We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict, and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of communism in China.
Levine, D., Modica, S. (2016). Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models. THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 11(1), 89-131 [10.3982/TE1978].
Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
Modica, Salvatore
2016-01-01
Abstract
We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict, and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of communism in China.
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