Isomorphism and Mirror Neuron system

This paper aims to give a constructive contribution to Eagle & Wakefield's con-tention ( Gestalt Theory 29, 59-64) that the Gestaltists' hypotheses regarding isomorphism andphenomenological direct access to other's mind anticipate recent accounts of mind-readingability. I attempt to specify the extent to which Gestalt psychology might be seen to be consistentunder certain respects with mirror neurons system theory and embodied simulation theory,claimed to be founding the aforementioned ability. Therefore, empirical and theoretical issues such as the neurobiological features of the mirrorneuron system, the psychological explanation of its functions, and the features of the embodied simulation theory are briefly addressed. Further, some points about the consistence of this explanatory view with some key Gestaltist no-tions are made. It is argued that talk of off-line action planning as internal pretend-ing states might not be consonant with Koffka's attempt to explaining other's men-tal states as a special class of phenomenal qualities.