

UNIPA Springer Series

Simone Tulumello

Fear, Space and Urban Planning

A Critical Perspective
from Southern Europe



UNIVERSITÀ
DEGLI STUDI
DI PALERMO

 Springer



23

Simone Tulumello

24

Fear, Space and Urban Planning

25

26

A Critical Perspective from Southern
Europe

27

28



UNIVERSITÀ
DEGLI STUDI
DI PALERMO

29

 Springer



31 Simone Tulumello
32 Instituto de Ciências Sociais
33 Universidade de Lisboa
34 Lisbon
35 Portugal
36
37
38

39

40 ISSN 2366-7516 ISSN 2366-7524 (electronic)
42 UNIPA Springer Series
43 ISBN 978-3-319-43936-5 ISBN 978-3-319-43937-2 (eBook)
45 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43937-2
46

47 Library of Congress Control Number: XXXXXX
48

49 © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

50 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
51 of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
52 recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
53 or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
54 methodology now known or hereafter developed.

55 The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
56 publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
57 the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

58 The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
59 book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
60 authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or
61 for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

62 Printed on acid-free paper
63

64 This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
65 The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland



72

Foreword

73

74 The intention—and the value—of this book is to foreground the more opaque
75 instances of fear in the urban dimension, opaque, i.e. from a mainstream or media
76 perspective, the instances which do not make the news or are taken for granted as
77 part of the routine of public debates. In order to do so, the author adopts a critical
78 perspective on fear and urban planning, raising significant issues and questions
79 about a wider range of theoretical implications and drawing on his research and his
80 experience of living in Southern Europe.

81 Given the context-based research field and the places in which he lives and has
82 lived, the author experienced difficulties in applying normative principles that are
83 nurtured by promises on behalf of deliberative democracy. These principles are
84 somehow inappropriate for those contexts that are in some ways ‘extreme’¹ but not
85 irrelevant, and those which are exposed, for example, to violence and to hidden and
86 illegal abuse, as is the case with organised crime. The contents of the book and its
87 reflections uncover further, and broader, issues in the field of planning theory. It is
88 worth highlighting that, according to the author, the cases should be considered
89 ‘explicit’ more than ‘extreme’ (see, for instance, the conclusions in Chap. 3). This,
90 it will become evident, is the point at which the perspectives of this foreword and
91 of the book are partially divergent. In a nutshell, the goal of this foreword is to
92 make use of a slightly different perspective as a way of complementing and fur-
93 thering the discussion of the issues of planning theory explored in this book.

94 The ‘denied citizenship’ represents the *fil rouge* of the book and still remains an
95 open question. If we assume the notion of citizenship as the theoretical and political
96 sphere where the inclusive or conflictual relations between ‘different’ subjects are
97 defined (Bobbio 1990), the contents of this book can be read in the light of the
98 relation between inclusive and exclusive forms of citizenship, and the recognition
99 of these forms in urban planning. According to Zolo (1994, 4), the notion of
100 citizenship puts into perspective individual subjective rights and pre-judicial

¹Here the expression ‘extreme contexts’ refers to conditions in which organised crime, corruption and ‘disorder’ (as a result of ‘conflicting orders’) are structurally concentrated.



101 reasons and conditions for political inclusion or exclusion. Consequently, the notion
102 of ‘substantial’ citizenship can be considered an indicator of the functional level of
103 democratic institutions in providing fair and equal access to public life and activ-
104 ities, including the urban ones (Zolo 1994, 4). In other words, to analyse democratic
105 institutions and their activities, planning included, under the perspective of sub-
106 stantial citizenship allows us to measure and evaluate the level of democracy of
107 political systems *ex parte populi*, as it adopts a double perspective: the entitlement
108 of rights and the endowment of rights (Barbalet 1988).

109 Contrary to that which Healey (2012: 34) properly highlights about the benefits
110 of strong local governance institutions in developing interactive, inclusive
111 approaches to rethinking the relations between the civil society and the state, the
112 contexts we are referring to differ in two main aspects: (a) the weakness of local
113 institutions; (b) the interference, and in some cases predominance, of ‘third
114 parties’—and not just organised crime, but also family and/or religion, or a mix of
115 all three!—in the relations between civil society and the state. In fact there are some
116 orders, processes and actions that are beyond or out of the state’s control. Most
117 policy and planning analyses consider the state area of intervention, underesti-
118 mating the role of other institutions, such as family, religion or illegal crime
119 organisations.

120 The effects on planning as well as on urban dynamics are significant: in areas
121 where there is a strong presence of organised crime, their powers are capable of
122 bending local governments to support real estate investments, encouraging phe-
123 nomena like unauthorised building, corruption and political patronage. The most
124 insidious causes of these phenomena reside in the ability to:

- 125 • defend, reconcile and promote particular private interests, deliberately jeopar-
126 dising the public ones; and
- 127 • de-legitimise the public administration, the politicians and professionals, by
128 hook—corruption—or by crook—violence/intimidation—or guaranteeing a
129 general condition of inertia/inaction/inefficiency/mistrust (De Leo 2011, 2013).

130 The rhetoric of fear is one of the instruments being used to enhance mistrust as
131 well as to influence public opinion. As a consequence, the right to the city is
132 ignored or neglected. From Lefebvre (1968) to Mitchell (2003), many scholars (see
133 Friedmann 1992, 1999; Harvey 2000, 2003; Purcell 2003) have discussed how the
134 right to the city must be defended if we want to live in a diverse, just society, as the
135 very idea of citizenship rights is fundamental to protecting the ideals of liberal
136 democracy. Consequently, citizenship is the theoretical and political sphere where
137 conflicting relations between different subjects are defined. Whatever the explicit or
138 implicit aims of any planning decision—whether favouring functional, economic or
139 aesthetic reasons—every planning initiative contributes to a redefinition of the
140 boundaries of citizenship, consequently shaping spatial or non-spatial forms of
141 social control (Lefebvre 1974; Yiftachel 1998; Hillier 2002). This continuous
142 process of redefinition by means of planning initiatives and decisions may occur
143 directly or indirectly, with intentional or unexpected effects, either wittingly (often)
144 or unwittingly (rarely). A redefinition of the boundaries of citizenship, in other



145 words, the rights to use the city, will always exist as an effect of the redistribution of
146 resources derived from planning decisions, whether or not it is a matter of
147 economies, spaces or rights.

148 The possible ‘extensive’ or ‘restrictive’ interpretations of the concept of citi-
149 zenship—as they are described by Kymlicka (1995) and Held (1989)—have some
150 relevant consequences, because they show, theoretically and practically, what citi-
151 zenship may include or exclude (Lo Piccolo 2010). The recognition of the dif-
152 ferences and the guarantee of an effective equity both imply a reconsideration of the
153 idea of citizenship. Nowadays, the characteristics of citizenship status, both legal
154 and political, prevail due to a paradox in history and a process of involution.² If
155 compared with the political civil struggles and juridical recognition of the 1970s,
156 democratic rights and justice claims are much more threatened by neo-liberal
157 capitalist globalisation and its effects upon the development and planning of cities
158 (Routledge 2010). In other words, the recognition of citizenship by institutions has
159 recently ignored most of the capacity or, indeed, the potential willingness to
160 encounter and engage with differences.

161 While a static concept of citizenship, considered as a guarantee of the acquired
162 rights, is widely prevalent, a dynamic concept of citizenship, considered as an
163 activity and a political practice where recognition, defence and plural articulation
164 of the rights are taken into consideration (Kymlicka 1995), is rarely promoted.
165 Citizenship as a status thus creates new geographies, distinguishing between centres
166 and peripheries of the right holders (Roche 1992); and in this way juridical
167 inclusion/exclusion has repercussions for spatial inclusion/exclusion.

168 Healey and Gilroy (1990) highlight, as one of the critical ingredients of
169 people-sensitive planning, the importance of an ethical consciousness, but how to
170 nurture and defend such consciousness still remains an open question. In the
171 Habermasian theoretical framework to which they refer, rationality and ethics rely
172 on accuracy, integrity, accountability of and sincerity in what participants say
173 during communicatively rational discussions, and on a planner’s duty of respon-
174 sibly constructing dialogues and knowledge according to truth and rigour. This
175 requires planners to be aware of the nature of the knowledge they use, how it relates
176 to the knowledge used by others, and the kind of ‘validity claims’ brought forward
177 (Healey and Gilroy 1990, 26). But there is an additional problem and one peculiar
178 to some undemocratic contexts. When individuals and/or groups are not substan-
179 tially recognised, there is no longer room for representation, as in the metaphorical

²Bobbio (1990), describing the increase in the number of the spheres of rights, highlights how now more than ever rights cannot be ascribed to an abstract category—the generic human being—but rather to different and peculiar categories—the specific human being—according to the characteristics and the privileges of the various social statuses. As status, e.g. family status, the status of the free citizen, the status of the legitimate child, etc. was in the past. Today citizenship is an instrument for the differentiation—and consequently the separation and the discrimination—of some subjects within the social body from others; hence, the status of citizenship is a privilege. This phenomenon is more evident in the urban dimension, especially if we consider the inability of the contemporary welfare-state to cope with ‘a more demanding citizenry, more conscious of our multiplicities’ (Healey 2012, 23).



180 figure of *homo sacer* used by Agamben (1998) in order to describe those cir-
181 cumstances when hegemonic power suspends the law with the intention of
182 excluding, depriving of rights and marginalising within the juridical order.

183 Agamben (1998) in his book *Homo Sacer: Sovereign and Bare Life* examines
184 the relation between the exception and its devastating consequence on human life,
185 which occurs under the guise of the law. He describes the status of *homo sacer* in
186 ancient Rome: persons that may be killed (without this act being considered
187 murder) but not sacrificed. Agamben uses the metaphorical figure of the *homo sacer*
188 in order to signal the existence outside the law, in terms of exclusion and deprivation of
189 rights. Agamben traces this history to theorise the continuous production of the
190 status of *homo sacer* in contemporary societies; although the *homo sacer* phe-
191 nomenon disappeared, it can be found nowadays when hegemonic power suspends
192 the law: this implicates exclusion and marginalisation within the juridical order.
193 The point that Agamben (1998) wanted to highlight is that those who are banned
194 from juridical considerations, are consequently the embodiment of the *homo sacer*;
195 Agamben also highlights that the ban (suspension of juridical order) allows bare life
196 to exist and to be maintained in contemporary society.

197 In such circumstances, conflicts can arise or just remain hidden, when, as in most
198 of our experiences, there is no moral shock, there is no room for representation,
199 'local voices' are disappearing, powerlessness is not contested by the powerless,
200 and protests are latent. It is not just a matter of imbalance of powers (Hillier 2002;
201 Hoch 1994), or of progressive and radical urban movements involved in resisting
202 the assaults on their life worlds and working for better living conditions (Routledge
203 2010). Rather, it is a matter of making conflicting positions clear and visible in
204 order to have the opportunity to deal with them. Whether on the side of collabo-
205 rative planning or of the agonist (Hillier 2003; Gunder 2003; Pløger 2004), what
206 about the contexts where conflicts are eluded, implicit or drained, i.e. devoid
207 of their oppositional power?

208 One solution can be to move towards a more diverse and often, less-formalised
209 governance activity, as suggested in the 'network governance' idea (Healey 2012),
210 though some pre-conditions are necessary:

- 211 1. The existence of the space of democracy, according to Arendt (2005), to have a
212 space in which to be allowed to talk and to be listened to, to enable and foster
213 those qualities that Healey (2012, 31) individuates as some of the essential
214 requirements for moving towards more people-centred governance and politics.³
- 215 2. The adoption of a normative perspective to make latent or hidden conflict as
216 visible and as publicly debated as possible, instead of just relying on merely
217 technical knowledge and expertise.

³Recognition of multiple identities; respect for different arguments, positions and feelings; 'in-
telligent' multi-sided discussion of issues-learning and reasoning in public; rich, responsive and
respectful interactions.



218 In a blatant or a hidden conflict situation of opposing interests, the role of values
219 is fundamental; we agree with Watson (2006, 44) that, ‘introducing questions of
220 value into deliberative processes is not necessarily contrary to a recognition of
221 multiple and conflicting rationalities’. It is not easy to bring the ‘irreconcilable’
222 opposition between different and divergent values back to a level of democratically
223 lawful and operationally possible discussion. The reference parameter can be found
224 in the ambit of rights and their acknowledgement, in their spatial declination and
225 how this translates into being ‘operational’: in other words, citizenship rights
226 (Lo Piccolo 2010; Lo Piccolo and Thomas 2001) in their substantially extensive
227 interpretation as described and explained by Kymlicka (1995) and Held (1987,
228 1989). This book, though investigating a specific urban phenomenon, gives some
229 insights into the predominant value of citizenship rights as a key issue in the effort
230 of moving from professional-technical knowledge to a socio-political and ethical
231 dimension of planning knowledge.

232 When considering the issues of citizenship and status, we should highlight the
233 political role that planning may have for minority groups and individuals, repre-
234 senting a potential political arena for them through the micro-practices of
235 democracy-in-action: ‘small struggles which hardly seem to make a difference may
236 sometimes, if built on in the flow of time, lead to major changes in political
237 cultures’ (Healey 2012, 20). The appropriation of spaces and the construction of
238 new uses for and practices in them, in ‘institutional’ or ‘insurgent’ forms, provide a
239 guarantee of the claims of those rights of citizenship that often are denied at the
240 political and/or juridical levels. Local actions of participation, formal or informal
241 practices of coexistence in urban space, as well as inclusionary planning initiatives,
242 become all-significant for a redefinition of the category of citizenship with respect
243 to the substantial changes (and plural articulation) of the social corpus in the
244 contemporary city (Lo Piccolo 2010). According to Healey (2012, 28), ‘this,
245 however, demands a changing ethos and practice from those working in the public
246 sector’.

247 The Habermasian (1981, 1989) substantive norm, which is at the base of Patsy
248 Healey’s work, sometimes fails not just because of the gap between its theory and
249 practice (Gunder 2003) or because it represents a restrictive model that does not
250 apply to most decision-making processes (Hillier 2003). In some cases, such as
251 those referred to in this book, it also fails due to the absence of a basic level of
252 access to citizenship rights that are the indispensable ingredients—as we would say,
253 pre-conditions—for Arendt’s (and hence Habermas’) space of democracy, which is
254 the physical and metaphorical arena where ‘reasoning in public’ practices can really
255 take place and flourish. According to Arendt (2005), the public space of democracy
256 can be defined as the ambit where all the discursive issues can show their
257 many-sidedness and people can freely show their own plurality by acting on and
258 expressing their plural opinions. Thus, the public space of democracy coincides
259 with the political space of freedom. The sense, but not the aim, of politics is the
260 freedom of plurality. Therefore, understanding a political situation means
261 acknowledging a large framework of different viewpoints and positions from which
262 the situation can be considered and judged.



263 We previously highlighted (Bonafede and Lo Piccolo 2010) the need for the
264 existence of political spaces where conflicts can take place fully and agreements
265 emerge through discursive and dialogic approaches, using some concepts as
266 developed by Arendt (1958, 2005). In this approach, a substantial precondition for
267 any form of ‘public reasoning’ is the existence of political spaces such as Arendt’s
268 idea of a discursive and active ‘infra-space’: the tangible space of the *agora* and the
269 metaphorical space of democracy. This exists among equal individuals freely
270 debating. Wherever this active and conversational freedom is lacking, a proper
271 political space does not exist (Arendt 2005). The case studies of this book
272 strengthen the above-mentioned assumption, being the rhetoric of fear an obstacle
273 to free and independent debates.

274 Accordingly, citizenship rights do not only represent a framework of reference
275 that is predominantly theoretical, or an abstract body of principles to which to
276 rhetorically appeal, but are a litmus of daily analyses/assessments (Zolo 1994),
277 debates, choices and deliberations that in our ambit of thought and intervention are
278 all specific, minute, practical and tangible. This commitment, however, assumes
279 recognition of an ethical dimension to the planning discipline that is neither obvious
280 nor automatic. Healey (2012, 28–29) suggests a changing ethos and practice from
281 those working within the public sectors, in the face of the current weaknesses of
282 elite democratic practices and the protests and/or challenges against the ‘tech-
283 nocrats’ as the source of authority.

284 The role of informal networks is consequently a major issue, but in which ways
285 do the formal and the informal levels cope or clash, even frequently, with the other,
286 especially in very latent conflicting and substantially undemocratic contexts?
287 According to Arendt (1958), without the existence of a common space—both
288 physical and metaphorical—initiatives fail or do not even take place. In planning
289 terms, without a common and sincere place of debate, there is no space that is also
290 efficacious for informal networks, because of the patronising attitude of the political
291 actors and the subjugated condition of all the other subjects. Also for this, fear is the
292 first threat to be fought, and this book offers a number of reasons and reflections for
293 achieving this goal.

294 Francesco Lo Piccolo
295 University of Palermo

296 References

- 297 Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life*. Stanford: Stanford University
298 Press.
299 Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
300 Arendt, H. (2005). *The promise of politics*. New York: Schocken Books.
301 Barbalet, J. M. (1988) *Citizenship. Rights, struggle and class inequality*. Milton Keynes: Open
302 University Press.
303 Bobbio, N. (1990). *L’età dei diritti*. Turin: Einaudi.



- 304 Bonafede, G., & Lo Piccolo, F. (2010). Participative planning processes in the absence of the
305 (public) space of democracy. *Planning Practice and Research*, 25(3), 353–375.
- 306 De Leo, D. (2011). Public sphere and illegal settlements: a case from the Naples metro-region. In:
307 M. Cremaschi & F. Ekardt (Eds.), *Changing places, urbanity, citizenship, and ideology in the*
308 *new European neighbourhoods* (pp. 199–220). Amsterdam: Teknè.
- 309 De Leo, D. (2013). Pianificazione e conflitti. *Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali*, 106, 103–111.
- 310 Friedmann, J. (1992). *Empowerment. The politics of alternative development*. Cambridge:
311 Blackwell.
- 312 Friedmann, J. (1999). Claiming rights: Citizenship and the spaces of democracy. *Plurimondi*, 1(2),
313 287–303.
- 314 Gunder, M. (2003). Passionate planning for the others' desire: an agonistic response to the dark
315 side of planning. *Progress in Planning*, 60(3), 235–319.
- 316 Habermas, J. (1981). *The theory of communicative action: Reason and the rationalization of*
317 *society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- 318 Habermas, J. (1989). *The theory of communicative action. Lifeworld and system: A critique of*
319 *functionalist reason*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- 320 Harvey, D. (2000). *Spaces of hope*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 321 Harvey, D. (2003). The right to the city. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*,
322 27(4), 939–941.
- 323 Healey, P. (2012). Re-enchanting democracy as a mode of governance. *Critical Policy Studies*,
324 6(1), 19–39.
- 325 Healey, P., & Gilroy, R. (1990). Towards a people-sensitive planning. *Planning Practice and*
326 *Research*, 5(2), 21–29.
- 327 Held, D. (1987). *Models of democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 328 Held, D. (1989). *Political theory and the modern state*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 329 Hillier, J. (2002). *Shadows of power. An allegory of prudence in land-use planning*. London:
330 Routledge.
- 331 Hillier, J. (2003). Agonizing over consensus: Why Habermasian ideals cannot be 'real'. *Planning*
332 *Theory*, 2(1), 37–59.
- 333 Hoch, C. (1994). *What planners do: Power, politics, and persuasion*. Chicago: Planners Press.
- 334 Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 335 Lefebvre, H. (1968). *Le droit à la ville*. Paris: Anthropos.
- 336 Lefebvre, H. (1974). *La production de l'espace*. Paris: Anthropos.
- 337 Lo Piccolo, F. (2010). The planning research agenda: plural cities, equity and rights of
338 citizenship. *Town Planning Review*, 81(6), i–vi.
- 339 Lo Piccolo, F., & Thomas, H. (2001). Legal discourse, the individual and the claim for equality in
340 British planning. *Planning Theory and Practice*, 2(2), 187–201.
- 341 Mitchell, D. (2003). *The right to the city. Social justice and the fight for public space*. New York:
342 The Guilford Press.
- 343 Pløger, J. (2004). Strife: Urban planning and agonism. *Planning Theory*, 3(1), 71–92.
- 344 Purcell, M. (2003). Citizenship and the right to the global city: Reimagining the capitalist world
345 order. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 27(3), 564–590.
- 346 Roche, M. (1992). *Rethinking citizenship. Welfare, ideology and change in modern society*.
347 Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 348 Routledge, P. (2010). Introduction: Cities, justice and conflict. *Urban Studies*, 47(6), 1165–1177.
- 349 Watson, V. (2006). Deep difference: Diversity, planning and ethics'. *Planning Theory*, 5(1),
350 31–50.
- 351 Yiftachel, O. (1998). Planning and social control: Exploring the 'dark side'. *Journal of Planning*
352 *Literature*, 12(2), 395–406.
- 353 Zolo, D. (1994). La strategia della cittadinanza. In D. Zolo (Ed.), *La cittadinanza. Appartenenza,*
354 *identità, diritti* (pp. 3–46). Roma: Laterza.