers. Shawket Samha⁴² from Jayyous village one of those people, who worked as a teacher and he still works as a farmer. He mentioned in the interview that before the construction of the wall he used to work in his farms every day after school, “I was working daily in my olive farm and citrus garden, ploughing the soil, and irrigating plants and trees”. Astonishingly, new realities and

⁴² Shawket Samha is a farmer and retired teacher (72 years old). The interview was conducted with him in July, 2013.

new way of life began to affect his personal life (used to live more than half century). Almost farmers in Qalqiliya region are negatively influenced; communities are separated from their fields, orchards, and olive-covered slopes (fig. 5.18).

The fieldwork (interviews & researcher's observation) enable to gain insights into what is happening actually on the ground, to observe and to examine data which cannot be gained by aerial photos. The interviews with groups of farmers from various communities in the region display their sufferings that feel like they are in prisons. To illustrate the impact of the wall over agricultural sector), two cases will be listed and discussed (Qalqiliya city and Jayyous village) as the following:




Fig. 5.18: The classification of agricultural lands in Qalqiliya district. Source: Halawani, 2014

Qalqiliya City

Since the year 2002, the wall has been separating farmers from their private lands; resulting in the loss of agricultural income and employment. Of the city's 6000 dunums of agricultural lands, about 5000 dunums has been separated by the wall. In the first two years of separation, access to lands was not permitted. Therefore, it was very hard for people to reach their lands because no permits issued to them by "Israel". Usually farms need a daily care, irrigation of crops, collection of ripe fruits, and trimming trees. The situation of separation, however, excludes any possibilities of cultivating, irrigating, harvesting trees, and taking care of farms and crops. Ali Hasan a farmer from Qalqiliya city told the researcher that more than two years, ripe fruits had been uncollected, and therefore fruits had dropped on the ground, trees had hardened, and crops had ruined (fig. 5.19). Ahdaf Soueif (2004, 141) an Egyptian writer who visited Qalqiliya district in the year 2003 described the situation in the date of October 20, 2003 by writing:⁴³

"Now their harvest is routing before their eyes and they cannot get to it Harvesting is a family affair so the soldiers face a crowd of men, women and children. What they do is this: first they collect all their identity papers. Then they call the people out one by one. Today they have decided that no male between the ages of twelve and thirty-eight will be allowed on his land. Also, no women will be allowed unless she is over twenty-eight and married. So, the majority of the farmers, men, women and teenagers stand at the gate, the Israeli soldiers and the barrier between them and the harvest that is their sustenance and income for the coming year".

As far as local concern about the wall problem is increased, it is noticeable that things began to change not about discontinuing construction of the wall or dismantling the segments that were built, but about mechanisms and procedures of control concerning access to lands. After creating a *de facto* situation by "Israel" through which Palestinian farmers must deal with it, local and international voices were raised against the injustice created by the wall.

On local level, Palestinian protesters demonstrated against the wall especially in the threatened area by the wall. In order to deal with the growing international criticism and local pressure, "Israel" began to partially ease restrictions imposed on movement of farmers by allowing them to have limited access to their lands. But the access is fully controlled by permit system which determines who might enter to his/ her land and how long he/she might stay. Indeed, limited numbers of farmers have been allowed to work into their farms.

Theoretically, permits should be issued to those who own lands behind the wall. Practically, however, many farmers who own lands behind the wall and who applied for having a permit were prevented to go to their lands. Their requests for permits were refused because of "security reasons" which was no

⁴³ She described what was happening in front of a gate which is located in Jayyous village and almost similar situation was happening to all gates in the district of Qalqiliya.

more than an excuse to prevent farmers to plant their lands. In many cases if one member of a family is refused by the occupying power because of so-called “security reasons”, all family members are refused to obtain a permit as a “collective punishment”. B’Tselem (June, 2004) reports that as of March 2004, some 2,240 residents from Jayyous and surrounding villages asked to obtain access permits while approximately 700 were rejected (i.e., 25% of the applications were denied)” and most of refusals were based on “security reasons” (B’Tselem, 2004, 11). Due to that situation, some lands were totally neglected (fig. 5.19).



Fig. 5.19: At the first years of the closure (from the year 2002 to 2004), Guava fruit were dropping on the ground and trees hardened because of inaccessibility to farms. Source: Qalqiliya Municipality

The permit system allows some farmers to work into farms, but with limited time. Additionally, they have difficult situations regarding the movement; there are gates through which they must pass. There

are crops behind the wall which need daily irrigation and daily care such as greenhouses in which tomatoes and cucumbers are grown. After the wall was built, many farmers were no longer able to plant the same kind of crops that need daily irrigation. They planted trees instead of vegetables because they are uncertain about their accessibility to their farming lands.

Additionally, due to the increase of production price of citrus fruits, many Palestinian farmers changed the type of trees from citrus to other types of trees to cope with the farm-to-market challenges they face. Mohammad Asa'd a farmer from Qalqilya who owns about 300 dunums of lands behind the wall, pointed out that he replaced the citrus trees to the guava trees, insisting that it is because of Palestinian market is full of "Israeli" agricultural product which extensively has spread in the market, resulting in inability to compete. This context increases supply of citrus fruit and consequently consumer's cost decreases which make hard competitive situation for Palestinian farmers to market their citrus fruits. He added: "I am wondering how we can compete with Israeli farmers who do not have restrictions like us. And if we decrease the consumer's cost we will have no financial revenue".

Moreover, the restrictions on movement towards farms and the work-time restrictions and the increase of journey times to farms promote some farmers to change type of crops usually planted to other types that need less time to take care.

Jayyous village

This village is famous of citrus fruits, guava trees, and vegetables. The village's lands measure approximately 13,500 dunums and most of its lands are fertile which farmed intensively with much of human investment in time and energy. Over time, fruits and vegetables have been produced not only for the village itself, but also for the whole West Bank. Therefore, its 3000 inhabitants have depended on farming as a main source of income.

The wall has affected severely the agricultural sector; the route of the wall was set far from Tzofin colony build up area, isolating Palestinian agricultural lands from the village of Jayyous (fig. 5.20, fig. 5.21, fig.22). Hence, there is about 8,600 dunums isolated by the wall, 75% of the villages' total area⁴⁴. The agricultural sector has declined due this isolation of fertile agricultural lands. In an interview with Adul-Latif Khaled (a Palestinian hydrologist expert), he declared that by August 2004, a year after the wall was completed around the village, local production had fallen from 7 to 4 million kilograms of fruits and vegetables, and 15,000 trees had died and the number of farmers cultivating their land declined from 300 to 100 (Dolphin (2006, 95).

⁴⁴ Source: Jayyous village council.

It is worth mentioning that approximately 4000 trees were uprooted because of the wall⁴⁵. The wall route's width varies from 40 to 80 meters, consisting of patrol road surrounded by trenches and barbed-wire fences. In the case of Shawket Samha (a farmer from Jayyous), during the construction of the wall which has a width of approximately 90 meters in his land, "Israeli bulldozers" uprooted one hundred olive trees on Shawket's land. A report of United Nation published in March, 2005 points out that on 9 December 2004, "Israeli bulldozers" uprooted 117 olive trees on Jayyous land, west of the barrier. Ten days later the work resumed and some 300 to 350 olive trees were uprooted in total.



Fig. 5.20: The wall separates fertile agricultural lands from the village of Jayyous. Source: Halawani, June 2013.

⁴⁵ Source: Jayyous Village Council.



Fig. 5.21: The wall snaking through the agricultural lands in the village of Jayyous. Source: Halawani, June, 2013



Fig. 5.22: The wall separates agricultural lands from villagers. Source: Halawani, June, 2013

Zufin colony was built on confiscated lands of the village of Jayyous. Approximately 1362 dunums of lands were confiscated⁴⁶. According to the following map the wall was established surrounding the colony, but with a view to offer a high potential for future expansion (fig. 5.23), encircling large areas; amounting about ten times more than its built-up area⁴⁷. The jurisdictional area (which is a purple color in the map below) is about 2,493 dunums⁴⁸, allowing “Israeli planners” to prepare extension plans and assuring the expansion and growth of the colony.




Fig. 5.23: The map shows the relation between the wall and the Zufin colony. Source: Halawani, 2014

⁴⁶ Source: Jayyous Local Council.

⁴⁷ It is about 75 % of Jayyous fertile lands and irrigated farmlands have been isolated by the wall, amounting to some 9,000 dunums.

⁴⁸ It is worthy to note that the route of the wall was re-planned around Zufin colony according to two decisions of the “supreme court of Israel”. The first decision was issued in 2006 to release about 1,500 dunums and return it back to the village of Jayyous. The second decision was issued in 2009 which ordered to release about 2,000 dunums and to be attached again to the land of Jayyous.

Many farmers, as mentioned, were dispossessed from their own land⁴⁹; they have not been given permits to attend their olive trees and agricultural lands. The two concepts of dispossession of farmers and isolation of farms have a wider meaning more than mere difficulties of reaching farms or prevention of working in fields. They are also methods of depriving farmers from land which is very precious physically and emotionally. Not surprisingly, some of those farmers, who were not given a permit to access through gates in the wall, cried bitterly during the interviews. One of them did not see his land more than ten year, even that he was never accused by “Israel” in any case.

Fear from confiscation and feeling of belonging urge many farmers to keep cultivation and to reclaim neglected lands located behind the wall. If a land is neglected and uncultivated, eventually it will be confiscated by the occupying power based on misrepresentation of laws and will be used for the use of colonies. In the group meetings with farmers, they emphasized that they inherited their lands from their ancestors, who invested time and efforts in cultivation. Despite the siege around their villages because of the existence of the wall they take the risk to go to lands in order to work and irrigate trees and crops. Keeping their lands green may avoid them the risk of confiscation

Farmers face severe difficulties to reach their lands; firstly they must apply to have an access permit. If they succeed to have a permit, the second difficulty will be the limited time to work. There are gates in the wall for access control (fig. 5.24, fig.5.25). For example, there are two gates in the wall in Jayyous village, the northern gate which is the main gate and the southern gate through which a few farmers were allowed to pass; just those who cultivates olive trees.

Fig. 5.24: The Jayyous North Gate: a farmer is under inspection by “Israeli soldiers” while going to his farm.
Source: Halawani, June, 2013



⁴⁹ Before the wall, farmers used to sleep in their lands at the time of harvest. After the wall some of them were prevented to go to their lands and those who have a permit they cannot do that anymore.

The northern gate opens in the morning one hour from 6:00 to 7:00 in order to allow farmers to pass through and after that it locked to open again in the midday from 12:30 to 13:00 and it locked again to open in the evening one hour (from 17:00 to 18:00), allowing farmers to return back to their village. In front of the gates, farmers must stop for inspection and showing their identity card and permit papers (fig. 5.25). The meaning of subjection, separation, and disenfranchisement accompany with the existence of gates which completely control the movement of farmers. The gates are manifestation of the prison and unfair confinement mechanism which are clear in multi-levels in the Palestinian life.

The gate system is one of the major methods of restriction imposed over farmers, resulting in weakening the agricultural sector. The best time for farmers to work (especially in summer time) is early in the morning and late in the afternoon. Farmers, before the existence of the wall, used to reach their farms at 5:30 and work until midday. Then, they have a rest time and after that they work in the evening when the sun is less intense. Today, this previous system does not work at all because of the gate opening system.



Fig. 5.25: Farmers are passing through the gate. Source: Jayyous village council

5.4.2 Water Sector

As it turns out in chapter four, one of the most important water resources in the West Bank is the Western Aquifer Basin, on which the city of Qalqiliya and surrounding villages stand. This unique location facilitates drilling water wells and facilitates intensive cultivation practices. The direct threat of water resources in the region has been occurring after the construction of the wall; restricting access to water resources, and limiting water usage from the Western Aquifer. Mohammad Abo EL Sheikh (the director of health and environmental issues in Qalqiliya governorate) emphasizes that the wall has isolated nineteenth ground water wells from the villages of the district and the city of Qalqiliya, leading to a lack of water (fig. 5.26).

The Western Aquifer has been exploited as mirrored in some “Israeli politician’s”, emphasizing to keep usurpation of water resources and depriving people of Palestine to access water. Benjamin Netanyahu (Prime Minister Of Israel) declared in 17 May 1998: “and when I talk about the importance to Israel’s security, this is not an abstract concept ... it means that a housewife in Tel Aviv can open the tap and there's water running to it, and it's not been dried up because of a rash decision that handed over control of our aquifers to the wrong hands.” (Amnesty International, 2009).

The narratives regarding the water issue change according to situations to suit the purposes of the occupation. For example, before the constructions of the wall, the occupying power claimed that restrictions imposed on Palestinians water utilization (water quotas, permit system and military orders) aim to protect the aquifer from overexploitation and consequently maintain the future food security of “Israel” (Rouyer, 2000, 3). What it seems obvious that “Israeli” Politicians’ declarations are reflected into the route of the apartheid wall (see the map above), which plays a role in reducing the Palestinians water utilization. Therefore, this policy aims to preserve the majority water for the use of Jewish settlers. The following paragraphs will set out how the wall relates to the restriction of Palestinian consumption of water.

During the construction of the wall, water networks that transfer the water from wells to farms were damaged, causing a great harmful to the farmers whose crops depends mainly on water supply from wells⁵⁰. Some farmers during the interview point out that they change the type of crops they plant, emphasizing that this change is due to the lack of water. They changed types of crops that depend on irrigation to other types that depends on rainwater such as olives trees.

In Jayyous village, the wall separated the only six water wells from the village. What do residents of Jayyous do to deal with the problem of inaccessibility to the water wells? Actually, they are forced to go to obtain water from another water wells from the nearby village of Azzun. The new situation

⁵⁰ Source: an interview with Mohammad Abo EL Sheikh (director of health and environmental issues in Qalqiliya governorate in the date July, 2013

influenced them harshly, creating a new way of life in relation with water issues; before the wall it was easy to access water wells and to provide the village with water tanks whenever it is necessary but after the wall there is no possibility to do that. There is no one case after the existence of the wall in which a permit is given to a farmer to bring water from isolated wells to the village. Not surprising that, the water consumption in the village of Jayyous dropped to a mere 23 liters per person per a day (Amnesty International, 2009, 54).




Fig. 5.26: The wall isolates tens of water wells. Source: Halawani, 2014

Those communities which suffer from the lack of water are forced to purchase expensive water tanks to satisfy their needs. For example Arab Abu Farda community does not have a water network (fig.5.27). Before the wall people depended upon water wells from the nearby village of Habala, but as a result of the wall which isolates them from water wells, they forced to purchase water tanks for the purpose of domestic use and also to water their flock of sheep and cows.



Fig: 5.27: Purchased water tank in Arab Abu Farda community in order to water animals. Source: Halawani, Aug., 2013

5.4.3 Cultural & Social Issues

Farms are not just places of work; instead, the relation between farms and villagers is manifested in various ways, like crop-tending, practicing social activities, preserving cultural values, and also promoting struggle against oppression. Of course, beside their positive contribution to aesthetic dimensions of the landscape of villages and to economic status of people, it is also an integral part of culture of people. For villagers the fertile land is an area, facilitating the meeting between farmers and

other inhabitants, where people are engaged in exchange of feelings, and where sense of belongings and good values are manifested. For example, the olive tree does not just have a utilitarian dimension, but it has a symbolism dimension (the symbol of steadfastness for people of Palestine). It means *Summud* (steadfastness) and adherence to the land, which is reflected in paintings in which olive tree used as a symbol of struggle and resistance against the occupation.

Villagers of Qalqiliya district experienced this unique relation with the land. Generation after generation used to take care of the land and to cultivate it, therefore, it is deeply rooted in their culture. Moreover, olive orchards, citrus gardens, and fields are part of daily talk where (before the wall) they used to organize social activities (such as communal picnics) in addition to the main activity (farming). This positive domain where activities can be practiced by families (communally) strengthens social bounds. Before the wall, farms were an environment for the purpose of work and for social purposes; family members were used to meet together, talking, eating, doing picnic under olive trees and children used to play together.

Today, the mentioned social activities transformed to memories; people cannot reach their lands anymore. People have been prevented to go to their lands by the wall, except a few of them only for the purpose of work. Farms are no longer included as a main feature of social and recreational activities (picnic parties, morning and evening walks, and playground for children). The social and communal activities totally disappeared from fields and orchards. Um A'zzam, grandmother who has three sons, four daughters, and twenty eight grandchildren, sees that their social activities decreased because the majority of relatives have been deprived from access to farms. She says: "before the wall, we had many chances to go to our orchards with relatives without any restrictions. Our social activities are highly influenced harshly by the wall. We lost our chances to invite them into farms". Consequently, the wall is not just a matter of deterioration of their economic situation, but also a threat to their traditional way of life and culture.

The knowledge about cultivation is socially transmitted from one generation to another; what fathers learned about farming and taking care of land are transmitted to children through practice (when sons help fathers in cultivation and picking fruit from trees). According to farmers, the work of cultivation by families facilitates transmission of knowledge about farming and sense of belonging of the land to their sons. It may be described as a cumulative knowledge. After the wall however, the chain of transmission of knowledge is broken.

Despite that, farmers are worried about the future; many farmers in the group meetings expressed their persistence to keep farming, irrigating their land because the land symbolizes the life for them. One of farmers wrote a short story titled 'The Sad Olive Tree', expressing his love to his land and his helplessness facing the destruction of his land. He described his happiness while working in his farm,

describing his feeling by writing: “He was very happy to work in his farm. He looked after his trees as his sons”. Then he described his powerlessness facing uprooting his trees by writing:

“One day, a year ago, when he was working hard, he saw a paper hanging on a branch of an olive tree. It was an order from the Israeli military officer. It was written in bad Arabic by saying that he would confiscate the farm to build a wall and a fence through it. A month later the Israeli bulldozers were brought to the farm and uprooted the hundred olive trees”.

What is lost as a result of the wall is a vast environment that had positive influence in generating and preserving good social habits in Qalqiliya communities. The destruction of the physical link between people and land decreases social meaning of agricultural activity; communal activities have transformed to individual activities. Nevertheless, people are strongly have the sense of belongings to the land. Nowadays, the knowledge related to agriculture passing from generation to generation cannot be gained by practice and observation except by narratives and storytelling.

Nowadays, people who live in the “Seam Zone” face difficulties in keeping their social relationships as past time (before building the wall). Indeed, their social and economic networks extend to communities in the whole Qalqiliya region and they have strong family ties linking them to other villages and cities in Palestine. On one hand, they view the wall as an element of disenfranchisement and marginalization. On the other hand, the wall prohibits people from visiting their relatives and friends living in the “Seam Zone” and consequently creates a space of unfair confinement and space of exclusion.

Accordingly, new social relationships might be defined which are not optional at all (not with the hand of people). New meaning of space has been shaped; the notions of outside and inside dominate the narrative of people. For example, the desire to marry a woman from outside becomes a hard decision. Because the system of control influences them obviously; it is not just wedding ceremony time is totally controlled by gates and checkpoints, but also the free access between the “Seam Zone” and the rest part of the West Bank is prohibited. This context would prevent any two families to keep in contact together. According to the interviews with people in A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi, they points out that their social occasions such as wedding ceremony are totally influenced by the permit system. Asraf from A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi told the researcher: “we can invite our friends to participate in wedding ceremony, but they will not be allowed to reach the community”. This expected context could lead to tremendous hardship for families in which one spouse is from “Seam zone” and the other from the West Bank.

5.4.4 Economic Sector

The agricultural sector is a corner stone in the district's economy. The interviews which was conducted seeks to uncover the way in which economic situation has been deteriorated, highlighting the restrictions imposed on farmers that participate vigorously in the decline of the economy of the district.

The restriction policy had many dimensions including difficulties in movement to the agricultural land, coupled with a serious obstruction of Palestinian development in agricultural sector as well as process of control (time control and permit system), already explained. In this way, the economy of the district has been deteriorated; unemployment rate increased among farmers. In the late of 2003, the unemployment had risen to 75% and more than 4000 citizens from Qalqiliya city had migrated to other West Bank towns (Dolphin, 2006, 73).

Framers interviewed by the researcher described the marketing process before the construction of the wall. They emphasized that they did not need to engage in a marketing process, because traders were coming to their fields in the time of harvest; putting fruits in boxes and shipping them to markets. After the wall, however, traders are not allowed to reach farms (they are not given permits). Thereby, farmers have responsibility to transport agricultural products to markets. Difficulties in the sale process and transport of products increase the production cost, and decrease the ability of marketing (especially with existence of "Israeli agricultural products").

There are complains among participants (farmers) about the existence of "Israeli agricultural product" in Palestinian markets, influencing negatively marketing process. They points out that "Israeli farmers" have an easy accessibility to water, support from their government and there is no restrictions against them of doing farming but full of support. The central question they asked how could they compete with "Israel agricultural product"? Some of them changed the type of crops they planted to deal with this problem. For example, one of farmers changed the crops from mandarin orange (which is extensively produced by "Israeli farmers") to lemon in order to avoid the assured loss.

Due to the policy of restriction, the allowed work time is very limited. Additionally, there is a limited opportunity to increase the number of farmers. Therefore, agricultural productivity has been declined, and quality of agricultural product has decreased. This circumstance prevents real investment in agricultural sector which can play a significant role in developing the Palestinian economy. Obstacles imposed on this sector forced farmers to deal with the problem of accessibility and not to think strategically of reclamation of uncultivated lands or to improve the quality and quantity of agricultural

products in order to increase the production as well as economic growth.⁵¹ The lack of strategic economic perspective regarding agriculture causes decline of Palestinian economy (no new job opportunities, low rate of wages, and high rate of unemployment).

Qalqiliya city was an important regional market before the establishment of the wall, many Palestinians who live in the West Bank as well as Palestinians who live in the occupied 1948 land used to go to Qalqiliya for day-to-day needs. But after the wall which cuts off main streets that connect the city with surrounding communities (fig. 5.28), the commercial activity was declined and half of the 1200 shops in Qalqiliya city were closed as a direct result of the wall (Hopper, 2007, 93). Another example of the deterioration of the economic situation as a result of the wall is the village of Mas'ha (located south of Qalqiliya city). The main street was blocked by a military gate and it transformed to an inner street inside the Elkana Jewish colony. Accordingly, the agricultural and commercial activities were sharply declined; the weekly commercial market which was full of shops on the both sides of the main street was totally disappeared.



Fig. 5.28: The upper photo and the below on the left side: the wall blocks one of main streets in Qalqiliya city. The below photo on the right side shows the closed shops because of the wall which deteriorate the economic situation. Source: Halawani, June, 2013

⁵¹ According to the interview with the administrator of Agricultural Department in Qalqiliya Governorate, it is obvious that there is no clear strategy of developing the agricultural sector in the region. The way that they follow to support farmers is just by providing them with new plants with low cost.

5.4.5 Health Sector

Qalqiliya is one of the main cities in the West Bank, serving as center of the district. There were no obstacles, preventing people who live in surrounding communities to benefit from health services of the main hospital located in Qalqiliya city. Since 2000, however, many obstacles such as checkpoints and the wall have been disrupting the health services. In this context, the life of people is under danger because of two reasons; namely there are elven communities suffer from the lack of any minor health services even a small health clinic, except a weekly mobile health clinic. Secondly, there are three communities are separated behind the wall and the people forced to pass through gates to benefit health services. If there is an emergency case in one of those communities, an ambulance has to pass through gates and checkpoint. Moreover, an ambulance must have a permit to be allowed to go into “Seam Zone”.

Yediot Ahronot reported in 2010 that a Bedouin- Palestinian pregnant women was forced to deliver a baby in the house because the inability of ambulance to reach here (fig.5.29). It is not allowed for ambulance to enter the “Seam zone” except by obtaining a permit in advanced by “Israeli Civilian Administration”. When a woman felt associated birth pain she called a taxi from the city of Qalqiliya and the taxi was stuck at the checkpoint. During that time she began to deliver a baby and one of women from the community cut the umbilical cord for the baby. According to the interview with Kassab (the spokesman of the community) he said that the women died because she was poisoned.



Fig. 5.29: *Yediot Ahronot* reports the story of *Aliya* who forced to deliver a baby in the house because she lives in the so-called “Seam Zone” where there are isolated Bedouin communities

5.4.6 Educational Sector

As mentioned those communities who have been separated from the rest of the West Bank have been cut off from regional services in terms of health and education. Therefore, in order to obtain these services, they must go out of the “Seam zone”. As an example, pupils of three Palestinian communities (A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi, A’rab ar Ramadin ash Shamali, and A’rab Abu Farda) have to travel outside the “Seam Zone” in order go to schools each day. There is a bus to transport them back and forth to go to school outside the enclave. Each time the pupil’s bus on its way back, it get inspected thoroughly at the checkpoint. Pupils cannot attend class after one o’clock or participate in extra-curricular activities for their fear of missing the bus. Basic services which are very essential to facilitate education do not exist in the community A’rab Abu Farda (where 200 Palestinian Bedouins residents live); there are no electricity, no sanitation network, and no water networks.

Due to difficulties of pupils to reach their school in surrounding villages and in Qalqiliya city, in 2012 the people of A’rab ar Ramadin al Janubi community constructed an elementary school using light materials. They used the same material that used to build a tent (fig. 5.31). The school consists of three classes and an outdoor yard. Teachers from outside the enclave have to apply for a permit to teach the school. What is important to say that the people built the school without having a building permit. Kassab points out that “they build the school without a permit because they are prevented at all to build any kind of buildings (houses, schools, and so on)”. What people have to do to cope with the absence of any method to build (emptiness of law)? Of course, as Kassab said: “we are compelled to build without a permit because there is no possibility to obtain a permit”. Indeed, there is no planning framework in which Bedouin can deal with in order to apply for a building permit. It can be said they are un-recognized communities in term of planning. Nowadays, the school is under threat of demolition according to the following document issued by the “Israeli civilian administration” in 16-10-2012 (fig. 5.30).



Fig. 5.30: The upper part of the document issued by “Israeli Civilian Administration” in which was declared that a local committee will discuss the destruction of building in a court session



Fig. 5.31: The elementary school in A'rab ar Ramadin al Janubi. Source: Halawani, June, 2013

5.5 The landscape of Control

- **Territorial Control**

The territorial control of Qalqiliya region is premised on a continuous process of control that started by establishing colonies. One aspect that keeps the territorial colonization intact is the continuous confiscation of land as well as the construction of the wall. Private lands belonging to individual or group of people are encircled by the wall. This means that people of Palestine are being relentlessly confined into smaller and smaller areas. It is possible to say that Qalqiliya district has never faced such territorial control as in the context of the wall; no construction is allowed within a distance of 300 meters of the wall (Dolphin, 2006, 40).

The transportation planning is also linked to the territorial control, engaging in separation and division; there are roads only for the use of the Jewish settlers and others for the use Palestinians. Moreover, space of movement is also divided into three dimensions. As an example, for Palestinians

who want to go to Habla village from Qalqiliya city, they must travel through a tunnel under a bridge which is exclusively for the use of Jewish settlers (fig. 5.32).



Fig. 5.32: The road is divided into two parts; the tunnel is for the use of Palestinians and the bridge is only used by Jewish Settlers. Source: Halawani, May, 2013

- **Time control**

Control over time is a core issue to be considered as part of the control system in the Qalqiliya district. This type of control makes a new system of work for the whole residents especially for farmers, due to the fact that the time is in the hands of “Israeli soldiers”. After the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991/ the aggressive attack against Iraq, checkpoints were erected between Palestinians cities in order to control people movement; additionally partial curfews were imposed on people at the beginning of the attack. Policies of restriction have been intensified by the establishment of the wall. People times are totally under control by a permit regime.

Control over time in the West Bank began to take shape obviously after the establishment of the wall. Since policies of restrictions were placed on the movement (between people and their private land), controlling time of people by creating a permit system and time schedules of gates. Many checkpoints were established in which the procedures of inspections and registrations are similar to airports inspection system. Qalandiya checkpoint (located to north of Jerusalem) is a clear example, and El Yaho checkpoint (which connects Qalqiliya city with Bedouins communities in Qalqiliya district) is another example.

The Permit system has become the main domain through which farmers are forced to deal with to be able to reach their private lands behind the wall. The permits are issued for small number of person with a limited time (usually from three months to one year). To have a new permit, new application should be applied before the work permit expires. In some cases, the renew process to having a new permit takes months, leaving expired permit holder in the context of continuous uncertainty.

Usually, permit holders are in doubt; how long can stay without a new permit, and even if they will succeed to have a new one or not. For example, in the interview with Ali (farmer from Qalqiliya city), he mentioned that he had not been given a permit for three successive years, and then a permit was issued for six months. After expiry of the second permit, he had waited three months to have another one. It is clear that the permit system is such a domain that controls time, behavior, and activities of farmers. In the context of uncertainty, at any moment the military commander could cease issuing work permits and totally cripples the access to lands behind the wall.

Farmers have to travel more distance than previous. Some farmers point out that before the wall daily journey to farming land took fifteen minutes. After the wall, however, daily journey takes more than hour; they must wait longtime to pass through the gate. Many of them emphasize that they are inspected while passing through gates (body inspection as well as checking of documents)⁵², and tractors' cargo (fertilizers and seedlings) are under inspection also. "Israeli soldiers" ask them to empty their tractors' cargo in order to look into a cart for inspection. Moreover, some of them are not given a vehicle permit and consequently they waste their time depending on primitive means of transportation (horses, donkeys ... etc.).

Farmers were not allowed to stay as long as they want in their farming lands. When they have a permit, their lengths of stay are under control. All of agricultural gates are controlled by a time schedule. There are three periods of time to allow farmers to pass through gates; one hour in the morning to allow farmer to go to work, one hour in the mid of a day, and one hour in the evening to let farmers return to their houses after the work. Many farmers emphasized, during the group meeting held in the municipality of Qalqiliya in August, 2013, that in summer time, one of the best period to work is after five o'clock (when the weather is fair). However, the time work is no longer flexible because the gates system, already described.

The problem of uncertainty is disturbing for farmers. The critical period in which permit may not be issued is the harvest time when fruits must be picked from trees. If this occurs they

⁵² During inspection, sometimes farmers are asked to remove shirts and Jackets.

will lose all their seasonal investment of time, energy, and money. Thereby, their economic life is not secure any more.

- **Procedural control**

In ‘Area c’, planning power is in the hand of the higher planning council (HPC) which is part of “Israeli civilian administration”. The members of the higher planning council (HPC) are appointed by the military commander. There are two separate planning systems, one for Jewish colonies and another for Palestinian communities. British regional plans (prepared in 1940^s) are still in force and used to issue building permits in ‘Area C’ for Palestinian communities. The British plan allows a very low building density; according to the Plan S/15 the maximum building area on a lot of land (for residential use) is 180 square meters, while the plans RJ/4 and R/6 permit less area compared with the plan S/15 (only 150 square meters) (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 79). Even though the “Israeli civilian administration” allows Palestinians to apply in order to get building permits, and even though it has prepared plans for most of their communities, the process of obtaining a permit is a complex one and the process of preparing and approving an outline plan takes a long time (Coon, 1992).

Obtaining building permit is a complicated issue facing Palestinians who live in ‘Area c’. The procedures include land survey, proving the ownership of land, and having approvals from various departments (survey, antiquities, and absentees departments). Despite, people of Palestine own the land, but the occupying power make this step (proof of ownership) very complex, because of most of the lands in the West Bank are registered in the property tax records and not in the Lands Registrar. The registration appears under the name of the original owners (dating back to Jordanian era)⁵³ (Shalev, Cohen-Lifshitz, 2008, 82).

In most of cases, the names of heirs have not written as owners in property tax and the procedure to prove ownership requires them to make a surveyed map of land with a signature of all heirs. Without all heirs’ signatures, the “Israeli civilian Administration” refuses to issue building permits considering that a partial ownership of lands.

The absence of any development plans for some Palestinians communities is another way in which procedural control is secured. For example, there are no plans prepared for some communities in Qalqiliya district (especially Bedouin communities). Therefore, the absences of master plans are the main obstacle for their future development, causing many spatial problems in different dimensions; housing, transportation, and public services and so on.

⁵³ Jordanian government began a process of registering land in the West bank in Lands Registrar, but because of the War in 1967 this was stopped process and the process had registered only about 38% of the lands (Coon, 1992, 114). Then in 1968, the military order number 291 suspended the process of land registration initiated by Jordanian Government (ibid, 115).

Bedouin communities are prevented from the right of building new houses; even extensions to the existing one are also prevented. For example, A'rab Abu Farda is a Bedouin tribe arrived to the Qalqiliya district in the year 1948 as Palestinian refugees, after that they bought the land on which they live. After 1967, discriminatory regulations imposed by the occupying power prevented them to develop their community (establishing roads and building houses), on paradoxically, in a short time (less than ten years) Alfe Menashe colony which was established in 1989, became a town where there are gardens, paved streets and public swimming pools. Moreover, successive master plans had been prepared, strengthening the existence of settlers and providing other public services such as (zoo and commercial centers).

The provision of housing for settlers in the West Bank, in comparison with Palestinians, is not an individual issue; it has been entirely managed by the "Israeli ministry of housing". The so-called "state lands" (which originally confiscated from the people of Palestine) have been devoted for building colonies while Palestinians were deprived to take any benefit from land classified as a "state land". There is no gainsaying the fact that settlers have no obstacles to own a house. There are extensive efforts of "Israeli ministry of housing" to facilitate establishing colonies on "state lands" by offering lands to cooperative association contractor & developers) at reduced prices to building houses exclusively for Jews. While the provision of housing for Palestinians who live in 'area c' depends, to the large extent, on private sector and people face complicated process to build a house, as already explained.

Another type of the procedural control is the permit regime. The only way for farmers to have access to their agricultural lands (which are located behind the wall) is to apply to have a permit. Nevertheless, farmers that had been interviewed emphasized that in some cases it is not easy to obtain a permit, as Fayaz Saleem, a farmer from Jayyous village and also former mayor of Jayyous village council between the years 1999 – 2005, emphasized that obtaining a permit is a complex process; there are numerous conditions to meet and many hardships to face. The procedures start by preparing ownership documents of a land then to be submitted for "Israeli Civilian Administration" in order to be checked. The point is that despite farmers inherited their farms from their fathers and grandfathers many lands are not registered in the land registrar. In this sense, the major difficulty is to have ownership documents of land. He added that many of applications were refused by in the name of "security" even that most of those people who were refused a permit have never been accused by the occupying authority.

5.7 Citizens Against the Wall (Rebel Villages)

The elements of control extensively implanted in the landscape of Palestine, leading to a wide spread of feeling of oppression among people of Palestine. In the group meeting recorded in July 2013, farmers expressed anger and the feeling of injustice in the face of territorial colonization. They complain about the hardship of their life, and the cruelty and maltreatment while they pass through gates to reach their lands. Since its construction, the separation wall which has separated farmers from their agricultural lands has triggered various waves of protests among villagers who oppose the construction of the wall, and they have been struggling against dispossession, fragmentation, and confiscation producing a ‘lived space’ (in Lefebvre’s terminology) or a space of struggle.

The struggle against elements of control (specifically the wall) has developed from an idea of complaints about the wall to state of social actions including demonstrations, making economic sanction of colonies products, and searching for international support which is embedded into grouping international volunteers against the wall and occupation. Since the establishment of the wall, many international activists have come to the West Bank especially to those places where the wall is under construction, in order to stand in solidarity with those people who have been oppressed. (Hopper, 2007, 58) who was one of international anti-wall activist mentioned that their main task is to report violation of human rights and support acts demonstration against the wall.

The People have protested to break the modality of control imposed upon their lands and to raise their own voices against the wall (fig. 5.33). The protest started in Jayyous village where 75% of its land has been separated by the wall. At the beginning, demonstrations took place every day, after that every week. They started by a small number of villagers from Jayyous, then more people went to the streets, and other people from other villages joined them.

The idea of protest spread quickly among the Palestinians (specifically farmers who live in threatened villages). During demonstrations protesters hold signs, and shout against the wall and occupation. Sharif Omar (a leader of the Local Land Defense Committee) and one of the main organizers of demonstration against the wall in Jayyous village mentions that protesters in some places constructed tents on the land threatened by confiscation. He added “we are resisting the wall by continuing farming and planting trees alongside protesting”.

The Organizers of demonstration used to urge people to participate by printing posters against the wall, reminding villagers about the destructive effect of the wall. The organizers used to call people by microphones to meet at a central public place in the village and then to go in groups to protest in front of gates. One of the organizers would make a speech to raise the morale of marchers. After that protesters would march towards the site of construction of the wall, standing and shouting near

“Israeli bulldozers” and soldiers. In many cases, the demonstrators were attacked by tear-gas, and noise bombs, and bullets (rubber and metal) (fig.5.34). Sometimes “Israeli soldiers” imposed curfews on the rebel villages and arrested protesters.

The ongoing protest has aimed to raise voices against oppression. Accordingly, it can be said that Palestinians (specifically farmers) are trying to play a role in change by many tactics; demonstrations, and trying to create a public opinion supporting their rights in the space, and asking civil organizations and institutions to make an action. What Palestinians aim by these tactics? They try to diffuse the only single power (the occupying power) that engaged in producing their landscape, embedding other minor powers to be involved in producing the landscape and in reducing the mechanism of control over them. It is worth to note that demonstrations aim just to raise voices against the oppression and the only way to get rid of oppression is the liberation of the whole Palestine.



Fig. 5.33: Protesters were marching towards the site of wall construction. Source: Jayyous Village Council



Fig. 5.34: Protesters were attacked by tear gas. Source: Jayyous Village Council

5.8 Conclusion

The ongoing transformation of the landscape in the West Bank is the result of the colonial process that began since the establishment of the Zionist colonies in Palestine as a result of British colonization. However, various methods have been used to deprive Palestinian farmers from their lands. In 1948, farmers were forcibly expelled from the land occupied in 1948, and at the present time their lands are confiscated in the name of the law which is used as a pretext of territorial colonization.

Planning is supposed to achieve prosperity and progress in communities. Planning theories address various types of planning for the aim of fair development. However, in the case of occupied Palestine planning is used as a weapon for the aim of control. Planning plays double standards; on one hand it is deployed for promoting progress and consolidating the existence of settlers, on the other hand it is used as a tool of territorial colonization. Laws and spatial knowledge are not to order things or facilitate the life of people of Palestine, but they are methods and ease the judaizing process.

The ongoing fragmentation of the landscape of Palestine including the West Bank (as a result of colonies, bypass roads, the separation wall ... etc.) is going in parallel with different narratives to justify the attempt of fragmentation. For example, when the wall is mentioned by "Israeli politicians" they deploy "security" as a pretext of confiscation and injustice, while ignoring the mention of robbery of lands, or of the housing demolition, or of trees uprooting, or of the lands confiscation, or of

the Palestinians dispossession, or of the isolation of tens of ground water wells, or of the prevention of access to private lands.

This chapter is an attempt to examine the consequences of using planning as a control tool which plays a clear role in stretching the meaning of landscape from a natural scene people interact with, to the meaning of domination and exploitation. In this context, there are two images in conflict with each other; they are struggling between two identities and two cultures: the culture of occupation and the culture of resistance. Villagers as explained try to resist the hegemonic image imposed by the occupying power, attempting to be minor power and to raise their voices against oppressor.

Clearly, the land according to the people of Palestine is deeply rooted and intertwined with the faith. The land plays a major role in Palestinian rural life; it is not just source of income, but it is also part of their culture. This fact reveals that the wall is not just the matter of denying accessibility of farmers to their lands, but it harshly changed the way of life of people. However, farmers show steadfastness and adherent to the land.

Chapter 6

Conceptualizing the Landscape as an Exercise of Unfair Power

Chapter 6: Conceptualizing the Landscape as an Exercise of Unfair Power

The aim of this chapter is to construct a model, based on the theoretical and the practical analysis, already illustrated in the previous chapters. Through the suggested model, the process and mechanism of landscape manipulation can be understood. Despite the context of Palestine is the context of colonization, where foreign colonial powers who decided about the geographic order of the region, but in other contexts (especially in conflict zones) this framework may be helpful.

This chapter highlights three main points; firstly it re-conceptualizes the notion of exception and its relation with the landscape? This part aims to unveil the mechanism through which the landscape has been transformed and manipulated in the case of the West Bank (in occupied Palestine). The first part is undoubtedly vital to address how Palestinian planners cope with the context of the landscape of exception where people live in closed spaces and separated from their lands. Secondly, this chapter highlights the way in which oppressed villagers seek to make what I call ‘space of steadfastness’ as a counter action of territorial colonization. Finally, challenges and role of planning in the context of exception will be examined. This part answers a main question, in the context of exception is there ‘a planning failure’?

6.1 The Production of the Landscape of Exception

This section answers a central question: what does the landscape of exception mean? Another question will be examined: what is the relation between planning laws and the production and reproduction of the landscape in Palestine?

The planners who work with the occupation entity practice their own political ideology, considering planning as an un-substitutable opportunity to achieve control over land and people of Palestine. In the case of Palestine, this is clearly manifested where planning is exploited to the utmost limit to keep the occupying power superior and control over people of Palestine. Consequently, landscape has been constantly transformed and changed, as it turns out, up to a complete change of its indigenous image. Today, the landscape is saturated with elements of control (colonies, walls, and bypass roads), losing its liveability and geographical continuity.

The landscape of exception is a material scene as well as non-material narratives which have been reproduced for the purpose of the territorial and mental colonization. It is a real object, but it is also a process through which the landscape is transformed to play a role of an exercise of unfair power over its users. In our case, the landscape has been restructured by creating domains and frameworks in which people (mental) and space (physical) are controlled by a machinery of fabricated and order (such as laws and courts) imposed by the occupation.

This chapter shows the employment of the context of exceptionalism for the desire of continuous control and subjection on Palestinians. The landscape of exception produced and reproduced by a misrepresentative “system of law” which is fabricated to normalize and “legitimize” the exception. ‘Landscape of exception’, as this study highlights, is produced through three inter-connected processes: firstly, destruction of the indigenous landscape; Secondly, manipulation of laws (especially inherited laws); thirdly, enforcing the executive power (military orders) and fourthly, constructing elements of control for the purpose of exercising unfair power.

- **Destruction (urbicide) of the indigenous landscape**

Scattered stones and few crumbled houses are what remained in most of the sites of the Palestinian villages that were demolished in the year 1948. Urbicide did not skip also part of cities such as *Alquds* (Jerusalem) and *Yafa* (Jafa). The obliteration trials of Muslims culture had been intensified by converting ancient mosques to restaurants in some cases, while in other cases they have been put to use as bars, night clubs, and art galleries. For example, the mosques of Majdal and Qisarya were turned to restaurants, and the mosque of Al-Naqab into shop. The Ayn Hawd mosque is used as a bar (Pappe, 2006, 219). The village of Deir Yassin has been used as a mental hospital. This transformation was driven for the desire to wipe out people of Palestine history and culture and replace it with fabricated version.

Some sites of destroyed villages are changed to parks planted with unoriginal pine trees which were used to chance the original character of the landscape as Pappe’ (2006, 272) described the change of the landscape of Palestine (specifically the occupied 1948lands) “pine trees were planted not only over bulldozed houses, but also over fields and olive groves”. It is worth to note that green zones are not escaped from being destroyed; some of preserved lands protected for environmental considerations were devastated, and then within few years were exploited to build Jewish colonies. This situation is clear in the case of Abu-Ghnaim Mountain (see 4.9.2). In addition, large areas of agricultural lands have been neglected due to farmers’ inaccessibility to them. Indeed, the indigenous landscape is no longer there.

Landscape, as examined, represents culture, values, and memories. The practice of urbicide in Palestine, specifically to the villages in the land 1948 has aimed to abolish roots and memories. As

described in (section 1.2) that enormous number of villagers had their villages destroyed. After that, the landscape was restructured by creating a new order, new appearance, and new spatial structure which deny and obliterate the indigenous landscape.

Urbicide had been going in parallel with the process of making new colonial culture. The process of renaming the landscape features is part of this culture. And hebronization is a major approach behind this process through which Arabic names of places such as valleys, villages, cities have been abolished and given Hebrew names. A committee was established by David Ben Gurion on 7th of July 1949 for the purpose of hebracization of Palestine (Benvenisti, 2002, Al-Shaikh, 2010). Therefore, maps were used as an intellectual weapon to make “new culture” and new narrative of the landscape, serving to naturalize the “colonial culture”. According to Benvenisti (2002, 14): “the creation of Hebrew map was an extremely powerful means of doing so, no less important than the building of roads or the founding of settlements. It was, of course, also easier, quicker, and cheaper”. Clearly, drawing a Hebrew map of Palestine was used to obliterate the history and create facts on the ground in which Arab names of places were abolished.

- **Manipulation of inherited laws**

The occupying power manipulated and misrepresented the Islamic Ottoman Law which in its original form aimed to give opportunities for individuals to cultivate uncultivated lands. In other words, the Islamic laws concerning agriculture encourage the process of reclamation of unused lands in Palestine, and that laws were applied before in Palestine before the British occupation in 1917 (Amiry, Rahhal, 2003, 21). The Islamic law was changed and manipulated by the occupation entity as it was examined in section (4.7.1), for the purpose of making new system of laws which aims to confiscate lands.

Consequently, confiscation of lands from Palestinians' farmers was done based on the manipulated laws. In this sense, many confiscated lands were classified as a “state land”, which have been devoted for the benefit of Jewish settlers. It is worth to mention that, hundreds of thousands of dunams of “state land” have been allocated to building colonies under the responsibility of the World Zionist Organization. Therefore, thousands of housing units for Jews have been built on these lands (B’Tselem, 2011, 5). This strategy of manipulation served into shifting the aim of land laws from enlarging and developing agricultural lands into declining and vanishing the agrarian landscape of Palestine.

- **Manipulation of planning**

Agamben (2005) specifies that ‘an emptiness of law’ is a major feature of the context of exception in which executive power dominates other branches of authorities. In this sense, norms are deactivated.

Clearly, planning has been manipulated in many cases in the West Bank; “Israeli planners” arrested the development of Palestinians communities by deploying the discipline of planning. In most of villages’ schemes, the boundaries were drawn close to build up areas, limiting horizontal expansion of residential zones. What is also significant to emphasize is the way in which planning is twisted for the desire of territorial colonization. For example, the same agricultural zones in British regional plans have been employed in two contradictory approaches. On one hand, it is used to prevent expansion of Palestinians villages; on the other hand it is used as reserve lands for colonies. Most of colonies were established on lands classified as agricultural lands (according to British regional plans). The aforementioned process of manipulation crystallizes clearly Agamben's viewpoint of the role of power in circumventing laws in order to create the context of exception.

Accordingly, the planning policies are not based on reform basis and real planning considerations. Instead, the policies are based on discriminative considerations in order to serve the occupiers, and to create a landscape of domination and fragmentation. Through this mechanism of discrimination, planning becomes a repression tool despite that planning is a field of study structured around progress and reform issues.

- **Issuing military orders**

Obviously, planning decisions have taken the shape of executive actions. This is one of the features of the state of exception, as Agamben (2005, 18) describes the state of exception by writing: "the executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power". Thus, planning regulations which never existed before were issued suddenly by military order mechanism, ensuring full control of space and the whole planning structure. As shown, in the West Bank, military order number 418 concentrated and centralized the power of planning into one body (High Planning Commission), which was headed by the “Israeli military commander”. Hence, planning decisions such as preparing master plans have to pass to the “military commander” in order to be approved. The military commander of the West Bank has a wide range of authority. Immediately, after the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, a military proclamation was issued, stating that "every governmental, legislative, appointive and administrative power in respect of the region or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me alone and shall only be exercised by me or by persons appointed by me for that purpose or acting on my behalf" (Benvenisti, 1984: 37).

- **Implanting elements of control for the purpose of exercising unfair power**

The apartheid wall separates Palestinian villages from their farming lands. The wall (as chapter five details) has separated farmers from their private lands, subjecting them to a situation where access to their farms depends on permit regime and gates. This system determines who can go to work and how long might stay, influencing (negatively) the agricultural activity.

Accordingly, many lands have been neglected and some of them confiscated based on the manipulated laws. It is worth mentioning that, many trees especially olive trees were uprooted during the construction of the wall. A report of United Nations published in March, 2005 pointed out that on 9 December 2004, “Israeli” bulldozers uprooted 117 olive trees on Jayyous land, west of the wall.

Cities and villages where Palestinians live have been transformed into cantons under restricted rules. As illustrated in the analysis of the case study (Qalqiliya district), the wall encircles Qalqiliya city from three sides and separated it from surroundings, producing what is called ‘seam zone’ where the life of Palestinian Bedouins has been severely affected in terms of socio-economic, health, education services ... etc. These new principles are similar to the plague and leprosy principles explored by Foucault, confining people into cantons and determining their activities, controlling their behaviours with restricted rules. The apartheid wall functions as a physical tool for subjecting people and controlling people’s time and space; it determines when and how they move where they should go and where they should not. These principles, as a ‘mechanism of disciplinary’, become a superior power, forcing Palestinians either to obey or to be punished.

- **Producing Urban and Regional Prisons**

There are multi-levels of unfair confinement mechanism in occupied Palestine, because the matter of occupation is not limited to the control over a geographical area, but it is also the matter of producing zones of urban and regional prisons, where Palestinians have been categorized into different categories such as those who live behind “the green line” (who live in 1948 areas) and those who are not (who live in 1967 areas), those who live behind the apartheid wall and those who are not, those who are Jerusalemite and those who are not. Since building the apartheid wall in 2002, many regions have been divided into enclaves and enclosures.

When Palestinians move between mentioned zones⁵⁴, they are forced to move through checkpoints and gates. While they move between cities and between villages, “Israeli soldiers” may register all information related to them; their names and purpose of visit. That policy integrates their life (work and movement, and so on) into a domain of control to the degree that the colonial feeling is subject to the daily life for them.

Villages and cities have been confined and villagers are asked to seek a permit if they want to go and work in their farming lands. It is impossible for villagers to reach their lands that are located behind the wall without permission. In this sense, villages are run like prisons, its inhabitants placed under

⁵⁴ It is worth to mention that not all people are able to move from one zone to another for example Palestinians who live in Gaza cannot go to the West Bank and vice versa.

restricted rules of movement, and under supervision and surveillance of soldiers when they work in farming lands.

Accordingly, Palestinian's life is reduced to *bare life*; body scanner, and inspection of identity become a permanent mechanism that they face daily. As it was described by Abu-Zahra (2009), Israeli-issued ID cards for Palestinians are colour-coded, signifying the geographic zone to which each person is confined. Then, different degrees of unfair power exercising over them have been implemented in relation to these codes.

These strategies are deployed to make "disciplinary society", according to Foucault power aims to control behaviors of people through what he called disciplinary power (see section 2.2). In the case of Palestine, the disciplinary mechanisms of occupation consist of surveillance system. Therefore, the landscape is saturated with surveillance devices; cameras, observer towers ... etc. The apartheid wall plays also a role of surveillance because it is full of watching towers which have small windows through which "Israeli soldiers" can see people, while people do not able to see soldiers who might or might not be inside the watchtowers. This mechanism is exactly similar to the Panopticon mechanism (see 2.2).

The apartheid wall divides the geography of the West Bank into cantons, making closed zones, and separating villages and towns from each other. In the case of Qalqiliya, people find themselves forced to travel long distances more than previous to other surrounding villages due to travel difficulties produced by the wall. In addition to that (as examined in the case study analysis), people found themselves isolated in a closed area called 'Seam Zone'. Therefore, people have been cut off from regional services due to the existence of gates and checkpoints.

This mechanism (mechanism of division) is not just a physical division, but it is also a social isolation and social separation. It is similar to the Panopticon mechanism in which prisoners cannot contact each other as Foucault wrote "each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions" (Foucault, 1977, 200).

As a result there are two spaces; the space of colonizer which is separated from the space of people who have been colonized. The ways of the two spaces function are totally different: the space where colonized people live takes the form of cantons and fragmentation, losing its norms and continuity, while the space where colonizers live hegemonies landscape. This situation resembles what Foucault (1984) refers to as 'heterotopia', where norms are abolished and suspended in the space.

- **Militarization of the landscape**

The concept of surveillance and fortification are leading concepts of spatial distribution of colonies. Top of mountains were transformed to fortified Jewish colonies surrounded with fences and surveillance cameras, having buffer zones which are considered danger zones for Palestinian farmers who will be in danger when they go to their lands inside these zones. What is important to note that top of the mountains have been also transformed into surveillance points, reminding us of the panoptic principle explored by Foucault; through the panoptic principle observers carry out a full surveillance over others continuously.

In this sense, “security” is used as a pretext to reshape the landscape. According to Sharon plan (see 4.6.1.1), colonies were proposed in the form of network, arguing that the liner from of colonies would not provide a suitable “defense”. In addition, large area of lands in the Jordan valley was usurped by the occupation to establish military closed zones.

- **The double standard of green zones**

On one hand, green zone is a method used in the West Bank to obstruct and prevent Palestinian spatial development, on the other hand is used as a land reserve for colonial purposes (especially for constructing colonies). In fact, most of the areas in the West Bank that surround Palestinians communities have been classified as agricultural lands (according to British plans) where spatial development is prevented and no construction is allowed. Indeed, most of building permit applications have been refused by the occupying power. At the same time on the same land that classified as agricultural zone, Jewish colonies were constructed or expanded.

In this sense, a green zone is a double standard tool, consisting of two contradictory approaches: progressive mechanism regarding colonies, serving the current and future rapacity of the Jewish settlers; and regressive approach which hinders the current and the future development of the Palestinian residents. Landscape planning (in the case of Palestine), therefore, is a discriminatory tool used for the desire of occupiers.

6.1.1 Absence of Master Plans

Agamben’s theory – the state of exception theory– describes those contexts where the deactivation of norms do occur, having as result the production and reproduction of spatial areas as zones which are characterized by a void of law (see section 5.4.6). This condition is found in the so-called “seam zone” where the emptiness of law is very clear by the absence of any outline plan concerning Palestinians communities.

Indeed people are not allowed to build any building and even paving roads. In an interview recorded in August 2013, Ashraf (the spokesman of A'rab ar Ramadin al Janubi) said: “we have been prevented by Israeli soldiers from paving the main street of our community by a base course”. Intentionally, there are no planning laws in which people can deal with to have a building permission. In other words they are unrecognized communities in term of planning; no master plans, and no building permits to be issued.

According to what has been mentioned, the emptiness of law, which is clear by the absence of any outline plan concerning Palestinians communities located in the “seam zone” in Qalqiliya district, cripples the use of planning. Clearly, planning is used when it benefits the occupiers as in the case of determining the route of the apartheid wall to ensure future expansion of the colonies, while it is deactivated in the case of Palestinians communities for the purpose of making their life intolerable. In this sense planning has been used to limiting and hindering Palestinian community development, leaving them with shrinking spaces. This reflects the Agamben's theory about the model of exception in which there is no law and norms are deactivated.

6.1.2 Attempts of “legalization” and “Legitimization” of the landscape of Exception

What happened to colonise Palestine unveil the deceiving role of occupying power in the formation and enactment of control, subjection and discrimination. Domains and frameworks were constructed to “legalize” the reordering and reproduction of its landscape. The process of making laws since the occupation of the first part of Palestine in 1948 reveals that “the legal structure” has been institutionalized for the purpose territorial colonization. The absentees' property law which was enacted in 1958 by the “Keenest” is a clear example. According to Forman and Kedar (2003, 809) “the Israeli authorities gradually but rapidly created legal structures to seize, retain, expropriate, reallocate, and reclassify the Arab lands appropriated by the state”. Therefore, clearly the use of this law was to “legalize” the confiscation lands of Palestinians who were expelled outside Palestine.

After the occupation of the West Bank, new method of “legalization” has been adopted to confiscate lands. The construction of new “system of law” took the form of selective and amendment manner of inherited laws. Thus, “a new juridical structure” emerged, consisting of manipulated inherited laws and new laws of occupation to facilitate territorial, socio-economic, and cultural control. For example, and as mentioned in section (4.7.3) Jordanian law was amended to centralize the planning decision in the hand of the “Israeli military commander”.

In the name of “security” Palestinian farmers have been prevented to go to their farming lands after the construction of the apartheid wall in the West Bank. Many farmers were not given permits as reported by B'Tselem in June, 2004 (see section 5.4.1). The report indicated that many applications by farmers were refused in the name of “security”. In an interview with Fayaz Saleem (the previous

mayor of Jayyous village council between the years 1999 – 2005), he emphasized that many of applications were refused by the “Israeli civilian administration”, despite that most of applicants had not been accused by the occupying authority (see section 5.5).

As a result of the wall, oppressed Palestinians who live in the influenced villages and cities made petitions to “Israeli Courts”. Nevertheless, in a very few cases the court ordered to change the route of the wall, this so-called “legal frame work” that is invented by the occupying power is used as an attempt to normalize and neutralize the existence of the wall.

One of the main attempts that have been used in the process of “legitimization” of landscape of exception is the so-called political agreements between Palestinian liberation Organization (PLO) and the occupying power specifically the so-called “Oslo Agreement” (see section 1.2) in which this “agreement” has become a turning point in which the production of knowledge by “Palestinian Ministries” is limited and tied to its terms. Therefore new terms emerged; instead of the term occupied Palestine a new term appeared which is ‘occupied Palestinian territories’ for indicting the West Bank and Gaza strip. It is an attempt to deny and veil part of the landscape of occupied Palestine.

6.1.3 The Meaninglessness of law in the Landscape of Exception

Clearly, landscape planning and landscape are inseparable from the domain of politics and struggle. Landscape of exception does not mean that there is no “system of law” shaping the landscape, but law becomes in the form of spectrum and are made for the desire of colonization. Schmitt (2005, 12) insists that "the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind".

Planning regulations, laws and outline plans are used as vehicles for sustaining oppression in the landscape. Nevertheless, the law as examined in the case study is very ambiguous and blur, having as result the production and reproduction of landscape as zones/areas which are characterized by a void of law. According to Agamben (2005) when the context of exception is produced, ‘an emptiness of law’ becomes the form of the juridical order. Then, the exception becomes a rule (Hagmann and Korf, 2012: 207). In the context of exception, the force of law transforms to a force without a law.

There are many cases in which the occupying authority abandons the law (which was issued by itself) to the advantage of its expediency and for the purpose of ensuring its full control. As an example is the case of Har Homa colony, the confiscation of the mountain was done in accordance to 'AO' law, which permits expropriation of the land for public purpose. However, all the plots of land that were confiscated under this law were for the purpose of establishing housing for Jewish settlers. Despite that the area of the mountain was classified as a natural preserved zone by “Israeli legislators” themselves, the colony was constructed. Under these circumstances the occupying authority allows its

will not just of undertaking actions out of the so-called “juridical order”, but of becoming the law itself. These practices indicate that the law could be changed suddenly, revealing the meaninglessness of law versus the occupying power.

All the discussions and examples above illustrate that the occupying power is not bound by the rule of the fabricated laws, because it becomes the law itself, allowing itself to reshape the landscape by eliminating natural preserve zones and constructing elements of dominance and control. What seems logical and coherent with the basic principles of planning and landscape, such as preserving forests and satisfying people’s needs are separated from planning decisions, therefore planning has been denied and ignored but used when necessary for control. Consequently, the landscape of exception is separated from norms, as Agamben asserts that "the state of exception separates the norm from its application in order to make its application possible" (Agamben, 2005: 36).

6.2 The Spatial Consequences of the Landscape of Exception

There is no doubt that under the pressure of colonization paradigm as illustrated, the meaning of landscape deviates from its original meaning as a delightful medium that people interact with, to a medium that is full of control, exploitation and domination. This paradigm becomes an atmosphere for domination of Jews; in which the ongoing manipulation of law limits the development and demographic growth of people who have been occupied (people of Palestine), while at the same time it strengthens the existence of colonizers. In this context, there are two images struggles with each other; they are struggling between two identities and two cultures: the culture of occupation and the culture of resistance.

Despite that the landscape is full of elements of control; it is still possible for those who are under oppression and subjection to create their own images to form a counter-hegemonic image and actions, trying to persist on their rights to the space and landscape. The persistence of that right is called steadfastness (*Summud*), because they live under unfair confinement and restriction mechanisms, and at the same time they practice farming under severe restrictions and living with what is available to them.

- **The space of steadfastness (*Summud*)**

Much of the debate about space in theories (see chapter 3) neglects the interrelation between the roles of oppressed and exploited people with the production of the space, as many conceive space in terms of beauty and enjoyment, or as a medium for representation of hegemonic and dominant powers. Consequently, this section highlights the role of oppressed villagers as one of the actors of the production of space who are engaged in space of steadfastness, countering hegemonic orders imposed by the occupation authority (what Lefebvre called a ‘lived space’).

Despite the fact that the landscape of Qalqiliya has been fragmented and segmented, and the elements of control dominate the landscape, the farmers have shown various ways to resist the fragmentation of their landscape especially after the construction of the apartheid wall. The wall has been separating agricultural lands from farmers, causing a new way of life and a wave of protests.

The intensifying elements of control in the landscape of the district has led to a wide spread of feeling of persecution among the people. The interviews and group meetings unveil these negative feelings among farmers who complain about the hardship of their life, and the cruelty and mistreatment they face when they pass through gates to reach their lands, insisting on their right of movement and of living in dignity. It had never happened before that an element of control received so much public attention as the wall, because it has been influencing directly and harshly the daily life of people and abusing their rights by separating them from their private owned lands.

Palestinians (specifically farmers) have been trying to take action regarding the change and manipulation of their landscape. They have tried to counter land confiscation and the elements of control that engaged in producing their landscape by adopting different tactics such as demonstrations, applying petitions (against confiscation of lands, and the wall), and trying to make an international public opinion that supports their rights of the space. These are reactions against the ‘conceived space’ where the occupying power reproduced it to control Palestinians.

One of actions of steadfastness that have been adopted by farmers is persistence on keep farming despite all suffering; for example Sharif Omar (a leader of the Local Land Defense Committee) mentioned in the interview that: “we are resisting the wall by continuing farming and planting trees alongside protesting”. Hence, reclamation of land by planting trees is a counter action against confiscation and uprooting trees. In this sense, farmers’ acts give the space a unique meaning. The practice of agriculture becomes act of steadfastness and a struggle against the occupation.

Palestinian farmers who have been oppressed and prevented from their right to use their private owned land as explained, practiced what Lefebvre called ‘lived space’ which is the space of inhabitants where the imagination of people seeks to change; they refused the hegemonic image imposed over their landscape and have tried to resist that to change the actual space (perceived space) where it was transformed to sustain oppression and exploitation as a result of the occupation. They have attempted to re-grasp the mental image that resembles the original image of their landscape (the landscape without the wall). The point is that the imagination of people regarding space clarifies what space should be, and plays a role as a generator to change and counter the elements of control implanted within their landscape.

Despite that the occupying power denies the indigenous narratives and trying to abolish them, in our case users of the space have been trying to play an active role in the struggle against the dominant

stories produced by the power. Farmers who were separated from their farms are still holding the image of their original landscape. As mentioned (see 5.4.3), one of farmers, who was not allowed to see his land since ten years ago, except for a few months, cried bitterly and expressed that the land symbolizes life for him. He wrote a short story, titled ‘The Sad Olive Tree’.

According to the interviews, Palestinians’ mental image is still alive, despite the fact that the ‘perceived space’ is full of features and elements that reflect the image of occupation such as colonies and the apartheid wall. For example, the farmer Hani Amer described his tragedy as a continuous process of occupation of Palestine. Hani Amer began his speech by indicating that he is a refugee and his father was expelled from Palestine in 1948, unveiling that the land was deeply entrenched in his life and memory.

6.3 The Challenges of Future Spatial Development of Palestinian Communities

As described with the support of international colonial powers and as a result of the collapse of *Al-Khilafa*, Palestine has been occupied. The year 1917, was the starting point of confiscation and usurpation of lands. New cities and agricultural villages exclusively for Jewish settlers were built, changing the face of original landscape.

With the passage of the time, the landscape of Palestine has been fragmented. In this context, the main question is; how planning can cope with the endless spatial problems caused by the occupying power? Planning theories do not answer the question, or offer clues to understand how planners cope with this situation, or offer roles and approaches that planners might adopt to solve problems.

Indeed, Palestinian planners find it difficult to prepare regional plans, because there is no sovereignty on the ground and the wall encircles many communities, cutting them off from the land reserves available for their future urban development. Additionally, the so-called Oslo agreement participates in the division of the West Bank. It is worth mentioning that uncertainty and unpredictable situations are major problems and obstacles in the face of planning.

Concerning these circumstances, regional planning cannot be employed as a tool of development. For instance, cities and villages extensions could not be proposed on ‘Area C’ as well as roads that might be proposed for regional services. Not surprise that there is no effective urban and rural development without a continuous territory. Palestinian regional planners are powerless, facing fragmented geography. Moreover, at local scale planners hardly find suitable solutions for community’s future development in terms of agriculture, housing, and public services.

Shrinkage of agricultural land is expected due to the problem of confiscation, the wall construction, and the lack of land for future housing development. Recently, planners of the new master plan of Qalqiliya city proposed to change the use of agricultural lands to residential use. Planners found the only practical solution to satisfy the needs of inhabitants (particularly the housing problem) was to change the use of agricultural land that surrounds the city to residential use. There are no vacant lands to be used for the purpose of housing extension except the agricultural lands.

Regarding the transportation from communities to surroundings, there is one entrance that connects them to a main road. This is similar to the bottle neck concept, easy to close by the occupying power. For example the wall in Qalqiliya city (the center of the region) cuts all transportation links with surroundings except two roads one links to Habala village and another link to Nablus city. In any moment, the occupying power may close entrances, making cities and villages similar to the situation of prison. For this purpose, there is a gate on each main entrance of many of Palestinian villages; therefore they can easily be transformed to a prison with no access to outside (fig. 6.1).



Fig. 6.1: Yellow steel gate is on the entrance of villages A'azuin in Qalqiliya district. Source: Halawani, June, 2013

These spatial circumstances would lead to some expected spatial problems. Namely, the prices of lands are expected to increase at high rates, because of successive restrictions of urban development in terms of local and regional scales. Secondly, existing neighborhoods might turn to such neighborhoods with bad housing qualities; high density, lack of gardens, and lack of public spaces. Thirdly, slums and informal housing could be emerged, causing social and environmental problems.

Consequently, all that would lead some people in the future to view their city as not an appropriate place to live due to the expected overcrowded, deterioration of spaces, housing shortage, and high real estate prices that would drive them to leave the city to live in suburbs.

The future planned route of the wall, according to the map below (fig. 6.2), separates and divides completely the northern part from the southern part of the region. People would travel a circuitous route to go from south to north and vice versa. The journey that requires people minutes to travel and few kilometers would require hours and tens of kilometers. This expected situation would exacerbate hardship for thousands of residents who need to travel between the two sides (north and south). This separation might lead to emerge a new regional center (spontaneously) to satisfy the needs of people who would be cut from the existing center.




Fig. 6.2: The future planned route of the wall, divides the Qalqiliya district into three completely separate cantons. Source: Halawani, 2014

The people who live in the “Seam zone” (especially Palestinian Bedouin communities) express their worries (during the interview) not only about restrictions of movement and inaccessibility to their lands, but also about expected future threats of their existence on their lands. The colonies were built very close to their houses which might cause a risk of disposition in the future. They express the fear of land robbery by the occupying power and anxiety to be expelled from their place of residence, insisting that dispossession is not an imaginary situation but it may be a real situation because Palestinian Bedouins in Jerusalem and Al-Naqab desert has been facing practical steps of expulsion and dispossession. Cook (2003) in his article titled ‘Bedouin in the Negev Face New Transfer’ mentions the way in which “Israel” controlled the Palestinian Bedouin community in the dessert of Naqab in 1950s by transferring them into places attached to towns where they work as labourers with low-wages and also by building Jewish colonies around their communities. Yiftachel (2012, 298) points out that Bedouins in Al-Naqab region faced dispossession and displacement. He notes: “The most visible and painful interaction between Bedouins and the Israeli state has been the practice of land dispossession. This has involved a denial of ancestral land rights, massive forced relocation, and persistent segmentation”.

In the case of Ma’ale Adummim colony, the area was inhabited by hundreds of Palestinians of Arab El-Jahalin Bedouins and part of the confiscated land was planted by Palestinian farmers. When “Israel” decided to build the colony, it dispossessed Palestinian farmers and uprooted the Bedouins from tents and tin buildings. Nowadays, two thousands Bedouins are threatened with eviction from the vicinity of Ma’ale Adumim, for the purpose of its expansion (B’Tselem, 2009, B’Tselem, 2013).

Chapter 7

Epilogue

Chapter 7: Epilogue

Space outlines complex set of spatial relations; therefore questions about the relation between type of regime and production of the space is central for understanding the way in which the physical space is structured. Generally speaking, across the world space is restructured for the benefits of people; political powers seek to build infrastructure to take advantage of natural resources, satisfying the needs of people. However, in the occupied Palestine, the space has been restructured to make unfair confinement and restriction mechanisms in multi-level.

In this sense, landscape is transformed from a delightful scene that people interact with to a scene that has the ability to exercise unjust power over its users. This is occurred by using planning as a control tool rather than a reform tool and by deployment of the paradigm of exception ‘emptiness of law’ in order to provide the occupying power a situation to serve its ideological perspective and desires. Accordingly, the whole meaning of landscape has been changed from the original meaning of enjoyment or development into the meaning of surveillance, repression, and punishment.

This study shifts the focus on landscape planning (which is branch of spatial knowledge) from a progressive knowledge to a destructive knowledge which has the role of subjection, exploitation and control. This thesis examined the process through which knowledge is reconfigured by examining the relations between: the occupying power, concept of exception, landscape, and planning. It answers questions concerning the way in which the occupying power can deploy spatial knowledge (which is in our case planning and landscape planning) to achieve control over the people of Palestine. The occupying power uses fabricated and misrepresentative “systems of law” as a source of “legitimacy” to deprive people of Palestine from their land and their basic rights (right of work, houses, movement ...etc.).

Clearly, according to the analysis, the occupying power did not just concentrate on controlling the land and natural resources. But, also it has been seeking to make systems of control to sustain its capture and occupation of the land of Palestine and to reproduce the indiginous landscape by strengthening the exitence of Jewish colonizers and waekning the existence and demography of indigenus Palestinians.

Mechanisms, such as categorization of people of Palestine and green land policy, have been designed to facilitate the process of confiscation, obstructing the growth and development of the Palestinian

communities. Planning is used as a progressive tool for the colonizers (facilitating the construction of colonies) and as a repressive tool for colonised. It can be said that Palestinian spatial space (cities, villages, and Bedouin communities) are frozen through deployment of the context of exception, and deployment of spatial knowledge to exercise of unfair power.

The discipline of Planning (as a branch of spatial knowledge) is used to arrest the development of Palestinian communities. For example, demarcation of the route of the wall highlights how planning is used, on one hand to promote a progress of settlers by enabling a future expansion of colonies while on the other hand it limits urban development of Palestinian communities. The apartheid wall aims to prevent Palestinians from two essential features (water and land). This patently shows what in the mind of occupying authority, concerning the existence of Palestinians as a “demographic danger”.

Despite that the narratives of the occupying power dominate other narratives; farmers in Qalqiliya constructed their own counter narratives and actions. They have been trying to persist on their rights of the space; their right to cultivate and live on their lands. They are following tactics of steadfastness until the liberation of the whole Palestine. For them, the apartheid wall besides its meaning of oppression and unfair confinement, it also fosters the meaning of steadfastness (*Summud*). These tactics have given voices to them and power to resist the manipulation of their landscape and to be an unavoidable layer in influencing the transformation of landscape.

The notion of land in Palestine as the study examined is linked and revolved around faith and struggle against the occupation. Specifically, the Islamic faith led, as described, the last Ottoman Caliphate Sultan Abd-al Hamid II to resolutely refuse to sell Palestine to Jews under any circumstance (see section 4.1). The Caliphate was the major obstacle to Jewish plans, when it was collapsed Palestine occupied by the international colonial powers. From this perspective, it is clear that planning is highly intertwined with politics and type of regime, and the way in which planning is used in Palestine proves that it has little regard for Palestinians' life, only strengthening the Jewish settlers. Consequently, the real change of the role of planning in Palestine and the end of oppression in Palestine means liberation of the whole Palestine by unification of Muslims (as they were before the so called Sykes–Picot borders).

One of steps to support farmers is to make agriculture profitable for them by providing plants, helping them in marketing process, providing practical training for young men. Of course, those recommendations neither enable the development of the agriculture sector nor reducing the exercise of unfair power. But, these steps will increase farmers' enthusiasm, endurance, and willingness to make sacrifices till the end of occupation of Palestine.

Finally, the situation of people of Palestine may go from bad to worse; continuation of land confiscation, land division, land fragmentation, and housing demolition, but the real risk is the distortion of the mental image regarding the indigenous/ original landscape. Therefore, scholars,

intellectuals and decision makers should concern seriously about the mental image which is associated with Palestine (all Palestine) as geography, landscape, and land to stay alive in the mind of future generation. Consequently, people of Palestine who are the salt of the land will continue their adherence to land –*Sumud*–.

Proposed future research – Can counter planning help in the context of landscape of exception?

The thesis examined the question (what has been done?), rather than the question (what should be done?). The thesis paves the way to other researchers who may focus on a main question: what should Palestinian planners do?. This part invites other researchers who are interested in this subject to take into consideration the following points:

- **How to develop a framework of a counter planning?**

There is a lack of planning strategies and policies concerning people who are living in enclosed and colonized spaces. Despite the fact that planning as an instrument may not be effective, it is important to find out practical steps to support people in those places and to strengthen their demography.

This theme is important in the atmosphere of land confiscation. Because, the geographical fragmentation may not stop; the future planned route of the wall as shown will encompass colonies together and at the same time separates the Palestinians' communities. What is important to note that the proposed counter planning should propose methods and ways to reduce the risk of deprivation and confiscation.

- **The importance of faith and culture.**

The land of the whole Palestine is part of the Islamic faith and Islamic culture. This land is mentioned in Al Quran. Therefore, counter planning should take into consideration the ways and methods to strengthen the Islamic culture which plays an important role in the practice of steadfastness and adherence to lands.

Appendixes

Appendix A:




Fig. a1: Palestinian Refugees expelled in the year 1948. Source: Khalidi, 1992

Appendix B: List of Interviewees

• **List of Interviewees (key persons)**

Name of interviewee	Date	Position
Dr. Jamal Amro	June, 2012	Planner & Lecturer in Birzeit University/Palestine, Department of Architecture
Dr. Ali Abdelhamid	July, 2012	Planner & Lecturer in Al-Najah University/Palestine, Department of Architecture
Mohammad Abo EL Sheikh	May, 2013	Director of health and environmental issues in Qalqiliya Governorate
Dr. Yousuf Jabareen	August, 2013	Planner & Lecturer in Haifa University
Mr. Anthony Coon	April, 2014	Planner & the author of the book “Town Planning Under Military Occupation”
Prof. Brendan Murtagh	June, 2014	Lecturer in School of Planning in Queen’s University/ Belfast, UK
Prof. Gehan Selim	June, 2014	Lecturer in Architectural Department in Queen’s University/ Belfast, UK

• **List of Interviewees (farmers)**

Twenty farmers	Between May, 2013 - September, 2013	Those who have experience of work before and after building the wall
Two group meetings with farmers from Qalqiliya district	June, 2013	Those whose lands were separated and isolated because of the wall

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